



BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

Arizona Corporation Commission

DOCKETED

FEB 05 2004

COMMISSIONERS

MARC SPITZER, Chairman
WILLIAM A. MUNDELL
JEFF HATCH-MILLER
MIKE GLEASON
KRISTIN K. MAYES

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In the matter of)

CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC.)
(formerly known as Salomon Smith Barney)
Inc.))
388 Greenwich Street)
New York, New York 10013,)
CRD# 7059)

DOCKET NO. S-03538A-03-0000

DECISION NO. 66768

Respondents.)

ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST, ORDER
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AND
CONSENT TO SAME
BY: CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC.

WHEREAS, Salomon Smith Barney Inc. ("SSB")¹ now known as Citigroup Global is a broker-dealer registered in the state of Arizona; and

WHEREAS, an investigation into the practices, procedures and conduct of SSB respecting: (a) the preparation and issuance by SSB's U.S. equity research analysts ("Research Analysts") of research, analysis, ratings, recommendations and communications concerning common stocks of publicly traded companies covered by such analysts ("Research Coverage"), during the period 1999 through June 2002, including without limitation, commencement and discontinuance of Research Coverage, actual or potential conflicts of interests affecting Research Coverage, Research Analysts or termination of Research Analysts, and misleading statements, opinions, representations or non-disclosure of material facts in Research Coverage; (b) the allocation by SSB and its

¹ On or about April 7, 2003, SSB changed its name to Citigroup Global Markets Inc. ("Citigroup Global"). The U.S. Equity Research of SSB continues as part of Citigroup Global. Since the matters which were the subject of the Investigations occurred prior to the name change, the Findings of Fact herein generally refer to SSB.

predecessor Salomon Brothers, Inc. of stock from initial public offerings that traded at a premium in the secondary market when trading in the secondary market begins and spinning by SSB (i.e., allocating such offerings as preferential treatment to officers and directors of companies having or potentially having investment banking business with SSB), during the period 1996 through 2001 ("IPO Allocations") and; (c) any other conduct referred to in the Findings of Fact set forth below in paragraphs 3 through 153 has been conducted by a multi-state task force (the "Investigation").

WHEREAS, the Investigation was conducted in connection with a joint task force of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York Stock Exchange, and the National Association of Securities Dealers (together, with the multi-state task force referred to above, the "regulators"); and

WHEREAS, SSB has cooperated with regulators conducting the investigations by responding to inquiries, providing documentary evidence and other materials, and providing regulators with access to facts relating to the Investigation; and

WHEREAS, Citigroup Global has advised regulators of its agreement to resolve the Investigation; and

WHEREAS, Citigroup Global agrees to implement certain changes with respect to research and stock allocation practices, and to make certain payments; and

WHEREAS, Citigroup Global elects to permanently waive any right to a hearing and appeal under Articles 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of Arizona, A.R.S. §44-1801 *et seq.* ("Securities Act") and Title 14 of the Arizona Administrative Code with respect to this Order To Cease and Desist and Order for Administrative Penalties ("Order"); neither admits nor denies the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Order, and consents to the entry of this Order by the Commission.

NOW, THEREFORE, the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission") hereby enters this Order:

I.

FINDINGS OF FACT**A. Summary and Jurisdiction**

1. Citigroup Global is, and under its former name SSB was, at all relevant times, a registered broker-dealer with its principal place of business located at 388 Greenwich Street, New York, New York 10013. SSB has engaged and Citigroup Global continues to be engaged, in a full-service securities business, including institutional and retail sales, investment banking services, trading and research.
2. The Commission has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article XV of the Arizona Constitution and the Securities Act.
3. In 1999, 2000, and 2001 (the "relevant period"), as described below, SSB issued research reports on two telecommunications ("telecom") companies that were fraudulent and issued research reports on several telecom companies that were misleading.

- 1 4. During the relevant period, SSB employed business practices that required research analysts
2 to promote SSB's investment banking efforts. Research alone did not generate substantial
3 profits for SSB; investment banking did, and it needed the services of research analysts to
4 do so. Research analysts were expected to vet prospective investment banking deals,
5 promote SSB's investment banking business to issuers during pitches, and market
6 investment banking deals to SSB's customers. When SSB secured investment banking
7 business, research analysts were expected to provide favorable coverage of SSB's
8 investment banking clients. Important factors in evaluating an analyst's performance and
9 determining an analyst's compensation at SSB were investment banker evaluations and
10 investment banking revenues generated in an analyst's sector. These business practices
11 created a culture in which investment bankers could and did pressure research analysts to
12 maintain coverage or favorable ratings for investment banking clients and created the
13 incentive for analysts to use research to obtain, retain and increase revenue from investment
14 banking deals. SSB failed to manage the conflicts created by its practices.
- 15 5. Jack Grubman was the linchpin for SSB's investment banking efforts in the telecom sector.
16 He was the preeminent telecom analyst in the industry, and telecom was of critical
17 importance to SSB. His approval and favorable view were important for SSB to obtain
18 investment banking business from telecom companies in his sector. In total, SSB earned
19 more than \$790 million in investment banking revenue during the relevant period from
20 telecom companies Grubman covered. Given Grubman's key role in SSB's investment
21 banking success in the telecom sector, SSB compensated him handsomely. During the
22 relevant period, Grubman was one of the most highly paid research analysts at SSB and on
23 Wall Street. Between 1999 and August 2002, when he left the firm, Grubman's total
24 compensation exceeded \$67.5 million, including his multi-million dollar severance
25 package.
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- 1 6. During the relevant period, SSB and Grubman published fraudulent research reports on
2 Focal Communications and Metromedia Fiber Networks, as set forth below. These reports
3 were contrary to the true views Grubman and another analyst on his team privately
4 expressed, presented an optimistic picture that overlooked and minimized the risk of
5 investing in these companies, predicted substantial growth in the companies' revenues and
6 earnings without a reasonable basis, did not disclose material facts about these companies,
7 and contained material misstatements about the companies.
- 8 7. Moreover, SSB and Grubman also published certain research reports that were misleading.
9 In April 2001, Grubman expressed a need to downgrade six telecom companies (Level 3
10 Communications, Williams Communications Group, XO Communications, Focal, Adelphia
11 Business Solutions, and RCN Communications). Investment bankers pressured Grubman
12 not to downgrade these companies and Grubman did not. He continued to advise investors
13 to buy these stocks, and did not disclose the influence of investment bankers on his ratings.
14 In addition, a research report on Williams Communications lacked a reasonable basis
15 because it did not disclose the true views Grubman and others on his team privately
16 expressed at the same time about the company and certain research reports on Focal failed
17 to disclose facts as described below.
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- 1 8. In November 1999, Grubman upgraded AT&T from a Neutral (3) – his longtime rating on
2 the stock -- to a Buy (1). SSB and Grubman did not disclose in the report that Grubman
3 had a conflict of interest relating to his evaluation of AT&T. Prior to the upgrade, Sanford
4 I. Weill (“Weill”), the co-CEO and Chairman of Citigroup (and a member of the AT&T
5 board of directors), had asked Grubman to take a “fresh look” at AT&T, and Grubman had
6 asked Weill for assistance in gaining admission for his children to the selective 92nd Street
7 Y preschool in New York City at the same time Grubman was conducting his “fresh look”
8 at the company. Subsequently, Grubman stated privately that he had upgraded AT&T to
9 help his children get into the 92nd Street Y preschool. After Grubman upgraded AT&T and
10 his children were admitted to the preschool, Weill arranged a pledge of \$1 million payable
11 in equal amounts over five years from Citigroup to the 92nd Street Y.
- 12 9. Grubman’s upgrade of AT&T also helped SSB gain investment banking business from
13 AT&T. In late fall 1999, AT&T determined to make an initial public offering (“IPO”) of a
14 tracking stock for its wireless unit – the largest equity offering in the United States. In
15 February 2000, AT&T named SSB as one of the lead underwriters and joint book-runners
16 for the IPO, in large part because of Grubman’s “strong buy” rating of, and “strong
17 support” for, AT&T. SSB earned \$63 million in investment banking fees from this
18 engagement.
- 19 10. During the period 1996 through 2000, SSB engaged in improper spinning practices by
20 allocating hot IPO shares² to executives of current or potential investment banking clients
21 and providing special treatment for these executives. The executives profited significantly
22 from selling IPO stock allocated to them. The investment banking business generated by
23 the firms for which these executives worked represented a substantial portion of SSB’s
24 revenues during this period.

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26 ² A “hot IPO” is one that trades at a premium in the secondary market whenever trading in the
secondary market begins.

1 11. Additionally, SSB failed to maintain books and records sufficient to determine whether or
2 not the distribution of IPO shares had been completed prior to the initiation of secondary
3 market trading. Further, SSB failed to administer Issuer Directed Share Programs
4 appropriately and failed to establish and maintain written supervisory procedures for the
5 appropriate management of such programs.

6 **B. SSB Failed to Manage Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking**

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8 12. SSB's business practices intertwined research with investment banking, thus creating the
9 vehicle for investment banking to exert inappropriate influence over research analysts.
10 SSB failed to manage the resulting conflicts of interest in an adequate or appropriate
11 manner.

12 **1. SSB's Business Practices Required Research Analysts to Support Investment**
13 **Bankers**

14 13. Companies paid SSB's investment bankers to assist them with (a) capital raising activities
15 such as IPOs, "follow on" offerings (subsequent offerings of stock to the public), and
16 private placements of stock, and (b) other corporate transactions, such as mergers and
17 acquisitions. During the relevant period, investment banking was an important source of
18 revenue for SSB; revenues from investment banking grew from approximately \$3.0
19 billion in 1999, to approximately \$3.6 billion in 2000, and to approximately \$3.9 billion in
20 2001. Investment banking fees comprised over 21% of SSB's revenue in 1999, over 22%
21 in 2000, and over 25% in 2001.

22 14. SSB's equity research analysts provided SSB's investing clients and the public with
23 research reports on certain public companies. SSB held out its research analysts as
24 providing independent, objective and unbiased information, reports, ratings, and
25 recommendations upon which investors could rely in reaching investment decisions. SSB
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1 distributed its analysts' reports to its clients directly and by placing the reports on its
2 website.

3 15. At SSB, research was a cost center. In contrast, investment banking generated substantial
4 profits for SSB. To leverage its research, SSB required research analysts to serve, among
5 others, investment banking. Accordingly,

- 6 • SSB expected research analysts to prepare business plans each year that, among
7 other things, highlighted what the research analysts had done and would do to help
8 SSB's investment bankers;
- 9 • SSB's research analysts were encouraged to develop investment banking business
10 from issuers and private companies in their sectors;
- 11 • SSB's research analysts were expected to support investment banking by pitching
12 business to prospective clients and marketing investment banking deals to
13 institutional customers through roadshows;
- 14 • Investment banking concerns sometimes affected research analysts' decisions to
15 initiate coverage, rate companies, and drop coverage. SSB's research analysts were
16 generally expected to initiate coverage of SSB's investment banking clients with
17 favorable ratings;
- 18 • Investment bankers reviewed the performance of the principal research analysts in
19 their sector as part of the analysts' annual review; and
- 20 • Investment banking revenue generated in an analyst's sector and attributable to an
21 analyst was an important factor SSB used to evaluate an analyst's performance and
22 determine an analyst's compensation.

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24 16. This integration of research analysts with investment banking was an SSB objective. In a
25 January 1998 presentation to senior management at Travelers Corporation, then the parent
26 of SSB, the head of SSB wrote: "There is a continuing shift in the realization that an

analyst is the key element in banking success.” Underscoring the same theme two years later, on December 8, 2000, the head of SSB’s Global Equity Research wrote to the CEO of SSB that one of his goals since becoming global head of research was “to better integrate our research product with the business development plans of our constituencies, particularly investment banking”

17. In reviewing his performance for 2000, the head of SSB’s Global Equity Research stated:
We have become much more closely linked to investment banking this year as a result of participating in their much-improved franchise review process this year. There has been a yearend [sic] cross review of senior analysts and bankers particularly in the U.S. and Europe and with the development of the Platinum Program in the investment bank, the analyst’s understanding of the relative importance of clients for IB [investment banking] and GRB [global relationship bank] is much improved.
18. In January 2000, SSB held a “Best Practices Seminar” for research analysts that was hosted by the head of U.S. Equity Research Management. At that seminar, a senior member of Research Management stated:

[W]hen you look at the market share gap between us and the three competitors who are trying to close. When I just eyeballed it, it looked like to me there is something like roughly a billion dollars of, maybe not Equity Capital Markets but Investment Banking revenues, on the table for this firm. And that’s a lot of money.
And its clear...that Research is driving a lot of this increasingly. And therefore, as a [research] department our goal has to be, to be a really effective partner in terms of helping drive initiation, execution and everything else. Because there is a lot of money on the table for this company. And we’ll all benefit from it.

2. SSB Analysts Helped Investment Bankers Identify and Obtain Business

19. Research analysts at SSB helped investment banking by identifying prospective clients and mandates and by participating in sales “pitches” for investment banking business. SSB

1 bankers would not pitch for investment banking business unless they knew the SSB analyst
2 who would cover the company was going to support the proposed deal.

3 20. SSB's pitchbooks to potential investment banking clients routinely highlighted the
4 experience and qualifications of the lead analyst in the company's sector and how the
5 analyst would help market the proposed deal. During the "pitch" process, SSB conveyed
6 that its research analysts would cover the company if the company gave it investment
7 banking business, and analysts frequently attended the "pitch" sessions. Once a company
8 selected SSB as the underwriter, SSB analysts worked together with investment bankers to
9 (among other things) perform due diligence on the deal and take the company executives
10 out on "roadshows" to market the potential transaction to institutional investors.

11 21. During the relevant period, all parties involved – the analyst, the firm, and the issuer –
12 understood that the analyst would initiate coverage of the company if SSB was given
13 investment banking business and would initially rate the company favorably.

14 **3. SSB's Research Analysts Supported Investment Banking Through Their Ratings**
15 **and Coverage**

16 22. SSB encouraged analysts to support SSB's investment banking business through their
17 ratings. Each research report SSB issued included an investment rating that purportedly
18 reflected the analyst's objective opinion of the relative attractiveness of the company to the
19 investors.

20 23. During the relevant time period, SSB advised its customers that it utilized the following
21 five-point investment rating system:

22 1 - Buy

23 2 - Outperform

24 3 - Neutral

25 4 - Underperform
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1 5 - Sell
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3 24. In addition, SSB during the relevant period included in each research report a risk rating of
4 L (low risk), M (moderate risk), H (high risk), S (Speculative), or V (Venture). Each of the
5 research reports and call notes discussed below, other than those on AT&T, rated the
6 company S (Speculative).

7 25. In practice during the relevant period, SSB's research analysts rarely rated companies a 4
8 (Underperform) and never a 5 (Sell) in part to avoid antagonizing issuers in a way that
9 would harm SSB's investment banking business. As a Director who provided Research
10 Management Support stated in a March 30, 2001 e-mail:

11 [W]e in U.S. Research currently have no "4" (Underperform) or "5" (Sell)
12 ratings. We use neutral rating as a statement that we are not at all
13 enthusiastic about a stock. That effectively conveys the message that
14 customers should not be in the stock. If we were to use 4 or 5 ratings that
15 approach would be perceived as highly antagonistic to buy side accounts . . .
16 [and] company management teams.

17 26. In a later e-mail, the same person suggested that the common terms SSB used to rate
18 stocks did not mean what they said: "various people in research and media relations are
19 very easy targets for irate phone calls from clients, reporters, etc. who make a very literal
20 reading of the rating [I]f someone wants to read the ratings system for exactly what it
21 says they have a perfect right to do that."

22 27. The head of SSB's Global Equity Research raised the issue of research integrity directly
23 with the head of SSB in a memorandum entitled "2000 Performance Review," when he
24 expressed a "legitimate concern about the objectivity of our analysts which we must allay
25 in 2001." The head of Global Equity Research also addressed the nature of the research
26 ratings at an SSB equities management meeting. He made a presentation regarding the
 SSB "Stock Recommendations as of 1/29/01," which showed that, out of a total of 1179

1 stock ratings, there were no Sell ratings and only one Underperform rating. In
2 handwritten notes attached to this presentation, he described these ratings in the U.S. as
3 the "worst" and "ridiculous on face." He observed that there was a "rising issue of
4 research integrity" and a "basic inherent conflict between IB [investment banking],
5 equities and retail." In a February 22, 2001 memo, the head of Global Equity Research
6 told the managing directors in the U.S. equity research division that the global head of
7 SSB's private client (i.e., retail) division said SSB's "research was basically worthless"
8 and threatened to terminate his division's contribution to the research budget.

- 9 28. SSB did not change its rating system, however, and the de facto three-category rating
10 system remained in place throughout 2001. As of the end of 2001, SSB covered over
11 1000 U.S. stocks but had no Sell ratings and only 15 Underperform ratings (1.4%).
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13 **4. Investment Banking Influenced SSB's Evaluation and Compensation of Research**
14 **Analysts**

- 15 29. SSB established a compensation structure that linked research analysts with investment
16 banking. Research analysts were requested to draft business plans that discussed, among
17 other things, their steps to support investment banking business in the past year and their
18 plans to support investment banking in the upcoming year.
- 19 30. In addition, investment bankers among others evaluated the performance of research
20 analysts. Bonuses for research analysts – comprising most of their compensation – were
21 tied to several factors, one of the most important of which was the investment banking
22 revenue SSB attributed to the research analyst.
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25 **C. Grubman Supported SSB's Investment Banking Business in the Telecom Sector**
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1 31. During the relevant period, Grubman was one of the most prominent analysts on Wall
2 Street. He was a Managing Director of SSB, and the preeminent research analyst at SSB.
3 He managed a team of analysts who issued research reports ("Reports") and call notes
4 ("Notes") on telecom companies. Grubman was principally responsible for each Report
5 and Note SSB issued on these companies.

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7 **1. Grubman Helped Obtain Investment Banking Clients for SSB**

8 32. Grubman helped to obtain and maintain business for SSB's investment bankers from
9 telecom companies in his sector. Grubman also vetted proposed transactions involving
10 telecom companies and vetoed those he could not view favorably. Once he determined he
11 could support a proposed transaction, he and other telecom analysts who reported to him
12 often participated in pitching the potential client to award SSB investment banking
13 business and in roadshows that marketed offerings to investors.

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15 **2. Grubman's Ratings Assisted SSB's Investment Banking Business**

16 33. During the relevant period, SSB was the lead underwriter on 6 IPOs for telecom
17 companies. For each company, Grubman initiated coverage with a 1 (Buy)
18 recommendation. In virtually every instance, Grubman also issued favorable research
19 reports on telecom companies for which SSB acted as lead or co-manager of a secondary
20 offering of equity stock offering. In fact, Grubman and his group, with only one
21 exception, did not rate a stock a 4 during the relevant period and never rated a stock a 5.
22 Rather, he and the research personnel who reported to him would drop coverage
23 altogether rather than rate a stock at less than a Neutral.

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26 **3. Grubman Helped Generate Substantial Revenue for SSB's Investment Banking
Department and Was Highly Compensated**

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34. Grubman's efforts contributed to the telecom sector generating substantial investment banking revenue for SSB. During the relevant period, as reflected in documents prepared in connection with Grubman's evaluation and compensation, SSB earned more than \$790 million in total gross investment banking fees from telecom companies covered by Grubman: approximately \$359 million in 1999, \$331 million in 2000, and \$101 million in 2001.
35. Grubman was well paid for his efforts. During the relevant period, he was one of the most highly compensated research analysts at SSB. His total compensation (including deferred compensation) from 1999-2001 exceeded \$48 million: over \$22 million in 1999, over \$20.2 million in 2000, and over \$6.5 million in 2001. In light of the importance investment banking played in SSB's annual evaluations, Grubman and two of his assistants in their 2001 performance evaluation highlighted the investment banking deals for which they had been responsible.
36. As was true of other research analysts, Grubman was evaluated by investment bankers, institutional sales, and retail sales. Grubman received high scores and evaluations from investment bankers in 2000 and 2001 that reflected his importance to investment banking. Investment bankers rated analysts on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). For 2000, Grubman received a 5 rating overall from investment bankers, who ranked him first among all analysts. His ratings and rankings in specific investment banking categories, such as pre-marketing, marketing, and follow-up were also at the top levels. For 2001, Grubman's average score (the only score presented that year) from investment bankers was 4.382, ranking him 23rd among the 98 analysts reviewed.
37. SSB's institutional sales force rated Grubman 16th out of 113 analysts in 2000 and 46th out of 115 analysts in 2001.

1 38. Retail brokers ranked analysts on a scale from -1 (lowest) to 2 (highest). For 1999, the
2 retail sales force gave Grubman an average score of 1.59, ranking him 4th out of 159
3 analysts evaluated. In contrast, for 2000 and 2001, Grubman's evaluations from retail
4 were dramatically lower and well below his scores from investment bankers and the
5 institutional sales force in both years. In 2000, retail ranked Grubman last among all
6 analysts with a score of -0.64. The same was true for 2001 -- the retail force ranked
7 Grubman last among all analysts reviewed, and his score fell to -0.906.

8 39. Moreover, Grubman received scathing written evaluations from the retail sales force in
9 2000 and 2001. Hundreds of retail sales people sent negative written evaluations of
10 Grubman in both years.

- 11 • Many claimed Grubman had a conflict of interest between his role as an analyst and his
12 role assisting investment banking:
 - 13 o "poster child for conspicuous conflicts of interest";
 - 14 o "I hope Smith Barney enjoyed the investment banking fees he generated,
 - 15 because they come at the expense of the retail clients";
 - 16 o "Let him be a banker, not a research analyst";
 - 17 o "His opinions are completely tainted by 'investment banking' relationships
 - 18 (padding his business)";
 - 19 o "Investment banker, or research analyst? He should be fired";
 - 20 o "Grubman has made a fortune for himself personally and for the investment
 - 21 banking division. However, his investment recommendations have
 - 22 impoverished the portfolio of my clients and I have had to spend endless hours
 - 23 with my clients discussing the losses Grubman has caused them."
- 24 • Many criticized his support of companies that were SSB investment banking clients:
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- o “Grubman’s analysis and recommendations to buy (1 Ranking) WCOM [Worldcom], GX [Global Crossing], Q [Qwest] is/was careless”;
- o “His ridiculously bullish calls on WCOM and GX cost our clients a lot of money”;
- o “How can an analyst be so wrong and still keep his job? RTHM [Rhythm NetConnections], WCOM, etc., etc.”;
- o “Downgrading a stock at \$1/sh is useless to us.”;
- o “How many bombs do we tolerate before we totally lose credibility with clients?”

40. The evaluations and comments from retail did not appear to affect Grubman. In a January 2001 e-mail, he stated:

I never much worry about review. For example, this year I was rated last by retail (actually had a negative score) thanks to T [AT&T] and carnage in new names. As the global head of research was haranguing me about this I asked him if he thought Sandy [Weill] liked \$300 million in trading commission and \$400 million (only my direct credit not counting things like NTT [Nippon Telecom] or KPN [KPN Qwest] our total telecom was over \$600 million) in banking revenues. So, grin and bear it. . . .

41. When Grubman left SSB in August 2002, he signed a separation agreement that included compensation worth approximately \$19.5 million plus approximately \$13 million in deferred compensation previously accrued in 1999, 2000, and 2001.

D. Investment Bankers Successfully Pressured Grubman to Maintain Positive Ratings on Stocks

42. Investment bankers pressured Grubman to maintain positive ratings on companies in part to avoid angering the covered companies and causing them to take their investment banking business elsewhere.

43. On April 18, 2001, one of the companies Grubman covered, Winstar Communications, Inc. (a Competitive Local Exchange Carrier or CLEC), declared bankruptcy. In the

1 aftermath of the Winstar bankruptcy, an SSB investment banker suggested that SSB's
2 telecom investment bankers and research analysts have a conference call followed by a
3 meeting to consider the prospects of other CLECs and similar telecom companies.
4 Grubman agreed, but made clear that the Winstar bankruptcy had convinced him of the
5 need to downgrade other CLECs and telecom companies, all of which he rated a Buy (1)
6 at the time:

7 Also to be blunt we in research have to downgrade stocks lest our
8 retail force (which Sandy cares about a lot which I know to [sic]
9 well) end up having buy rated stocks that go under. So part of this
10 call will be our view that LVLTL [Level 3], WCG [Williams
11 Communication Group], XOXO [XO Communications], FCOM
[Focal], ABIZ [Adelphia Business Solutions], RCN [RCN
Communications] must not remain buys.

12 44. Thereafter, the then-head of investment banking for SSB and the head of telecom
13 investment banking called Grubman separately. The head of investment banking told him
14 not to downgrade the stocks because doing so would anger these companies and hurt
15 SSB's investment banking business. The head of telecom investment banking told him
16 that they should discuss his proposed downgrades because some of the names were more
17 sensitive than others. SSB and Grubman did not downgrade these stocks until months
18 thereafter, continued to advise investors to buy these stocks and, in the weeks and months
19 following, merely lowered the target prices for each of these companies.

20 45. Grubman acknowledged that investment banking influenced his publicly expressed views
21 about the companies he covered. He stated in a May 2001 e-mail to an analyst who
22 reported to him:

23 . . . If anything the record shows we support our banking clients too
24 well and for too long.

25 46. The analyst agreed and stated that Grubman had helped SSB's investment banking
26 business by using his influence to sell securities for questionable companies:

1 . . . I told [an investment banker] that you get the good and the bad
2 with you [Grubman] and to look at all the bad deals we sold for them
3 in the past. He agreed.

- 4 47. On May 31, 2001, Merrill Lynch downgraded XO, one of the stocks Grubman had wanted
5 to downgrade in April. Merrill's actions caused Grubman to consider again whether he
6 should have downgraded XO:

7 Another one. *I hope we were not wrong in not downgrading. Try to*
8 *talk to folks to see what they think of these downgrades. Maybe we*
9 *should have done like I wanted to. Now it's too late. (Emphasis*
10 *added.)*

- 11 48. A research analyst who reported to Grubman responded to this e-mail by reiterating a
12 negative view of XO and Level 3:

13 . . . XOXO is a lost cause, its [sic] never too late to do the call, we
14 could downgrade XO, LVLTL, etc.

- 15 49. Later the same day, the same analyst e-mailed Grubman, warning him that an institutional
16 investor thought downgrading XO would:

17 definitely get the Lame-O award on CNBC & wouldn't help anyone
18 out, it would just call attention to our negligence on not downgrading
19 sooner.

- 20 50. A few weeks later, Grubman was invited to a dinner with the head of U.S. Equity
21 Research and two senior investment bankers. Grubman anticipated discussing banking's
22 displeasure with his commentary on telecom stocks. Grubman e-mailed one of his
23 research colleagues:

24 . . . I have dinner with [a senior investment banker and the head of
25 U.S. Equity Research] I bet to discuss banking's displeasure with our
26 commentary on some names. *Screw [the investment bankers]. We*
should have put a Sell on everything a year ago. (Emphasis added.)

51. The next day, Grubman e-mailed the head of U.S. Equity Research, stating that the
pressure from investment banking had caused him not to downgrade stocks he covered:

See you at dinner. If [a senior investment banker] starts up I will
lace into him. . . . most of our banking clients are going to zero and

1 you know I wanted to downgrade them months ago but got huge
2 pushback from banking.

- 3 52. SSB and Grubman maintained Buy ratings on Level 3, WCG, XO, RCN, Adelphia, and
4 Focal for months after April 2001. SSB and Grubman did not downgrade Level 3 until
5 June 18, 2001; RCN until August 2, 2001; Focal and Adelphia until August 13, 2001; and
6 WCG and XO until November 1, 2001. In each instance, SSB downgraded these stocks to
7 a 3 (Neutral). None of the Notes published between April 18 and the date of each
8 downgrade disclosed the pressure investment bankers had exerted on Grubman and
9 Grubman's yielding to such pressure. These Notes were inconsistent with the
10 views Grubman had expressed, as reflected in the emails above, concerning these stocks.

11 **E. SSB and Grubman Published Fraudulent Research That Promoted Focal
12 Communications and Metromedia Fiber, Two of SSB's Investment Banking Clients**

- 13 53. SSB and Grubman published certain fraudulent research reports on Focal
14 Communications and Metromedia Fiber, two investment banking clients of SSB. As
15 described below, certain research reports on these companies were contrary to Grubman's
16 private views and those of his team. Moreover, certain research reports on these two
17 companies presented an optimistic picture that overlooked or minimized the risk of
18 investing in these companies and predicted substantial growth in the companies' revenues
19 and earnings without a reasonable basis.

20 **1. SSB and Grubman Published Fraudulent Research Reports on Focal**

- 21 54. Focal was a CLEC – a broadband telecommunications provider of limited reach. As of
22 December 31, 1999 it operated in 16 locations nationwide and as of December 31, 2000 it
23 operated in 20 locations nationwide. Focal was never profitable. Focal's net loss was
24 approximately \$500,000 in 1996, \$3 million in 1997, \$8 million in 1998, \$22 million in
25 1999, and \$105 million in 2000.

- 1 55. Focal was an investment banking client for SSB. SSB underwrote Focal's initial public
2 offering in July 1999. It also assisted the company in other investment banking
3 transactions. In total, SSB earned approximately \$11.8 million in investment banking fees
4 from Focal.
- 5 56. Shortly after SSB underwrote Focal's initial public offering, it initiated coverage with a
6 Buy (1) rating and maintained that rating until August 12, 2001. Grubman was
7 responsible for SSB's Reports and Notes on the company.
- 8 57. SSB and Grubman published two Notes on Focal that were fraudulent – one issued on
9 February 21, 2001 and one issued on April 30, 2001. The February 21 Note "reiterated" a
10 Buy recommendation. It left the target price unchanged from \$30 (approximately twice
11 the stock price of \$15.50). The Note reported overall results that were "in line" with
12 expectations, and a revenue mix that "continues to improve." It also reported that Focal
13 "continues to gain a stronger foothold in the large business market and continues to grow
14 sales of existing customers with existing and new products and also into multiple
15 markets." The February 21 Note reported EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes,
16 depreciation, and amortization) that improved over the previous quarter and was in line
17 with estimates; it advised investors that Focal expected to be EBITDA breakeven
18 sometime in 2001. Finally, the Note thought the company could continue to perform well
19 and grow and, if it did, the target price and estimates would be increased:

20 The quarter's results were in line with our expectations. The revenue
21 and line mix is improving but the fact remains that FCOM still has
22 exposure to recip comp and exposure to ISPs, which are areas of
23 concern for investors. While FCOM is collecting recip comp and is
24 good at reviewing its customer credit profiles with ISPs, which are
25 areas of concern for investors, we believe it is prudent to see a few
26 more quarters of good execution and growth before we change
numbers. We continue to remain prudent and thus, we don't think
we should raise our price target to above \$30 when the stock is only
trading at \$15. But, as we stated in our 3Q note, if [Focal]
management continues to execute and also delivers on its data

1 strategy, we believe this will be reflected in its stock price, and thus,
2 we will be in a better position to raise numbers.

- 3 58. The same day as the February 21 Note, however, Grubman stated that he believed Focal
4 should be rated an Underperform (4) rather than a Buy(1), that "every single smart
5 buysider" believed its stock price was going to zero, and that the company was a "pig."
6 Focal apparently complained about the February 21 Note. When Grubman heard of the
7 complaint, he e-mailed two investment bankers:

8 I hear company complained about our note. I did too. I screamed at
9 [the analyst] for saying "reiterate buy." If I so much as hear one
10 more fucking peep out of them we will put the proper rating (ie 4 not
11 even 3) on this stock which every single smart buysider feels is going
12 to zero. We lose credibility on MCLD and XO because we support
13 pigs like Focal.

- 14 59. Also on February 21, an institutional investor e-mailed a research analyst who worked for
15 Grubman, "Mcld [McLeod USA, Inc.] and Focal are pigs aren't they?" and asked whether
16 Focal was "a short." The analyst responded to the e-mail: "Focal definitely"
17 60. Grubman continued to express his true view of Focal in a subsequent communication. As
18 described in Section D above, he stated on April 18, 2001 that the company needed to be
19 downgraded in the aftermath of the Winstar bankruptcy.
20 61. Contrary to these negative views of Grubman and his colleague, the April 30 Note on
21 Focal again advised investors to buy Focal. By April 30, the stock price had fallen to
22 \$6.48. Although the April 30 Note lowered the target price to \$15, calling the previous
23 target price of \$30 "stale," the new target price was still more than twice the stock price.
24 The April 30 Note stated that the company had reported quarterly results in line with
25 estimates, repeated that Focal's "revenue mix is improving towards telecom," and noted
26 the "line mix" continued to improve.
62. Neither the February 21 Note nor the April 30 Note disclosed the actual views of
Grubman and his colleague about Focal. Indeed, both Notes contradicted such views.
Neither Note described the company as a "pig" or a "short," disclosed that "smart

buysiders" were predicting that Focal's stock price was going to zero, or indicated that the proper rating for Focal was an Underperform (4). The February 21 Note and the April 30 Note did not provide any other reason the stock should be downgraded. To the contrary, both Notes advised investors to buy the stock, predicted that the company's stock price could at least double over the next 12 to 18 months, and indicated that the company's numbers were "in line" and in some respects improving. Accordingly, the Notes issued on February 21, 2001 and April 30, 2001 were fraudulent.

2. SSB and Grubman Issued Fraudulent Research Reports on Metromedia Fiber

63. Metromedia Fiber built and operated fiber optic systems nationally and in Europe. It intended to provide telecom services to CLECs and large telecom companies, cable companies, internet service providers, and Fortune 500 companies in large metropolitan areas. As of the end of 2000, Metromedia Fiber was increasingly unprofitable, spent substantial amounts of cash to construct its fiber optic systems and required even more capital to complete its planned network.
64. Metromedia Fiber was an investment banking client for SSB. SSB underwrote Metromedia Fiber's IPO in 1997 and a secondary offering in November 1999. In addition, SSB engaged in other investment banking transactions for the company. In total, SSB earned approximately \$49 million in investment banking fees in Metromedia Fiber deals. After Metromedia Fiber's IPO, SSB and Grubman initiated coverage of the company with a Buy (1) rating and maintained that rating until July 25, 2001.
65. In 2001, the company entered into an agreement with Citicorp USA, Inc. (an SSB affiliate) to provide it with a credit facility that it needed to fund its operations. The deadline for closing on the facility was extended twice and, in the end, the facility was completed for less than half its full amount. The Notes on Metromedia Fiber issued

1 between April 2001 and July 2001 did not adequately disclose the red flags concerning the
2 credit facility or Grubman's view that the company might not get the funding. Moreover,
3 in June 2001, a research analyst working for Grubman told him that while the company
4 had funds through the end of 2001, thereafter the company's fundamentals would
5 deteriorate. This contradicted the ratings and price targets SSB and Grubman published
6 on the stock in a Note dated June 28, 2001. For these reasons, the Notes dated April 30,
7 2001, June 6, 2001, and June 28, 2001 were fraudulent and misleading.

8 66. Metromedia Fiber announced on January 8, 2001 that it had "obtained a commitment for a
9 fully underwritten credit facility for \$350 million from Citicorp USA, Inc., which it
10 expects will fully fund its current business plan of building 3.6 million fiber miles . . . by
11 the end of 2004."

12 67. As of March 2001, Metromedia Fiber faced a risk of not obtaining financing for its
13 operations, had sufficient funds for its operations through the end of 2001, and may not
14 have had sources for additional capital to finance its operations after the end of 2001. In
15 particular, the company stated at the time that it may not be able to close on the pending
16 \$350 million credit facility from Citicorp USA.

17 68. In an April 18, 2001 e-mail to a senior investment banker, Grubman indicated he was
18 aware that Metromedia Fiber might not close the credit facility and would downgrade the
19 company should it not obtain the additional funding: "If MFNX [Metromedia Fiber] does
20 not get credit facility they too get downgraded [from a buy]."

21 69. Nevertheless, on April 30, 2001, SSB and Grubman issued a Note that reiterated a Buy (1)
22 rating for Metromedia Fiber, stating: "We want to make it very clear that [Metromedia
23 Fiber] remains one of our favorite names." Regarding funding for the company, the Note
24 stated:

25 As noted in our previous note, MFN has obtained a commitment for
26 a fully underwritten credit facility for \$350 million from Citicorp

1 USA, Inc., which it expects will fully fund its current business
2 plan....

3 70. The April 30 Note failed to disclose that the company believed it might not consummate
4 the credit facility and that Grubman had expressed doubt that the company might get
5 funding.

6 71. Metromedia Fiber subsequently announced that the deadline for closing on the credit
7 facility had been extended from May 15 to June 30, 2001.

8 72. In a June 6, 2001 Note, SSB and Grubman continued to state that the stock was
9 "exceptionally inexpensive" and opined that the company had "good visibility in its core
10 fiber business." Grubman began and ended the Note with: "We strongly reiterate our
11 Buy . . . and we would be aggressive at current prices." Regarding the funding for the
12 company, Grubman wrote:

13 We continue to believe the \$350 million bank loan, which will bring MFNX to fully-
14 funded status, will close by the end of June.

15 * * *

16 ...The lack of available capital for MFNX-lookalikes only strengthens MFNX's
17 position. Most recently private companies, such as OnFiber and other metro builders,
18 have failed in getting private financing and other companies in the metro space have
19 an extremely difficult time.

20 * * *

21 MFNX has a business plan that is fully funded and many "would-be" competitors are
22 never getting to the market.

23 73. The Note did not disclose that (a) the deadline for consummating the bank loan had been
24 extended from May 15 to the end of June; or (b) after announcing the funding
25 commitment, the company had determined that it may not be able to successfully
26 consummate the senior credit facilities. The Note also did not reflect Grubman's opinion

1 that Metromedia Fiber might not secure the financing. As described above, the Note
2 emphasized and recognized the importance of Metromedia Fiber's fully-funded position.

3 74. In its June 28, 2001 Note, two days before the expiration of the funding commitment, SSB
4 and Grubman disclosed that Metromedia Fiber had not consummated the bank loan and
5 that the deadline had been extended from May 15 to June 30. SSB and Grubman
6 minimized the funding problem by advising investors that the company had other options
7 for financing, but added that they "can only guess on the nature or terms of the alternative
8 financing [Metromedia Fiber] would agree to." Nevertheless, the Note analyzed the
9 company's financing needs assuming the company could secure the \$350 million in
10 additional funds under the loan or by other means and therefore would be fully funded
11 through 2003. The Note continued to project a positive EBITDA for 2003 and reiterated
12 its Buy (1) rating.

13 75. The Notes published from April to July 2001 on Metromedia Fiber minimized the risks
14 facing the company, assumed the company was going to be fully funded, and estimated
15 that the company would enjoy explosive growth in revenues and earnings. The \$25 price
16 target issued on April 30, 2001 assumed that the company would have estimated revenue
17 in 2010 of \$10.6 billion and EBITDA of \$4.4 billion. The June 6, 2001 target price of \$15
18 assumed the company would have \$8.7 billion in revenue nine years out and EBITDA of
19 \$3.2 billion. The June 28, 2001 target price of \$10 maintained the estimate of future
20 revenue and EBITDA.

21 76. These reports, and the ratings and price targets included in them, reflected SSB's and
22 Grubman's publicly expressed opinion that the company's future was secure. This view
23 was contrary to the actual views of SSB's analysts, which were expressed privately and
24 not disclosed. On June 21, 2001, a research analyst who reported to Grubman discounted
25
26

1 the prospects of the company, telling Grubman in an e-mail that while the company had
2 funding through the end of 2001, its fundamentals would deteriorate thereafter:

3 I have received over 50 calls today on MFNX (its down \$0.20 again
4 to \$1.51). . . . Most people have written off this stock saying that it
5 will go bankrupt, even if they could get an equity infusion here it
6 would be massively dilutive. At lease [sic] they have some cash
7 through the end of the year but I doubt the fundamentals recover
8 which is actually the important thing. I think downgrading right now
9 is not advisable since everyone would say "gee thanks." I think we
10 need an excuse [sic] from the company, we should have done it the
11 day they lowered guidance but of course we were restricted.

- 12 77. SSB did not downgrade Metromedia Fiber until July 25, 2001 and even then only
13 downgraded the stock to a Neutral (3) rating. By then, the company's stock price had
14 sunk to 98 cents, more than a 33 percent drop from its price on June 21, 2001, when the
15 analyst who reported to Grubman disparaged the company's future.

16 **F. SSB Issued Misleading Research Reports on Level 3, Focal, RCN, Adelphia, WCG,
17 and XO**

- 18 78. Research reports must not contain misleading statements, analysts must have a reasonable
19 basis for their recommendations, and reports must present a fair, balanced picture of the
20 risks and benefits of investing in the covered companies and avoid exaggerated or
21 unwarranted claims regarding the covered companies. As described below, certain
22 research reports issued on Level 3, Focal, RCN, Adelphia, WCG, and XO violated these
23 requirements.

24 **1. SSB Issued Misleading Research on Focal**

- 25 79. As stated above, on February 21, 2001 and April 30, 2001, SSB and Grubman published
26 fraudulent research reports on Focal. In addition to those reports, SSB and Grubman
published four misleading research reports on Focal, dated April 10, 2000, April 18, 2000,
April 26, 2000, and July 31, 2000.

1 80. In April 2000, Focal selected SSB to be the joint book runner for a secondary offering of
2 its stock. Focal also announced a major expansion of its business plan. At the time, the
3 company had significant capital expenditures and required additional capital to complete
4 its new business plan. It faced the risks that it could not raise such capital and could not
5 complete its new plan, and that, because of its capital expenditures, it would potentially
6 have substantial negative operating cash flow and substantial net operating losses for the
7 foreseeable future, including through 2000 and 2001. Nevertheless, the Notes SSB and
8 Grubman published on April 10, 2000, April 18, 2000, April 26, 2000, and July 31, 2000
9 either did not disclose these risks or did not fully address them. In addition, these Notes
10 published a target price that did not have a reasonable basis.

11 81. On April 10, 2000 SSB and Grubman issued a Note that reiterated a Buy (1)
12 recommendation on Focal and increased the target price for Focal from \$60 to \$110. The
13 Note discussed Focal's planned expansion, describing it as "sexy" and "providing the
14 sizzle in this story." Based on Focal's expanded business plan, SSB and Grubman
15 predicted that the company's revenue within 10 years would increase to \$6 billion and
16 EBITDA would increase to \$2.4 billion. The Note described Focal management as
17 "stellar." The Note did not disclose the additional capital expenditures that would be
18 necessary to fund Focal's expanded business plan or the risk the company may not be able
19 to obtain such capital. It did not disclose the likelihood that the expanded business plan
20 would increase the company's substantial negative operating cash flow and substantial net
21 operating losses.

22 82. On April 18, 2000, SSB and Grubman issued a Note reiterating the \$110 price target and
23 Buy rating. The April 18 Note stated that "[Focal] is expanding its business plan to 24
24 markets and aggressively pursuing data opportunities . . . The name of the game in value
25 creation is to drive geographic footprint & service capabilities. Focal is dramatically
26

1 increasing the latter w/its data initiative while increasing its geographic footprint by 15-
2 20% . . . We reiterate our Buy rating & \$110 target & would be aggressive buyers.” The
3 April 18, 2000 Note did not disclose the additional capital expenditures that would be
4 necessary to fund Focal’s expanded business plan or the risk the company may not be able
5 to obtain such capital. It did not disclose the likelihood that the expanded business plan
6 would increase the substantial negative operating cash flow and substantial net operating
7 losses the company faced in the foreseeable future.

- 8 83. On April 26, 2000, SSB and Grubman issued a Note that reiterated a Buy
9 recommendation, the \$110 target price, and Grubman’s predictions of substantial growth
10 in the company’s revenues and EBITDA. By this time, Focal’s share price had dropped to
11 \$34.00. The Note repeated Grubman’s earlier comments that Focal’s new data initiative
12 “is the real sizzle in this story . . . we believe that [Focal’s] recent geographic & data
13 expansion will enable [Focal] to become one of the critical path points in what is the next
14 evolution in the Internet.” The Note stated:

15 From a liquidity standpoint, no matter what happens with the capital
16 markets, between the money [Focal] has on hand and its bank
17 facilities commitments, we believe that [Focal] will be fully funded
18 through mid- to late-2001. During the first quarter, [Focal]
completed a \$275 million offering of 11 7/8% senior notes due 2010
through a private placement.

- 19 84. The Note concluded with another recommendation for investors to buy the stock: “We
20 continue to be very bullish on [Focal] and believe the stock is undervalued at current
21 levels.” The Note did not disclose the additional capital expenditures that would be
22 necessary to fund Focal’s expanded business plan or the risk the company may not be able
23 to obtain such capital. It did not disclose the likelihood that the expanded business plan
24 would increase the substantial negative operating cash flow and substantial net operating
25 losses the company faced in the foreseeable future.
26

1 85. The Note SSB and Grubman published on July 31, 2000 left the rating and target price
2 unchanged. The Note extolled the virtues of Focal's management, stating that the
3 reported strong earnings for second quarter 2000 "highlights the execution abilities of
4 FCOM management" It repeated earlier advice to investors that "the stock is
5 undervalued at current levels." The July 31 Note stated:

6 From a liquidity standpoint, [Focal] received a commitment for \$300
7 million of senior secured credit facilities during the quarter. Capital
8 expenditures totaled \$77 million this quarter and we still expect
9 [Focal] to spend \$300 million and \$305 million in 2001. We
estimate that with the cash on hand of \$342 million and the available
credit, [Focal] will be fully funded through 2001.

10 86. Missing from the July 31 Note, however, were sufficient risk disclosures adequate to warn
11 investors of the funding needs facing Focal. The Note did not disclose the additional
12 capital expenditures that would be necessary to fund Focal's expanded business plan or
13 the risk that the company may not be able to obtain such capital. It did not disclose the
14 likelihood that the expanded business plan would increase the substantial negative
15 operating cash flow and substantial net operating losses the company faced in the
16 foreseeable future.

17 87. By October 17, 2000, Focal's stock price had plummeted to \$18. That day, SSB and
18 Grubman issued a Report on Focal and other CLECs entitled "CLECs: Clean Up of
19 Ratings, Price Targets & DCFs." In this Report, SSB and Grubman maintained a Buy (1)
20 rating on Focal, but lowered Focal's target price from \$110 to \$30, noting that the
21 previous target price was "a clearly stale number." Despite advising investors for months
22 prior to October that Focal's new business strategy was "sexy" and "the sizzle to the
23 story" and would raise Focal's stock price by \$50, Grubman decreased Focal's price target
24 in part by substantially reducing the revenue expected from the new business strategy.
25
26

2. Level 3, Focal, RCN, Adelphia, WCG and XO

- 1 88. As described above in Section D, in April 2001 Grubman expressed the need to
 2 downgrade Level 3, Focal, RCN, Adelphia, WCG, and XO in the aftermath of the Winstar
 3 bankruptcy. Investment bankers pressured Grubman not to change the Buy ratings on
 4 these stocks and he did not downgrade them until months later.
- 5 89. None of the following Notes for these companies issued between April 18, 2001 and the
 6 date the stocks were downgraded disclosed the pressure the investment bankers had
 7 exerted on Grubman or the fact that he had acceded to it; these Notes were inconsistent
 8 with the views Grubman had expressed, as reflected in the e-mails described in Section D.
 9 above, concerning these stocks:³

10
 11 Level 3: Report issued on April 18, 2001.

12 WCG: Reports issued on May 1, 2001, August 1, 2001, and September 21, 2001.

13 XO: Reports issued on April 26, 2001, and July 25, 2001.

14 Adelphia: Report issued on May 14, 2001.

15 RCN: Report issued on May 3, 2001.

16 3. WCG

- 17 90. The May 1, 2001 Note on WCG lacked a reasonable basis because it did not disclose the
 18 contrary private views of Grubman and a member of his team. On May 1, 2001, SSB and
 19 Grubman issued a Note that failed adequately to disclose the views of Grubman and
 20 another analyst of the funding risks facing WCG. Before the issuance of that Note,
 21 Grubman and the analyst commented privately that the company "need[s] money." These
 22 funding concerns were so acute that the analyst warned an institutional investor to "be
 23 careful with WCG." Similarly, Grubman explained to a SSB retail broker who
 24 complained about Grubman's target price for WCG that WCG was a "tough one. They
 25 still need money. I think business is ok"

26 ³ For the additional reasons set forth in Section E, the Note on Focal for April 30, 2001 was fraudulent.

- 1 91. The May 1 Note, however, reiterated a Buy recommendation on the stock. It noted that
2 "visibility on funding better vs. 6 mos. ago." It reassured investors that WCG had
3 adequate funds "into 2003." The Note stated that the company had reduced capital
4 expenditures and "has made steps to improve its funding situation since the beginning of
5 the year and have [sic] raised additional liquidity of more than \$2 billion." While
6 predicting that the company may need \$1 billion to fund its operations in 2003, the Note
7 stated "frankly, if the second tranche of the bank facility gets fully syndicated out, and
8 WCG does perform as it expects . . . then our funding gap will be cut dramatically."
9 92. The May 1 Note failed to accurately describe the negative view of Grubman and the
10 analyst who reported to him of the company's funding concerns. Rather than informing
11 investors that WCG's business was merely "ok" or a "tough one," the May 2001 Note
12 advised investors to "be more aggressive on [WCG]." The Note did not warn investors to
13 "be careful" with WCG and did not fully reflect the analysts' views on the company's
14 funding needs.
15
16
17

18 **G. Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest Pervaded Grubman's Upgrade of AT&T in
November 1999**

19 **1. AT&T Complained About Grubman's Views of the Company**

- 20
21 93. From 1995 through November 1999, Grubman maintained a Neutral (3) rating on AT&T.
22 Though at times he offered qualified approval of AT&T's strategy, he also repeatedly
23 disparaged the company in his research and his public comments.
24 94. Beginning in July 1998 and continuing through the relevant period, Sanford Weill, then
25 co-CEO and Chairman of Citigroup, was a member of the AT&T Board of Directors.
26 Prior to November 1999, AT&T management complained to Weill and other SSB

1 representatives about the tone of Grubman's comments. In particular, the AT&T CEO
2 told Weill that Grubman's unprofessional tone and comments about AT&T made it
3 difficult for AT&T to do business with SSB.

- 4 95. At an October 1998 industry trade show, Grubman failed to mention AT&T as one of the
5 important telecommunications companies of the future. AT&T complained to Weill, and
6 Weill relayed the complaint to senior SSB investment bankers. As a result, Grubman
7 wrote a letter of apology dated October 9, 1998 to Weill and the heads of SSB's
8 investment banking and equities departments. Before it was finalized, the letter was
9 reviewed and approved by Weill and several members of senior management. Grubman's
10 apology stated, in part:

11 It has come to my attention that a speech I made offended AT&T. I
12 want to make it perfectly clear that the last thing I want to do is
13 embarrass the firm or myself or for that matter have AT&T put in an
14 awkward position in dealing with Salomon Smith Barney. To the
15 extent I have done so, I apologize to you and to the firm. I will also
16 find the appropriate time and place to apologize directly to AT&T.
Despite our current investment stance on AT&T, I view AT&T as
one of the most significant companies in this industry, a company
that I hope we can build a long and valued relationship with and one
where I truly am open-minded about changes in investment views.

- 17 96. In his cover memo to the head of SSB investment banking, and the SSB investment
18 banker covering AT&T, Grubman indicated that his letter was suitable to send to AT&T.
19 On October 12, Weill and the investment banker covering AT&T traveled to AT&T's
20 Basking Ridge, NJ headquarters and met with AT&T's CEO.

21 **2. Weill Asked Grubman to "Take a Fresh Look" at AT&T**
22

- 23 97. A few months later, in late 1998 or early 1999, Weill asked Grubman to "take a fresh
24 look" at AT&T in the hope that Grubman might change his opinion of the company.
25 Weill had a positive view of AT&T and its CEO whom Weill had known personally for
26 years. AT&T's CEO was a member of Citigroup's Board of Directors during the relevant

1 period and, prior to the merger of Citicorp and Travelers Corporation (SSB's corporate
2 parent), had been a member of the Travelers' Board of Directors since 1993.

3 98. Thereafter, on April 5, 1999, Grubman sent AT&T a seven-page questionnaire seeking
4 further information about its business. On June 11, 1999 Grubman sent Weill a
5 memorandum noting that AT&T had not responded to his questionnaire. Weill apparently
6 then spoke to AT&T's CEO about the questionnaire. AT&T asked Grubman to re-send
7 the questionnaire, and Grubman wrote Weill: "Maybe this time we can actually make
8 some progress in closing the deal with [AT&T's CEO]." On July 19, 1999, AT&T sent an
9 eleven-page response to Grubman.

10 99. On August 5, 1999 Grubman and Weill traveled to AT&T's headquarters for a meeting
11 with AT&T's CEO that Weill had arranged. On August 19, 1999, Grubman wrote to
12 AT&T's CEO:

13 I am writing to follow up on our meeting with Sandy. . . . I thought it
14 was important to write to you directly to lay-out what I think we
15 agreed to in order to get this process going. . . . I need to get to a
16 level of specificity well beyond what's on the street today and I will
17 need your help getting to the right people. . . . Wall Street is lacking
18 analysis that comes remotely close to answering the detailed
19 economic, technical, and operational questions that investors are
20 demanding answers to regarding the roll-out of the bundled service
platform using the cable plant When my analysis is complete
and if the results are in line with what you and I are both anticipating,
once I'm on board there will be no better supporter than I. . . . As I
indicated to you at our meeting, I would welcome the role of being a
"kitchen cabinet" member to you.

21 100. Grubman sent a copy of his August 19, 1999 letter to Weill, SSB's head of investment
22 banking, and the SSB investment banker covering AT&T.

23 **3. Grubman Requested Weill's Assistance to Get His Children Accepted to the**
24 **92nd St. Y Preschool and AT&T Considered Issuing a Tracking Stock for Its**
Wireless Unit

25 101. In September 1999, Grubman began his efforts to get his children admitted to the
26 prestigious and competitive preschool at the 92nd Street Y in New York City.

1 102. On October 20, 1999, the AT&T Board of Directors began discussing whether to issue a
2 tracking stock for its wireless unit. That day, Weill attended an all-day meeting of the
3 AT&T Board, at which AT&T's management presented a number of strategic
4 alternatives, including issuing a tracking stock for AT&T's wireless business.

5 103. On October 29, 1999, Weill and Grubman had a 14 minute telephone conversation during
6 which they discussed the status of Grubman's "fresh look" at AT&T. In that conversation
7 or one shortly thereafter, they also discussed Grubman's desire to send his children to the
8 92nd Street Y preschool in New York City.

9 104. By November 2, AT&T had taken its first steps towards issuing a tracker stock for its
10 wireless unit. That day, an investment banking firm advising AT&T on financial
11 strategies met with AT&T's outside counsel to discuss a proxy statement for AT&T
12 shareholder approval of the wireless tracker.

13 105. On November 5, 1999, Grubman sent a memo to Weill entitled "AT&T and 92nd Street
14 Y." In it, Grubman updated Weill on his progress in "taking a fresh look" at AT&T and
15 outlined the future steps he would take to reexamine the company. He referred to his
16 earlier meeting with AT&T's CEO and to his scheduled meetings in Denver with the head
17 of AT&T's cable operations and in Basking Ridge with AT&T's network operations
18 personnel. Grubman also sought Weill's assistance in getting his children admitted to the
19 92nd Street Y preschool. Noting the difficulty in getting into the school, Grubman stated
20 that "there are no bounds for what you do for your children. . . . it comes down to 'who
21 you know.'" In the last paragraph of his memo, Grubman concluded: "Anyway, anything
22 you could do Sandy would be greatly appreciated. As I mentioned, I will keep you posted
23 on the progress with AT&T which I think is going well."

24 **4. Grubman Kept Weill Apprised of His Reevaluation of AT&T in November**
25 **1999; AT&T Management Recommended That AT&T Issue a Tracking Stock**
26

1 106. During November 1999, Grubman intensified his "fresh look" at AT&T. He met and
2 spoke by telephone with AT&T's CEO and traveled to AT&T's Denver and New Jersey
3 offices to meet with company officials and view AT&T's operations. Grubman reported
4 on his efforts to Weill during an unprecedented number of telephone calls on November 3,
5 11, 17, 22, 24 and 30.

6 107. On the morning of November 17, Weill attended an AT&T board meeting at which senior
7 AT&T management recommended that the board approve the issuance of a tracking stock
8 for the wireless business. Grubman called Weill from Milan, Italy late that night and the
9 two discussed the status of Grubman's "fresh look" at AT&T. During a call on November
10 22 or November 24, Grubman informed Weill that he soon would be issuing a report
11 upgrading AT&T.

12 **5. Grubman Upgraded AT&T and Subsequently Stated He Did So to Get His**
13 **Children Into the 92nd St. Y Preschool**

14 108. Grubman announced on November 29, 1999 that he was upgrading AT&T from a Neutral
15 (3) to a Buy (1) rating. The same day, Grubman sent an e-mail to the SSB publications
16 department, with a copy to Research Management, stating:

17 The AT&T Report must be edited and mailed out to the printers
18 today so that it can be distributed in time to meet Sandy Weill's
19 deadline (before the AT&T meeting.)

20 109. The next day, Grubman issued a 36-page Report setting forth his new rating and rationale.
21 In his November 30 Report, Grubman wrote that his upgrade rested largely on two points:
22 (1) the "real economics" of AT&T's cable strategy and (2) AT&T's ability to upgrade its
23 cable technology to deliver a range of different services to consumers' homes. Grubman
24 commented positively in his report about the widely-reported wireless tracking stock but
25 denied upgrading because of the possible IPO.
26

1 110. After issuing the report, Grubman told an analyst who reported to him and an institutional
2 investor, in separate conversations, that he upgraded AT&T to help get his children into
3 the 92nd St. Y preschool.

4 111. Roughly a year after the upgrade, on January 13, 2001, in an e-mail to a friend, Grubman
5 stated:

6 You know everyone thinks I upgraded T [AT&T] to get lead for
7 AWE [AT&T Wireless tracker]. Nope. I used Sandy to get my kids
8 into 92nd St Y pre-school (which is harder than Harvard) and Sandy
9 needed [the AT&T's CEO's] vote on our board to nuke [John] Reed
10 in showdown. Once coast was clear for both of us (ie Sandy clear
11 victor and my kids confirmed) I went back to my normal negative
12 self on T. [AT&T's CEO] never knew that we both (Sandy and I)
13 played him like a fiddle.

14 112. The following day, Grubman e-mailed the same friend: "I always viewed T [AT&T] as a
15 business deal between me and Sandy."

16 **6. After the AT&T Upgrade, Weill Helped Facilitate the Admission of**
17 **Grubman's Children to the 92nd St. Y Preschool**

18 113. After Grubman issued his November 1999 report on AT&T, Weill helped gain admission
19 for Grubman's children to the 92nd St. Y preschool. On or about December 17, 1999,
20 Weill called a member of the 92nd St. Y board and told her he would be "very
21 appreciative" if she would help Grubman, a "valued employee" at Citigroup. Weill did
22 not explicitly offer a donation to the Y during this phone call. By indicating that he would
23 be "very appreciative," he understood that he was implicitly offering such assistance.

24 114. In March 2000, Grubman's children were admitted to the Y preschool. Subsequently, the
25 board member called Weill, suggested a donation be made to the Y, and may have
26 suggested the amount. Weill agreed. Weill was one of three corporate officers who
approved charitable donations from Citigroup or the Citigroup Foundation. During a
subsequent conversation with the president of the Citigroup Foundation, Weill indicated

1 that the Foundation should make a \$1 million donation to the Y and instructed the
2 Foundation president to work with the Y to develop a suitable program with the donation.
3 The program that was subsequently developed consisted of a series of 10 events per year
4 that had cultural, artistic, and educational aims. Weill, the president of the Foundation,
5 and another Citigroup corporate officer approved the donation on July 24, 2000⁴ and the
6 first installment of the donation (\$200,000) was sent to the Y in September 2000. The
7 president of the Foundation understood the donation was a "thank you" for the admission
8 of the Grubman children to the preschool at the 92nd St. Y.

9 **7. After Grubman's Upgrade of AT&T, AT&T Selected SSB as a Lead**
10 **Underwriter in the AT&T Wireless IPO**

11 115. Grubman's upgrade of AT&T assisted SSB in being selected as a lead underwriter and
12 joint book-runner for the IPO of a tracking stock for AT&T's wireless subsidiary.

13 116. The AT&T Board approved the IPO during its December 5, 1999 Board meeting. AT&T
14 announced its plans at a meeting with analysts the following day.

15 117. In January 2000, SSB competed to be named a lead underwriter and book-runner for the
16 offering. In its pitch book, it highlighted the experience, prominence, and support for
17 AT&T of Grubman and the SSB wireless analyst. Among other things, SSB's pitch book
18 contained numerous statements about Grubman's views regarding the positive impact the
19 wireless tracking stock would have on AT&T's shares, as well as promises about the role
20 he would play in marketing the deal to investors.

21 118. In evaluating the various proposals from SSB and other investment banks, AT&T
22 assigned significant weight (55%) to its views of each investment bank's wireline and
23 wireless telecommunications analysts. Because Grubman was a highly rated and highly
24

25 ⁴ Because of certain tax considerations, and in light of benefits Citigroup employees received
26 from the program supported by the donation, Citigroup, not Citigroup Foundation, made the
donation to the Y. The \$1 million donation was payable in equal amounts over five years.

1 respected analyst, had a "strong buy" on AT&T stock, and was a "strong supporter" of the
2 company, AT&T gave him the highest possible score in the internal matrix it used to rank
3 the competing investment banks. In February 2000, based in large part on this positive
4 evaluation of Grubman, AT&T named SSB as one of three joint book-runners for the
5 AT&T Wireless IPO. The IPO occurred on April 27, 2000. It was the largest equity
6 offering ever in the United States, and SSB earned \$63 million in fees as lead underwriter
7 for the offering.

8 **8. Grubman Downgraded AT&T**

- 9
10 119. On May 17, 2000, three weeks after the IPO, two months after his children were admitted
11 to the 92nd St. Y preschool, and after AT&T announced disappointing earnings, Grubman
12 issued a research report in which he compared AT&T with WorldCom. While Grubman
13 did not change his Buy ratings on the two companies, he lowered his target price for
14 AT&T from \$75 to \$65 per share and made a number of negative comments about AT&T.
15 120. Institutional investors viewed Grubman's report as a "virtual downgrade" because of his
16 unfavorable comparisons of AT&T to WorldCom. An internal AT&T document also
17 reported that Grubman was privately making comments to investors that were
18 considerably more critical than those in his written reports.
19 121. Grubman subsequently downgraded AT&T twice in October 2000: on October 6 he
20 downgraded the stock to an Outperform (2) and on October 25 he downgraded it to a
21 Neutral (3), citing what he described as negative news from the company.

22 **9. SSB's Policies Were Not Reasonably Designed To Prevent The Potential**
23 **Misuse Of Material, Non-Public Information**

- 24 122. During the relevant period, SSB had general policies in place requiring its employees to
25 obtain approval before becoming a director of another company and to keep non-public
26

1 information about that company confidential. SSB did not, however, have adequate
2 policies and procedures in place to ensure that communications between a person
3 associated with SSB who served as a director of another company and the SSB research
4 analyst who covered that company would not result in the misuse of material, non-public
5 information by the research analyst. For example, one such step SSB could have taken
6 would have been to require that a company be placed on its watch list if a person
7 associated with SSB served as a director of that company. Such a procedure would have
8 helped SSB to monitor whether a research analyst, before publishing research on a
9 company, had received material non-public information on it from a person associated
10 with SSB who also served as one of the company's outside directors.

11 **H. SSB Failed to Supervise Adequately the Activities of Its Research Analysts**

12 **1. SSB Failed to Respond Adequately to Red Flags Regarding Research**

13
14 123. Members of research management received copies of research reports and call notes when
15 they were issued and routinely reviewed research. Based on this review, complaints from
16 SSB employees and customers, and otherwise, SSB was aware of problems with its
17 research. Indeed, as described in Section B above, members of research management
18 themselves expressed reservations about SSB's research. Nevertheless, SSB did not take
19 steps to supervise the activities of research analysts adequately.

20 124. By early 2001, one of Grubman's supervisors believed that Grubman's ratings were
21 inconsistent with the performance and prospects of the some of the companies he covered.

22 125. Moreover, on July 2, 2001, a Director who provided Research Management Support sent
23 an e-mail to all research personnel, and others, warning that the models SSB analysts,
24 including Grubman, used to predict future revenues and earnings and generate target
25 prices "**must make sense**" (emphasis in original) and must be "smell tested." He
26 criticized these models for using "aggressive inputs to arrive at a predetermined

1 valuation/outcome.” He concluded by noting that, “Clearly, projected long-term
2 growth rates for many of our companies are too high and would benefit from a
3 thoughtful reappraisal.” (Emphasis in original.) At least one recipient of this e-mail
4 thought he was referring to Grubman (“Amen! You should have cc’d this to Grubman
5 just to make sure.”) The author of the e-mail did not disabuse the recipient of this
6 assumption: “No comment on that, at least not in writing.”

- 7 126. The same person specifically criticized Grubman’s research in a later e-mail to a senior
8 member of research management, implying that the research had been compromised by
9 investment banking concerns and acknowledging that SSB’s lax supervision of Grubman
10 was at least partly to blame. He focused in particular on Grubman’s coverage of
11 Metromedia Fiber and the June 6, 2001 Note (discussed above). He stated:

12 Explaining this isn’t easy. My candid opinion is that, until quite
13 recently, Jack Grubman’s team had not yet come to terms with the
14 debacle in this sector. While share prices plummeted, they remained
15 convinced of the longer-term potential of their group and were
16 unwilling to cut ratings and adopt a more cautious stance. *When you
add the heavy layer of banking involvement into the mix this very
problematic situation gets easier to understand.* (Emphasis added.)

- 17 127. He criticized Grubman’s coverage of Metromedia Fiber in particular. He noted that
18 Grubman’s

19 [e]xcessive optimism led to unattainable target prices that should
20 have been brought down much more quickly and earlier, than they
21 had been. . . . [T]he target prices were cut again and again, but never
22 enough to bring them into a more rational alignment with the share
23 price. The 6/6/01 note talks about reducing projected 2010 revenue
and EBITDA to \$8.7BB and \$3.2BB from \$10.68BB and \$4.4BB
respectively. *How anyone could think those levels could be attained
I cannot explain.* This only underscores the absurd assumptions
pervading many [discounted cash flow] models. (Emphasis added.)

- 24 128. He concluded by acknowledging that SSB’s supervision of Grubman had been inadequate:

25 What could have prevented this? . . . Even with all notes going
26 through an SA [supervising analyst] and many being scrutinized by

research legal as well, we clearly rely on senior analysts to do careful work, disclose all important data and denote all material risks. In the case of MFNX, and in other telecom situations that I could name, our approach was inadequate. There was a failure of analysis and, it pains me to confess, *a failure of management*. This is the only explanation I can offer. (Emphasis added.)

2. SSB Knew SSB Investment Bankers Pressured Research Analysts

129. SSB knew that its business practices, which intertwined research and investment banking, created a conflict of interest between investment banking and research, that investment banking pressured research analysts, and that investment banking concerns had the potential to affect, and, as described above with respect to Grubman, did affect, the decisions of research analysts on ratings and coverage. Nevertheless, SSB failed to take adequate steps to prevent such pressure or ensure that SSB's research was independent and objective.

130. SSB was aware that investment bankers pressured Grubman to maintain positive ratings or change negative ratings on companies. Moreover, on November 17, 2000, shortly after SSB was named in a private securities action relating to the AT&T Wireless IPO, Grubman e-mailed the head of Global Equity Research:

I think all legal stuff on ATT should be forwarded to Sandy [Weill] and [the head of SSB Investment Banking] as Exhibit A on why research needs to be left alone. These guys never understand the lingering consequences.

I. SSB Engaged in Improper Spinning and IPO Distribution Practices

131. SSB engaged in improper spinning practices whereby it provided preferential access to valuable IPO shares to the executives of corporations from which SSB sought or had obtained investment banking business. During the years 1999 and 2000, SSB earned over \$6.6 billion in investment banking revenue. Obtaining this investment banking business

1 was critical to SSB's success. For example, investment banking fees comprised over 21%
2 of SSB's revenue in 1999, and over 22% in 2000.

3 132. SSB failed to appropriately administer numerous Issuer Directed Share Programs
4 ("DSPs") it managed during this same period. Further, SSB engaged in significant "as of"
5 trading in IPOs and failed to ensure that its distribution of IPO shares, both through DSPs
6 and its branch offices, was timely and accurately reflected in its books and records.

7 **1. SSB Established a Special Branch to Facilitate Its Spinning Practices**

8 133. SSB employed two registered representatives ("RRs") whose primary function was to
9 open and service accounts for high net worth individuals who were founders, officers or
10 directors of current and potential banking clients ("Executive Accounts"). The two RRs
11 had begun servicing these types of accounts at Salomon Brothers and continued to
12 perform this function after Salomon merged with Travelers in 1997 to create SSB. SSB
13 took steps and entered into written agreements to provide these two RRs with preferential,
14 special, and unusual treatment including the following:

- 15 • SSB gave each of these two RRs special compensation, including a draw of \$1 million
16 for the first 6 months of their employment and a minimum of \$500,000 for the second
17 6 months;
- 18 • SSB provided office space for one of the two RRs on SSB's equities trading floor in
19 New York;
- 20 • SSB treated the business of the two RRs, designated "Private Wealth Management," as
21 if it were a separate SSB branch office ("PWM Branch") for the purpose of
22 determining IPO allocations, when it was actually only 2 brokers;⁵
23
24

25 ⁵ The two RRs ended their partnership in 1999 after which each operated as a separate branch and
26 the practices described herein continued. However, the two RRs are referred to as the "PWM
Branch."

- 1 • SSB provided the two RRs with unique access to hot IPO shares to distribute to the
2 Executive Accounts that was far above and beyond that of any other broker or branch;
3 and
- 4 • SSB provided the two RRs with access to IPO shares for distribution to the Executive
5 accounts from (i) the SSB Branch retail allocation, with PWM being treated as a
6 “branch office”; and (ii) the institutional pot, In some cases, the two RRs were able to
7 obtain access to DSP shares from issuers for distribution to the Executive Accounts.
8

9 **2. SSB Provided Preferential Treatment to Executive Accounts in the Allocation of Hot** 10 **IPOs**

11 134. SSB distributed its IPO shares by dividing the firm’s allocation between its retail and
12 institutional clients. Generally, SSB allocated to its retail clients, as a group,
13 approximately 20-30% of the firm’s allotment in any specific IPO, with a majority of the
14 remaining shares designated for allocations to institutional clients. Those shares set aside
15 for retail clients were designated as the “retail retention,” and the remaining shares were
16 designated as the “institutional pot.”

17 135. The retail shares were distributed to specific accounts through SSB’s branch managers.
18 For every IPO, SSB gave each branch manager a specific number of shares, and the
19 manager determined which retail brokers received shares and how many shares each retail
20 broker received. The retail broker then determined the allocation of shares among his or
21 her retail accounts, subject to the branch manager’s final approval.

22 136. The PWM Branch and its clients, however, were treated differently. As noted, the two
23 RRs’ client base consisted primarily of high net worth individuals whose companies were
24 potential investment banking clients or had provided investment banking business to SSB,
25 and these two individual brokers were designated as a special branch with a separate
26

1 profit and loss assessment. The PWM Branch received favorable treatment in the
2 allocation of hot IPO shares. Although SSB's written procedures for the distribution of
3 IPO shares specifically prohibited favoritism for the personal accounts of corporate
4 executives, SSB in fact provided preferential treatment to Executive Accounts in
5 connection with the distribution of hot IPO shares throughout the relevant period.

6 **a. Special Access to Retail and Institutional Shares**

7 137. While other SSB retail branches were ordinarily limited to receiving IPO shares for
8 clients from the retail retention, in many instances the two RRs in the PWM Branch
9 obtained shares from both the retail retention and the institutional pot. This arrangement
10 enabled them to consistently provide the Executive Accounts with larger numbers of
11 shares in lucrative hot IPOs than were allocated to other retail accounts.

12 138. For example, from June 1996 through August 2000, WorldCom's then-President and
13 CEO received IPO allocations in 9 offerings from Salomon and 12 offerings from SSB.
14 He made profits of \$10,612,680 and \$923,360 respectively, totaling \$11,536,041 on these
15 IPO allocations. From 1996 through 2000, WorldCom paid \$75,955,000 in investment
16 banking fees to SSB.

17 139. During 1999 and 2000, the two RRs in the PWM Branch received 35% of the total IPO
18 shares allocated for distribution to SSB's ten largest branches and PWM combined.
19 During this same period, these two brokers generated less than 3% of this combined
20 group's commission revenue and had less than 5% of the group's assets under
21 management. In 5.3% of the IPOs during this period, the two PWM brokers alone
22 received a greater IPO allocation than the total shares distributed to SSB's ten largest
23 branches.

24 **b. PWM's Solicitation of Syndicate for Additional IPO Shares**

1 140. In addition to the arrangement that provided the two PWM brokers with special access to
2 large numbers of IPO shares for its client base, these two RRs aggressively solicited the
3 Syndicate Department for additional shares in order to give preferential treatment to
4 founders, officers, and directors of investment banking clients. PWM brokers regularly
5 requested additional shares from Syndicate, while retail brokers did so rarely. This
6 occurred as early as 1996 and continued throughout the relevant period. For example, in
7 a June 7, 1996 facsimile to the Syndicate Department, one of the RRs requested shares in
8 the McLeod USA IPO for "Salomon Brothers Investment Banking Relationships to
9 receive preferential treatment."

10 **c. Special Access to DSP Shares**

11 141. As well as obtaining hot IPO shares for Executive Accounts from the retail retention and
12 institutional pot, a PWM broker sought access, on at least one occasion, to shares reserved
13 for an Issuer's Directed Share Program for allocation to Executive Accounts.⁶

14 142. In a July 6, 1999 letter, one of the two PWM Branch RRs solicited the President and CEO
15 of Focal for the inclusion of various favored Executive Accounts in Focal's DSP. Of the
16 seventeen listed PWM clients who were Focal bondholders requesting equity shares, at
17 least thirteen were telecom company executives. One of these seventeen PWM clients, the
18 former CEO of McLeod USA, received 100,000 shares through Focal's DSP.

19 143. SSB also directly allocated issuers' DSP shares to the Executive Accounts. When trades
20 through an Issuer's DSP program could not be confirmed, SSB used those shares for its
21 own clients and distributed them to its favored accounts. For example, one of the PWM
22 RRs was assigned by SSB to administer the KQIP DSP. KQIP began trading in the
23

24 ⁶ In each IPO, shares were set aside for distribution to a group of individuals designated by the
25 Issuer through its Directed Share Program, sometimes referred to as the "friends and family"
26 program.

aftermarket on November 9, 1999. Several days later, the issuer's CFO contacted the PWM RR and stated that 20,000 shares of IPO stock were left over from the DSP, and asked if the RR would like to allocate the shares to one of his clients. The RR took the DSP shares and in turn gave them to another broker who had assisted him with the KQIP DSP for allocation to that broker's favored customers. On November 12, 1999, the second broker allocated 5,000 shares of KQIP IPO stock to a customer, who was able to purchase them at the IPO price. On November 16, 1999, the broker allocated the remaining 15,000 shares of KQIP IPO stock to the same customer at the IPO price. On December 24, 1999 the customer sold all 20,000 shares of KQIP for a profit of \$832,540.

144. Additionally, several Executive Accounts serviced by the PWM brokers received IPO shares from a significant number of DSPs. For example, DSP shares were allocated in more than one-third of the SSB IPOs awarded to the former Executive Vice President of Qwest Communications International from May 1998 through September 2000. Likewise, DSP shares were allocated in half of the SSB IPOs awarded to the President of Qwest Communications International from June 1999 through September 2000.

3. Both SSB and Executives of the Firm's Investment Banking Clients Profited Significantly From SSB's Spinning Practices

145. The spinning practices engaged in by Salomon before the merger with Citigroup, and then by SSB after the merger through the PWM Branch proved very lucrative to both the firm and the executives of the firm's investment banking clients. Executives of five telecom companies made approximately \$40 million in profits from approximately 3.4 million IPO shares allocated from 1996 – 2001, and SSB earned over \$404 million in investment banking fees from those companies during the same period.

| | IPO Shares to | IPO Shares to | Net Profits of | Net Profits of | Investment | Investment |
|--|---------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Company | Company | Executives on | Executives on | Banking Fees | Banking Fees |

| | Executives Pre-Merger (1/96-11/97) | Executives Post-Merger (12/97-12/01) | Pre-Merger IPO Shares (1/96 - 11/97) (to nearest 000) | Post-Merger IPO Shares (12/97 - 12/01) (to nearest 000) | Paid to SSB, Pre-Merger (1/96 - 11/97) (to nearest 000) | Paid to SSB, Post-Merger (12/97 - 12-01) (to nearest 000) |
|--------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Global Crossing | 0 | 37,000 | \$ 0 | \$254,000 | \$0 | \$121,049,000 |
| Metromedia Fiber Network | 3,000 | 98,300 | \$11,000 | \$1,511,000 | \$5,243,000 | \$43,865,000 |
| McLeodUSA | 198,500 | 459,500 | \$4,849,000 | \$4,582,000 | \$23,071,000 | \$48,810,000 |
| Qwest | 254,654 | 838,822 | \$1,272,000 | \$7,763,000 | \$13,998,000 | \$32,810,000 |
| WorldCom | 1,236,400 | 262,000 | \$20,146,000 | (\$273,000) | \$17,631,000 | \$97,857,000 |
| Totals | <u>1,692,554</u> | <u>1,695,622</u> | <u>\$26,278,000</u> | <u>\$13,837,000</u> | <u>\$59,943,000</u> | <u>\$344,391,000</u> |

4. SSB Could Not Rely on Its Records to Determine if IPOs Were Fully Distributed

146. SSB's record keeping and its system of assessing whether the IPO distribution was completed were totally inadequate. The records failed to timely and accurately record the firm's distribution of IPO shares to its clients. As a result, the firm could not rely on these records to ensure that the distribution was complete. This faulty record keeping was particularly evident in the areas of "as of" trades and the distribution of DSP shares. These "as of" trades frequently provided immediate profits to the recipients.

a. "As Of" Trades

- 1 147. In the Metromedia Fiber offering, SSB booked approximately 68% of all allocations on
2 an "as of" basis two days or more after the IPO date and well after secondary market
3 trading had begun in each stock. In the Juniper Networks offering, over 80% of all
4 allocations booked by SSB were booked on an "as of" basis two days or more after the
5 IPO date. In at least 10 offerings, over 10% of the offering was booked on an "as of"
6 basis two or more days after the IPO date.
- 7 148. SSB placed a number of these "as of" IPO trades in Executive Accounts. In addition,
8 SSB's inadequate record keeping led to the appearance that certain IPO allocations were
9 sold short in violation of industry regulations. For example, Juniper Networks ("JNPR")
10 IPO stock went public on Thursday, June 24, 1999 at \$34 per share. Trade tickets for the
11 purchase of 5000 shares by WorldCom's former President and CEO were marked on the
12 day after the IPO, Friday, June 25 at 3:12 p.m., and the shares were not booked into the
13 account until the following Tuesday, June 29. SSB recorded this transaction on an "as of"
14 basis. Though the shares had not yet been booked into the client's account and the tickets
15 for the IPO trades were not yet written and time stamped, the CEO sold 4,000 JNPR
16 shares on June 25 at 12:03 p.m., at prices of \$100 and \$100.31 per share, for a profit of
17 \$264,125. The CEO sold the remaining 1,000 shares of JNPR on April 4, 2000 at \$210
18 per share, following a 3:1 stock split, for a total profit of \$860,125.
- 19 149. Similarly, the former Chairman of Qwest Communications also received several "as of"
20 IPO allocations that traded at a substantial profit in the aftermarket. For example, SSB
21 booked 5000 JNPR IPO shares into the account of the Qwest Chairman on June 29, 1999,
22 even though the IPO trade tickets were time stamped at 3:12 p.m. on June 25, one day
23 after the IPO date. At 11:59 a.m. on June 25, the Qwest Chairman sold 2000 shares of
24 JNPR for a profit of \$132,063, even though the tickets for the IPO trades had not yet been
25 written and time stamped, once again giving the appearance that the IPO shares were sold
26

1 short. In addition, on June 5, 2000, SSB booked 10,000 shares of ONI Systems Corp.
2 ("ONIS") IPO stock into this same client's account at the IPO price, even though ONIS
3 had begun trading in the aftermarket on June 1, 2000. The Qwest Chairman ultimately
4 sold the ONIS IPO stock for a profit of more than \$562,000.

5 **b. Directed Share Programs**

6 150. In many instances in which SSB was retained to administer the issuer's DSP, a large
7 number of allocations were booked into customers' accounts after the stock began trading
8 in the secondary market, resulting in a substantial number of "as of" trades. Some of
9 these instances resulted directly from SSB's failure to ensure that orders for DSP shares
10 were confirmed prior to the start of secondary market trading. In fact, one of the PWM
11 brokers acknowledged that, if he could not confirm a DSP allocation with a program
12 participant, he would continue to attempt to contact participants even after secondary
13 market trading had begun in the stock. SSB's inadequate record keeping left the firm
14 unable to ensure that the distribution of DSP shares had been completed before the stock
15 began trading in the secondary market.

16 151. Moreover, SSB did not appropriately administer DSPs. For example, SSB relied upon
17 branch offices and their staff to manage these labor-intensive programs without adequate
18 central supervision and coordination. Further, despite managing numerous DSPs, SSB
19 had no written procedures or supervisory system in effect to ensure the appropriate
20 administration of these programs and the complete and timely distribution of DSP shares.

21 **5. SSB Failed to Supervise Reasonably the Activities of the PWM Branch and**
22 **Others to Prevent Spinning**

23 152. SSB failed to have supervisory procedures and systems in place to (i) prevent spinning;
24 (ii) create records it could reasonably rely upon to assess whether or not the distribution
25 of IPO shares was completed in compliance with applicable law; and (iii) ensure that
26

1 issuers' DSP programs were managed in conformance with all applicable industry rules
2 and regulations.

3 153. By establishing the PWM Branch and providing the two RRs with several special
4 considerations, including the ability to obtain significantly larger hot IPO allocations than
5 other brokers, SSB ensured favorable treatment for the Executive Accounts. Moreover,
6 SSB management failed to adequately supervise the allocation process and specifically
7 failed to take steps to ensure that the PWM Branch complied with SSB's policy
8 prohibiting favoritism for the personal accounts of corporate executives. SSB also failed
9 to accurately and timely record its distribution of IPO shares and failed to have a system
10 to ensure that IPO distributions were completed, and recorded as completed, prior to the
11 initiation of aftermarket trading. Finally, SSB failed to adopt written supervisory
12 procedures and a supervisory system sufficient to ensure that the firm appropriately
13 administered DSPs.

14 II.

15 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

16 1. The Commission has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article XV of the Arizona
17 Constitution and the Securities Act.

18 2. SSB Published Fraudulent Research on Focal and Metromedia Fiber

19 As described in the Findings of Fact above, SSB publicly issued the following fraudulent
20 reports on Focal Communications and Metromedia Fiber that contained misstatements and
21 omissions of material facts about the companies covered, contained recommendations that
22 were contrary to the actual views of its analysts, overlooked or minimized the risk of
23 investing in these companies and predicted substantial growth in the companies' revenues
24 and earnings without a reasonable basis:

- 25 • Focal: Reports issued on February 21, 2001 and April 30, 2001; and
26

- Metromedia Fiber: Reports issued on April 30, 2001, June 6, 2001, and June 28, 2001.

As a result, SSB violated A.R.S. §44-1991(A).

3. SSB Published Exaggerated, Unbalanced or Unwarranted Statements and Made Recommendations Without a Reasonable Basis

As described in the Findings of Fact above, SSB issued certain research reports for Focal, RCN Communications, Level 3 Communications, XO Communications, Adelphia Business Solutions, and Williams Communications Group that did not disclose the pressure exerted by investment banking on Grubman not to downgrade those stocks, did not disclose other relevant facts, and did not provide a sound basis for evaluating facts regarding these companies business prospects. In addition, certain of the reports for Williams and Focal contained exaggerated or unwarranted statements or claims about these companies, and opinions for which there was no reasonable basis. The treatment of risks and potential benefits in the reports also was not adequately balanced. As a result, SSB violated A.R.S. §44-1961(A)(13) by publishing the following misleading reports, as described in paragraphs 78 - 92:

- Focal: Reports issued on April 10, 2000, April 18, 2000, April 26, 2000, and July 31, 2000.
- Level 3: Report issued on April 18, 2001.
- WCG: Reports issued on May 1, 2001, August 1, 2001, and September 21, 2001.
- XO: Reports issued on April 26, 2001, and July 25, 2001.
- Adelphia: Report issued on May 14, 2001.
- RCN: Report issued on May 3, 2001.

4. SSB Published a Misleading Recommendation on AT&T

1 As described in the Findings of Fact above, SSB did not, in the November 1999 research
2 report upgrading AT&T, disclose that Grubman's objectivity had been compromised by
3 the facts described above in paragraphs 93 - 122. This would have been material to
4 investors. As a result, such report was misleading and SSB violated A.R.S. §44-
5 1961(A)(13) by engaging in the above described conduct.

6 5. SSB's Business Practices Created Conflicts of Interest

7 As described in the Findings of Fact above, SSB's business practices allowed investment
8 bankers to wield inappropriate influence over research analysts. SSB failed to manage, in
9 an adequate or appropriate manner, the conflicts of interest these practices generated.
10 These SSB business practices fostered the flawed research reports described Sections I.E
11 and I.F above. Accordingly, SSB violated A.R.S. §44-1961(A)(13) by engaging in the
12 above described conduct.

13 6. SSB's Policies Were Not Reasonably Designed To Prevent The Potential Misuse Of
14 Material, Non-Public Information

15 As described in the Findings of Fact above, during the relevant period SSB did not
16 maintain written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the sharing and
17 misuse of material, non-public information between an affiliated person of SSB who
18 served as a director of another company and an SSB research analyst covering that
19 company. By reason of the foregoing, SSB violated A.R.S. §44-1961(A)(13) by engaging
20 in the above described conduct.

21 7. SSB Engaged in Spinning

22 As described in the Findings of Fact above, SSB provided favorable and profitable
23 allocations of hot IPO shares to officers of existing or potential investment banking clients
24 who were in a position to direct their companies' investment banking business to SSB.
25 The officers sold the shares provided to them for substantial profit. Subsequently, the
26

1 companies for which the officers worked provided SSB with investment banking business.
2 As a result of these actions, SSB violated A.R.S. §44-1961(A)(13) by engaging in the
3 above described conduct.

4 8. SSB Maintained Inaccurate Books and Records in Connection with its Spinning Activities
5 and IPO Distribution Practices

6 As described in the Findings of Fact above, SSB allowed its employees to engage in "as
7 of" trading and otherwise failed to maintain accurate books and records with respect to
8 spinning. SSB also failed to maintain adequate books and records to ensure that its
9 distributions of IPO shares were completed prior to the initiation of secondary market
10 trading. As a result, SSB violated A.R.S. §44-1961(A)(13) by engaging in the above
11 described conduct.

12 9. SSB Failed to Supervise

13 As described in the Findings of Fact above, SSB failed to establish and maintain adequate
14 procedures to protect research analysts from conflicts of interest from its investment
15 banking operation. Moreover, SSB failed adequately to supervise the activities of its
16 research analysts: it failed to respond to indications that SSB research was misleading and
17 failed to have a system to provide reasonable assurances that its research reports complied
18 with applicable law. SSB also failed adequately to supervise the employees engaged in
19 spinning. Finally, SSB failed to establish and maintain adequate procedures to ensure the
20 proper administration of Issuer Directed Share Programs. As a result, SSB violated
21 A.R.S. §44-1961(A)(13) by engaging in the above described conduct.

22 10. SSB's conduct is grounds for administrative penalties under A.R.S. §§ 44-1961(B)(1) and
23 44-2036.

24 11. SSB's conduct is grounds for a cease and desist order pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 44-
25 1961(B)(2) and 44-2032.

26 12. SSB's conduct is grounds for an order requiring SSB to take affirmative action to

1 correct the conditions and practices giving rise to this action pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 44-
2 1961(B)(3) and 44-2032.

3
4 **III.**

5 **ORDER**

6 On the basis of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Respondent Citigroup Global's
7 consent to the entry of this Order, for the sole purpose of settling this matter, prior to a hearing and
8 without admitting or denying any of the Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, the Commission
9 finds that the following relief is appropriate, in the public interest, and necessary for the protection
10 of investors.

11 **THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:**

- 12 1. This Order concludes the Investigation by the Commission and any other action that the
13 Commission could commence under applicable Arizona law on behalf of Arizona as it
14 relates to Respondent Citigroup Global, or its affiliates arising from or relating to the
15 subject of the Investigation.
- 16 2. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 44-1961(B)(2) and (3) and A.R.S. § 44-2032, Citigroup Global will
17 CEASE AND DESIST from violating A.R.S. § 44-1991 and A.R.S. § 44-1961(A)(13) in
18 connection with the research and stock allocation practices referenced in this Order and will
19 comply with the undertakings of Addendum A, incorporated herein by reference.
- 20 3. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 44-1961(B)(1) and A.R.S. § 44-2036, Citigroup Global shall pay an
21 administrative penalty in the amount of \$2,371,926.00.
- 22 4. Respondent Citigroup Global agrees that it shall not seek or accept, directly or indirectly,
23 reimbursement or indemnification, including, but not limited to payment made pursuant to
24 any insurance policy, with regard to all penalty amounts that Respondent Citigroup Global
25 shall pay pursuant to this Order or Section II of the SEC Final Judgment, regardless of
26 whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to the Distribution Fund

1 Account referred to in the SEC Final Judgment or otherwise used for the benefit of
2 investors. Respondent Citigroup Global further agrees that it shall not claim, assert, or
3 apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any state, federal or local tax for any
4 penalty amounts that Respondent Citigroup Global shall pay pursuant to this Order or
5 Section II of the SEC Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any
6 part thereof are added to the Distribution Fund Account referred to in the SEC Final
7 Judgment or otherwise used for the benefit of investors. Respondent Citigroup Global
8 understands and acknowledges that these provisions are not intended to imply that the
9 Commission would agree that any other amounts Respondent Citigroup Global shall pay
10 pursuant to the SEC Final Judgment may be reimbursed or indemnified (whether pursuant
11 to an insurance policy or otherwise) under applicable law or may be the basis for any tax
12 deduction or tax credit with regard to any state, federal or local tax.

- 13 5. If payment is not made by Respondent Citigroup Global or if Respondent Citigroup Global
14 defaults in any of its obligations set forth in this Order, the Commission may vacate this
15 Order, at its sole discretion, upon 10 days notice to Respondent Citigroup Global and
16 without opportunity for administrative hearing.
- 17 6. This Order is not intended by the Commission to subject any Covered Person to any
18 disqualifications under the laws of any state, the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico
19 (collectively, "State"), including, without limitation, any disqualifications from relying
20 upon the State registration exemptions or State safe harbor provisions. "Covered Person"
21 means Respondent Citigroup Global, or any of its officers, directors, affiliates, current or
22 former employees, or other persons that would otherwise be disqualified as a result of the
23 Orders (as defined below).
- 24 7. The SEC Final Judgment, the NYSE Stipulation and Consent, the NASD Letter of
25 Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, this Order and the order of any other State in related
26 proceedings against Respondent Citigroup Global (collectively, the "Orders") shall not

1 disqualify any Covered Person from any business that they otherwise are qualified, licensed
2 or permitted to perform under the applicable law of Arizona and any disqualifications from
3 relying upon this state's registration exemptions or safe harbor provisions that arise from
4 the Orders are hereby waived.

5 8. For any person or entity not a party to this Order, this Order does not prohibit, limit or
6 create: (1) any private rights or remedies against Respondent Citigroup Global; (2) liability
7 of Respondent Citigroup Global; or (3) defenses of Respondent Citigroup Global to any
8 claims. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the use of any e-mails or other
9 documents of Respondent Citigroup Global or of others.

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




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
9. Nothing herein shall preclude Arizona, its departments, agencies, boards, commissions, authorities, political subdivisions and corporations, other than the Commission and only to the extent set forth in paragraph 1 above, (collectively, "State Entities") and the officers, agents or employees of State Entities from asserting any claims, causes of action, or applications for compensatory, nominal and/or punitive damages, administrative, civil, criminal, or injunctive relief against Respondent Citigroup Global arising from or relating to the subject of the Investigation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order shall become effective immediately.

BY ORDER OF THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

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|--|---|---|
|  |  |  |
| CHAIRMAN | COMMISSIONER | COMMISSIONER |
|  |  | |
| COMMISSIONER | COMMISSIONER | |

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, BRIAN C. McNEIL, Executive Secretary of the Arizona Corporation Commission, have hereunto set my hand and caused the official seal of the Commission to be affixed at the Capitol, in the City of Phoenix, this 5th day of February, 2004.


BRIAN C. McNEIL
Executive Secretary

DISSENT

DISSENT

This document is available in alternative formats by contacting Yvonne McFarlin, Executive Assistant to the Executive Secretary, voice phone number 602-542-3931, E-mail ymcfarlin@cc.state.az.us.

(PAH)

1 **CONSENT TO ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER BY CITIGROUP GLOBAL**

2
3 Citigroup Global hereby acknowledges that it has been served with a copy of this Administrative
4 Order, has read the foregoing Order, is aware of its right to a hearing and appeal in this matter, and has
5 waived the same.

6 Citigroup Global admits the jurisdiction of the Commission, neither admits nor denies the
7 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Order; and consents to entry of this Order
8 by the Commission as settlement of the issues contained in this Order.

9 Citigroup Global states that no promise of any kind or nature whatsoever was made to it to induce
10 it to enter into this Order and that it has entered into this Order voluntarily.

11 Richard Kelchum represents that he ~~she~~ is General Counsel of Citigroup
12 Global and that, as such, has been authorized by Citigroup Global to enter into this Order for and on
13 behalf of Citigroup Global.

14 Dated this 4 day of September, 2003.

15 Citigroup Global

16
17 By: Richard Kelchum
18 Title: General Counsel

19 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 4th day of September, 2003

20
21 Mark A. Rhodes
22 Notary Public

23 My Commission expires:

24 May 13, 2006

25
26 MARK A. RHODES
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 31-4964241
Qualified in New York County
Commission Expires March 26, 1994
May 13, 2006

Addendum A

Undertakings

The firm shall comply with the following undertakings:

I. Separation of Research and Investment Banking

1. Reporting Lines. Research and Investment Banking will be separate units with entirely separate reporting lines within the firm – i.e., Research will not report directly or indirectly to or through Investment Banking. For these purposes, the head of Research may report to or through a person or persons to whom the head of Investment Banking also reports, provided that such person or persons have no direct responsibility for Investment Banking or investment banking activities.
 - a. As used throughout this Addendum, the term “firm” means Citigroup Global Markets Inc., formerly known as Salomon Smith Barney Inc. (“Citigroup Global”), Citigroup Global’s successors and assigns (which, for these purposes, shall include a successor or assign to Citigroup Global’s investment banking and research operations), and their affiliates, other than “exempt investment adviser affiliates.”
 - b. As used throughout this Addendum, the term “exempt investment adviser affiliate” means an investment adviser affiliate (including for these purposes, a separately identifiable department or division that is principally engaged in the provision of investment advice to managed accounts as governed by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940) having no officers (or persons performing similar functions) or employees in common with the firm (which, for purposes of this Section I.1.b, shall not include the investment adviser affiliate) who can influence the activities of the firm’s Research personnel or the content of the firm’s research reports; provided that the firm (i) maintains and enforces written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the firm, any controlling persons, officers (or persons performing similar functions), or employees of the firm from influencing or seeking to influence the activities of Research personnel

of, or the content of research reports prepared by, the investment adviser affiliate; (ii) obtains an annual independent assessment of the operation of such policies and procedures; and (iii) does not furnish to its customers research reports prepared by the investment adviser affiliate or otherwise use such investment adviser affiliate to do indirectly what the firm may not do directly under this Addendum.

- c. As used throughout this Addendum, the term "Investment Banking" means all firm personnel engaged principally in investment banking activities, including the solicitation of issuers and structuring of public offering and other investment banking transactions. It also includes all firm personnel who are directly or indirectly supervised by such persons and all personnel who directly or indirectly supervise such persons, up to and including Investment Banking management.
- d. As used throughout this Addendum, the term "Research" means all firm personnel engaged principally in the preparation and/or publication of research reports, including firm personnel who are directly or indirectly supervised by such persons and those who directly or indirectly supervise such persons, up to and including Research management.
- e. As used throughout this Addendum, the term "research report" means any written (including electronic) communication that is furnished by the firm to investors in the U.S. and that includes an analysis of the common stock, any security convertible into common stock, or any derivative thereof, including American Depositary Receipts (collectively, "Securities"), of an issuer or issuers and provides information reasonably sufficient upon which to base an investment decision; provided, however, that a "research report" shall not include:
 - i. the following communications, if they do not include (except as specified below) an analysis, recommendation or rating (e.g., buy/sell/hold, under perform/market perform/outperform, underweight/market weight/overweight, etc.) of individual securities or issuers:
 - 1. reports discussing broad-based indices, such as the Russell 2000 or S&P 500 index;
 - 2. reports commenting on economic, political or market

- (including trading) conditions;
 - 3. technical or quantitative analysis concerning the demand and supply for a sector, index or industry based on trading volume and price;
 - 4. reports that recommend increasing or decreasing holdings in particular industries or sectors or types of securities; and
 - 5. statistical summaries of multiple companies' financial data and broad-based summaries or listings of recommendations or ratings contained in previously-issued research reports, provided that such summaries or listings do not include any analysis of individual companies; and
- ii. the following communications, even if they include information reasonably sufficient upon which to base an investment decision or a recommendation or rating of individual securities or companies:

- 1. an analysis prepared for a current or prospective investing customer or group of current or prospective investing customers by a registered salesperson or trader who is (or group of registered salespersons or traders who are) not principally engaged in the preparation or publication of research reports; and
 - 2. periodic reports, solicitations or other communications prepared for current or prospective investment company shareholders (or similar beneficial owners of trusts and limited partnerships) or discretionary investment account clients, provided that such communications discuss past performance or the basis for previously made discretionary investment decisions.
2. Legal/Compliance. Research will have its own dedicated legal and compliance staff, who may be a part of the firm's overall compliance/legal infrastructure.
3. Budget. For the firm's first fiscal year following the entry of the final judgment in the action by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") against Citigroup Global in a related proceeding ("final judgment") and thereafter, Research budget and allocation of Research

expenses will be determined by the firm's senior management (e.g., CEO/Chairman/management committee, other than Investment Banking personnel) without input from Investment Banking and without regard to specific revenues or results derived from Investment Banking, though revenues and results of the firm as a whole may be considered in determining Research budget and allocation of Research expenses. On an annual basis thereafter, the Audit Committee of the firm's holding/parent company (or comparable independent persons/group without management responsibilities) will review the budgeting and expense allocation process with respect to Research to ensure compliance with this requirement.

4. Physical Separation. Research and Investment Banking will be physically separated. Such physical separation will be reasonably designed to prevent the intentional and unintentional flow of information between Research and Investment Banking.
5. Compensation. Compensation of professional Research personnel will be determined exclusively by Research management and the firm's senior management (but not including Investment Banking personnel) using the following principles:
 - a. Investment Banking will have no input into compensation decisions.
 - b. Compensation may not be based directly or indirectly on Investment Banking revenues or results; provided, however, that compensation may relate to the revenues or results of the firm as a whole.
 - c. A significant portion of the compensation of anyone principally engaged in the preparation of research reports (as defined in this Addendum) that he or she is required to certify pursuant to the SEC's Regulation Analyst Certification ("Regulation AC") (such person hereinafter a "lead analyst") must be based on quantifiable measures of the quality and accuracy of the lead analyst's research and analysis, including his or her ratings and price targets, if any. In assessing quality, the firm may rely on, among other things, evaluations by the firm's investing customers, evaluations by the firm's sales personnel and rankings in independent surveys. In assessing accuracy, the firm may use the actual performance of a company or its equity securities to rank its own lead analysts' ratings and price targets, if any, and

forecasts, if any, against those of other firms, as well as against benchmarks such as market or sector indices.

- d. Other factors that may be taken into consideration in determining lead analyst compensation include: (i) market capitalization of, and the potential interest of the firm's investing clients in research with respect to, the industry covered by the analyst; (ii) Research management's assessment of the analyst's overall performance of job duties, abilities and leadership; (iii) the analyst's seniority and experience; (iv) the analyst's productivity; and (v) the market for the hiring and retention of analysts.
 - e. The criteria to be used for compensation decisions will be determined by Research management and the firm's senior management (not including Investment Banking) and set forth in writing in advance.
 - f. Research management will document the basis for each compensation decision made with respect to (i) anyone who, in the last 12 months, has been required to certify a research report (as defined in this Addendum) pursuant to Regulation AC; and (ii) anyone who is a member of Research management (except in the case of senior-most Research management, in which case the basis for each compensation decision will be documented by the firm's senior management).
 - g. On an annual basis, the Compensation Committee of the firm's holding/parent company (or comparable independent persons/group without management responsibilities) will review the compensation process for Research personnel. Such review will be reasonably designed to ensure that compensation decisions have been made in a manner that is consistent with these requirements.
6. Evaluations. Evaluations of Research personnel will not be done by, nor will there be input from, Investment Banking personnel.
7. Coverage. Investment Banking will have no input into company-specific coverage decisions (i.e., whether or not to initiate or terminate coverage of a particular company in research reports furnished by the firm), and investment banking revenues or potential revenues will not be taken into account in making company-specific coverage decisions; provided, however, that this requirement does not apply to category-by-category

coverage decisions (e.g., a given industry sector, all issuers underwritten by the firm, companies meeting a certain market cap threshold).

8. Termination of Coverage. When a decision is made to terminate coverage of a particular company in the firm's research reports (whether as a result of a company-specific or category-by-category decision), the firm will make available a final research report on the company using the means of dissemination equivalent to those it ordinarily uses; provided, however, that no final report is required for any company as to which the firm's prior coverage has been limited to purely quantitative analysis. Such report will be comparable to prior reports, unless it is impracticable for the firm to produce a comparable report (e.g., if the analyst covering the company and/or sector has left the firm). In any event, the final research report must disclose: the firm's termination of coverage; and the rationale for the decision to terminate coverage.
9. Prohibition on Soliciting Investment Banking Business. Research is prohibited from participating in efforts to solicit investment banking business. Accordingly, Research may not, among other things, participate in any "pitches" for investment banking business to prospective investment banking clients, or have other communications with companies for the purpose of soliciting investment banking business.
10. Firewalls Between Research and Investment Banking. So as to reduce further the potential for conflicts of interest or the appearance of conflicts of interest, the firm must create and enforce firewalls between Research and Investment Banking reasonably designed to prohibit all communications between the two except as expressly described below:
 - a. Investment Banking personnel may seek, through Research management (or an appropriate designee with comparable management or control responsibilities ("Designee")) or in the presence of internal legal or compliance staff, the views of Research personnel about the merits of a proposed transaction, a potential candidate for a transaction, or market or industry trends, conditions or developments. Research personnel may respond to such inquiries on these subjects through Research management or its Designee or in the presence of internal legal or compliance staff. In addition, Research personnel, through Research management or its Designee or in the presence of internal legal or compliance staff, may initiate communications with

Investment Banking personnel relating to market or industry trends, conditions or developments, provided that such communications are consistent in nature with the types of communications that an analyst might have with investing customers. Any communications between Research and Investment Banking personnel must not be made for the purpose of having Research personnel identify specific potential investment banking transactions.

- b. In response to a request by a commitment or similar committee or subgroup thereof, Research personnel may communicate their views about a proposed transaction or potential candidate for a transaction to the committee or subgroup thereof in connection with the review of such transaction or candidate by the committee. Investment Banking personnel working on the proposed transaction may participate with the Research personnel in these discussions with such committee or subgroup. However, the Research personnel also must have an opportunity to express their views to the committee or subgroup outside the presence of such Investment Banking personnel.
- c. Research personnel may assist the firm in confirming the adequacy of disclosure in offering or other disclosure documents for a transaction based on the analysts' communications with the company and other vetting conducted outside the presence of Investment Banking personnel, but to the extent communicated to Investment Banking personnel, such communication shall only be made in the presence of underwriters' or other counsel on the transaction or internal legal or compliance staff.
- d. After the firm receives an investment banking mandate, or in connection with a block bid or similar transaction, Research personnel may (i) communicate their views on the structuring and pricing of the transaction to personnel in the firm's equity capital markets group, which group's principal job responsibility is the pricing and structuring of transactions (including by participating with the firm's equity capital markets group in the preparation of internal-use memoranda and other efforts to educate the sales force), and (ii) provide to such personnel other information obtained from investing customers relevant to the pricing and structuring of the transaction.
- e. Research personnel may attend or participate in a widely-attended

conference attended by Investment Banking personnel or in which Investment Banking personnel participate, provided that the Research personnel do not participate in activities otherwise prohibited herein.

- f. Research and Investment Banking personnel may attend or participate in widely-attended firm or regional meetings at which matters of general firm interest are discussed. Research management and Investment Banking management may attend meetings or sit on firm management, risk or similar committees at which general business and plans (including those of Investment Banking and Research) and other matters of general firm interest are discussed. Research and Investment Banking personnel may communicate with each other with respect to legal or compliance issues, provided that internal legal or compliance staff is present.
- g. Communications between Research and Investment Banking personnel that are not related to investment banking or research activities may take place without restriction.

11. Additional Restrictions on Activities By Research and Investment Banking Personnel.

- a. Research personnel are prohibited from participating in company or Investment Banking-sponsored road shows related to a public offering or other investment banking transaction.
- b. Investment Banking personnel are prohibited from directing Research personnel to engage in marketing or selling efforts to investors with respect to an investment banking transaction.

12. Oversight. An oversight/monitoring committee or committees, which will be comprised of representatives of Research management and may include others (but not personnel from Investment Banking), will be created to:

- a. review (beforehand, where practicable) all changes in ratings, if any, and material changes in price targets, if any, contained in the firm's research reports;
- b. conduct periodic reviews of research reports to determine whether

changes in ratings or price targets, if any, should be considered; and

c. monitor the overall quality and accuracy of the firm's research reports;

provided, however, that Sections I.12a and I.12b of this Addendum shall not be required with respect to research reports limited to purely quantitative analysis.

II. Disclosure/Transparency and Other Issues

1. Disclosures. In addition to other disclosures required by rule, the firm must disclose prominently on the first page of any research report and any summary or listing of recommendations or ratings contained in previously-issued research reports, in type no smaller than the type used for the text of the report or summary or listing, that:
 - a. "Smith Barney is a division of Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (the "Firm"), which does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report."
 - b. With respect to Covered Companies as to which the firm is required to make available Independent Research (as set forth in Section III below): "Customers of the Firm can receive independent, third-party research on the company covered in this report, at no cost to them, where such research is available. Customers can access this independent research at [website address/hyperlink] or can call [toll-free number] to request a copy of this research."
 - c. "Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision."
2. Transparency of Analysts' Performance. The firm will make publicly available (via its website, in a downloadable format), no later than 90 days after the conclusion of each quarter (beginning with the first full calendar quarter that commences at least 120 days following the entry of the final judgment), the following information, if such information is included in any research report (other than any research report limited to purely quantitative analysis) prepared and furnished by the firm during the prior quarter: subject company, name(s) of analyst(s) responsible for

certification of the report pursuant to Regulation AC, date of report, rating, price target, period within which the price target is to be achieved, earnings per share forecast(s), period(s) for which such forecast(s) are applicable (e.g., 3Q03, FY04, etc.), and definition/explanation of ratings used by the firm.

3. Applicability. Except as specified in the second and third sentences of this Section II.3, the restrictions and requirements set forth in Sections I [Separation of Research and Investment Banking] and Section II [Disclosure/Transparency and Other Issues] of this Addendum will only apply in respect of a research report that is both (i) prepared by the firm; and (ii) that relates to either (A) a U.S. company, or (B) a non-U.S. company for which a U.S. market is the principal equity trading market; provided, however, that such restrictions and requirements do not apply to Research activities relating to a non-U.S. company until the second calendar quarter following the calendar quarter in which the U.S. market became the principal equity trading market for such company. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section I.7 [Coverage] of this Addendum will also apply to any research report (other than the Independent Research made available by the firm pursuant to Section III [Independent, Third-Party Research] of this Addendum) that has been *furnished* by the firm to investors in the U.S., but not prepared by the firm, but only to the extent that the report relates to either (A) a U.S. company, or (B) a non-U.S. company for which a U.S. market is the principal equity trading market. Also notwithstanding the foregoing, Section II.1 [Disclosures] of this Addendum will also apply to any research report (other than the Independent Research made available by the firm pursuant to Section III of this Addendum) that has been *furnished* by the firm to investors in the U.S., but not prepared by the firm, including a report that relates to a non-U.S. company for which a U.S. market is not the principal equity trading market, but only to the extent that the report has been furnished under the firm's name, has been prepared for the exclusive or sole use of the firm or its customers, or has been customized in any material respect for the firm or its customers.
 - a. For purposes of this Section II.3, the firm will be deemed to have furnished a research report to investors in the U.S. if the firm has made the research report available to investors in the U.S. or has arranged for someone else to make it available to investors in the U.S.
 - b. For purposes of this Section II.3, a "U.S. company" means any

company incorporated in the U.S. or whose principal place of business or headquarters is in the U.S.

- c. For purposes of this Section II.3, the calendar quarter in which a non-U.S. company's "principal equity trading market" becomes the U.S. market is a quarter when more than 50% of worldwide trading in the company's common stock and equivalents (such as ordinary shares or common stock or ordinary shares represented by American Depositary Receipts) takes place in the U.S. Trading volume shall be measured by publicly reported share volume.

4. General.

- a. The firm may not knowingly do indirectly that which it cannot do directly under this Addendum.
- b. The firm will adopt and implement policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that its associated persons (including but not limited to the firm's Investment Banking personnel) cannot and do not seek to influence the contents of a research report or the activities of Research personnel for purposes of obtaining or retaining investment banking business. The firm will adopt and implement procedures instructing firm personnel to report immediately to a member of the firm's legal or compliance staff any attempt to influence the contents of a research report or the activities of Research personnel for such a purpose.

5. Timing. Unless otherwise specified, the restrictions and requirements of this Addendum will be effective within 120 days of the entry of the final judgment, except that Sections I.5 [Compensation], I.6 [Evaluations], I.7[Coverage], I.8[Termination of Coverage], I.9 [Prohibition on Soliciting Investment Banking Business], I.11 [Additional Restrictions on Activities by Research and Investment Banking Personnel], and II.4(a) [General (subpart a)] and II.7 [Superseding Rules and Amendments] of this Addendum will be effective within 60 days of the entry of the final judgment, and Sections II.1.b [Disclosures (subpart b)] and III [Independent, Third-Party Research] of this Addendum will be effective within 270 days of the entry of the final judgment.

6. Review of implementation.

- a. The firm will retain, at its own expense, an Independent Monitor acceptable to the Staff of the SEC, the NYSE, the NASD, the

President of NASAA, and the New York Attorney General's Office to conduct a review to provide reasonable assurance of the implementation and effectiveness of the firm's policies and procedures designed to achieve compliance with the terms of this Addendum. This review will begin 18 months after the date of the entry of the final judgment. The Independent Monitor will produce a written report of its review, its findings as to the implementation and effectiveness of the firm's policies and procedures, and its recommendations of other policies or procedures (or amendments to existing policies or procedures) as are necessary and appropriate to achieve compliance with the requirements and prohibitions of this Addendum. The report will be produced to the firm and the Staff of the SEC, the NYSE and the NASD within 30 days from the completion of the review, but no later than 24 months from the date of entry of the final judgment. (The SEC Staff shall make the report available to the President of NASAA and the New York Attorney General's Office upon request.) The Independent Monitor shall have the option to seek an extension of time by making a written request to the Staff of the SEC.

- b. The firm will have a reasonable opportunity to comment on the Independent Monitor's review and proposed report prior to its submission, including a reasonable opportunity to comment on any and all recommendations, and to seek confidential treatment of such information and recommendations set forth therein to the extent that the report concerns proprietary commercial and financial information of the firm. This report will be subject to the protections from disclosure set forth in the rules of the SEC, including the protections from disclosure set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (8) and 17 C.F.R. § 200.80(b) (8), and will not constitute a record, report, statement or data compilation of a public office or agency under Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
- c. The firm will adopt all recommendations contained in the written report of the Independent Monitor; provided, however, that as to any recommendation that the firm believes is unduly burdensome or impractical, the firm may demonstrate why the recommended policy or procedure is, under the circumstances, unreasonable, impractical and/or not designed to yield benefits commensurate with its cost, or the firm may suggest an alternative policy or procedure designed to achieve the same objective, and submit such explanation and/or alternative policy or procedure in writing to the Independent Monitor and to the Staff of the SEC. The firm and the Independent Monitor

shall then attempt in good faith to reach agreement as to any policy or procedure as to which there is any dispute and the Independent Monitor shall reasonably evaluate any alternative policy or procedure proposed by the firm. If an agreement on any issue is not reached, the firm will abide by the determinations of the Staff of the SEC (which shall be made after allowing the firm and the Independent Monitor to present arguments in support of their positions), and adopt those recommendations the Staff of the SEC deems appropriate.

- d. The firm will cooperate fully with the Independent Monitor in this review, including making such non-privileged information and documents available, as the Independent Monitor may reasonably request, and by permitting and requiring the firm's employees and agents to supply such non-privileged information and documents as the Independent Monitor may reasonably request.
- e. To ensure the independence of the Independent Monitor, the firm (i) shall not have the authority to terminate the Independent Monitor without the prior written approval of the SEC staff; and (ii) shall compensate the Independent Monitor, and persons engaged to assist the Independent Monitor, for services rendered pursuant to this Order at their reasonable and customary rates.
- f. For the period of engagement and for a period of three years from completion of the engagement, the Independent Monitor shall not enter into any employment, consultant, attorney-client, auditing or other professional relationship with the firm, or any of its present or former affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents acting in their capacity as such. Any entity with which the Independent Monitor is affiliated or of which he/she is a member, and any person engaged to assist the Independent Monitor in performance of his/her duties under this Order shall not, without prior written consent of the Staff of the SEC, enter into any employment, consultant, attorney-client, auditing or other professional relationship with the firm, or any of its present or former affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents acting in their capacity as such for the period of the engagement and for a period of three years after the engagement.
- g. Five years after the date of the entry of the final judgment, the firm shall certify to the Staff of the SEC, the NYSE, the NASD, the President of NASAA, and the New York Attorney General's Office, that the firm has complied in all material respects with the requirements and prohibitions set forth in this Addendum or, in the event of material non-compliance, will describe such material non-

compliance.

7. Superseding Rules and Amendments. In the event that the SEC adopts a rule or approves an SRO rule or interpretation with the stated intent to supersede any of the provisions of this settlement set forth in this Addendum, except Section IV [Investor Education] the SEC or SRO rule or interpretation will govern with respect to that provision of the settlement and such provision will be superseded. In addition, each of the SEC, NYSE, the NASD, the New York Attorney General's Office and any State that incorporates this Addendum into its settlement of related proceedings against Citigroup Global agrees that the SEC Staff may provide interpretive guidance with respect to the terms of the settlement set forth in this Addendum, except for Section IV [Investor Education], as requested by the firm and that, subject to Court approval, the SEC and the firm may agree to amend or modify any term of the settlement set forth in this Addendum, except for Section IV [Investor Education], in each case, without any further action or involvement by any other regulator in any related proceeding. With respect to any term in Section I or II of this Addendum that has not been superseded (as set forth above) within five years of the entry of the final judgment, it is the expectation of Citigroup Global, the SEC, NYSE, NASD, New York Attorney General's Office and the States that the SEC would agree to an amendment or modification of such term, subject to Court approval, unless the SEC believes such amendment or modification would not be in the public interest.
8. Other Obligations and Requirements. Except as otherwise specified, the requirements and prohibitions of this Addendum shall not relieve the firm of any other applicable legal obligation or requirement.

III. Independent, Third-Party Research

1. Obligation to Make Available. Each year, for the period ending five years after the effective date of this Section III (as set forth in Section II.5 [Timing] of this Addendum), the firm will be required to contract with no fewer than three independent providers of research ("Independent Research Providers") at a time in order to procure and make available Independent Research (as defined below) to the firm's customers in the U.S. as set forth below. There is, however, no requirement that there be at least three Independent Research Providers for the Common Stock of each Covered Company (as those terms are defined below):

- a. For common stock and equivalents (such as ordinary shares or common stock or ordinary shares represented by American Depositary Receipts) listed on a U.S. national securities exchange or quoted in Nasdaq (such securities hereinafter, collectively, "Common Stock") and covered in the firm's research reports (other than those limited to purely quantitative analysis) (an issuer of such covered Common Stock hereinafter called a "Covered Company"), the firm, through an Independent Consultant (as discussed below) will use its reasonable efforts to procure, and shall make available to its customers in the U.S., Independent Research on such Covered Company's Common Stock. (If the Independent Research Providers drop coverage or do not timely pick up coverage of the Common Stock of a Covered Company, the firm will not be in violation of any of the requirements in this Section III, and may continue to disseminate its own research reports on the Common Stock of the Covered Company without making available any Independent Research on the Common Stock of the Covered Company, if the firm takes reasonable steps to request that the Independent Consultant procure such coverage promptly.)
- i. For purposes of this Section III, the firm's research reports include research reports that have not been prepared by the firm, but only to the extent that such reports have been furnished under the firm's name, have been prepared for the exclusive or sole use of the firm or its customers, or have been customized in any material respect for the firm or its customers.
- ii. A non-U.S. company for which a U.S. market is not the principal equity trading market shall only be considered a Covered Company if in the calendar quarter ended March 31, 2003, or in any subsequent calendar quarter during the period that the firm's obligations to procure and make available Independent Research under this Section III are effective, the publicly reported, average daily dollar volume of U.S. trading in such company's Common Stock (measured by multiplying the publicly reported, average daily share volume of U.S. trading during the quarter by the closing price per share of the Common Stock on the last day of the quarter), exceeded \$2.5 million, and (b) the outstanding total public float of the Common Stock as of the last day of such

calendar quarter exceeded \$150 million. Further, the firm's obligation to procure and make available Independent Research with respect to such company shall become effective at the later of: (a) 90 days after the end of the calendar quarter in which the company met the foregoing trading and public float tests; or (b) the effective date of this Section III.

- b. For purposes of this Section III, Independent Research means (i) a research report prepared by an unaffiliated person or entity, or (ii) a statistical or other survey or analysis of research reports (including ratings and price targets) issued by a broad range of persons and entities, including persons and entities having no association with investment banking activities, which survey or analysis has been prepared by an unaffiliated person or entity.
- c. The firm will adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that, in connection with any solicited order for a customer in the U.S. relating to the Common Stock of a Covered Company, and if Independent Research on the Covered Company's Common Stock is available, the registered representative will have informed the customer, during the solicitation, that the customer can receive Independent Research on the Covered Company's Common Stock at no cost to the customer (the "Notice Requirement").
- d. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Notice Requirement will not apply to (i) the solicitation of an institutional customer (an entity other than a natural person having at least \$10 million invested in securities in the aggregate in its portfolio and/or under management) unless such customer, after due notice and opportunity, has advised the firm that it wishes to have the Notice Requirement apply to it (any customer who has not so advised the firm is hereinafter referred to as a "Non-Participating Institutional Customer"); (ii) orders as to which discretion was exercised, pursuant to a written discretionary account agreement or written grant of trading authorization; or (iii) a solicitation by an entity affiliated with Citigroup Global if such entity does not furnish to its customers research reports under the firm's name, prepared by the firm or for the exclusive or sole use of the firm or its customers, or research reports that have been customized in any material respect for the firm or its customers.

- e. Each trade confirmation sent by Citigroup Global to a customer with respect to an order as to which the Notice Requirement applies will set forth (or will be accompanied by a separate statement, which shall be considered part of the confirmation, that will set forth), as of the time the trade confirmation is generated, the ratings, if any, contained in the firm's own research reports and in Independent Research procured for the firm with respect to the Common Stock of the Covered Company that is the subject of the order.
- f. Each periodic account statement sent by Citigroup Global to a customer in the U.S. that reflects a position in the Common Stock of a Covered Company will set forth (or will be accompanied by a separate statement, which shall be considered part of the periodic account statement, that will set forth), as of the end of the period covered by the statement, the ratings, if any, contained in the firm's own research reports and in the Independent Research made available by the firm on the Common Stock of each such Covered Company; provided, however, that this requirement will not apply to Non-Participating Institutional Customers or discretionary accounts.
- g. Notice of the availability of Independent Research on Covered Companies' Common Stock will also be included prominently in the periodic account statements of Citigroup Global's customers in the U.S., in the firm's research reports, and on the firm's website.
- h. The firm will make the Independent Research available to its customers in the U.S. using, for each customer, the means of dissemination equivalent to those it uses to provide the customer with the firm's own research reports, unless the firm and customer agree on another means of dissemination; provided, however, that nothing herein shall require or authorize the firm to comply with the Notice Requirement or make available or disseminate Independent Research at a time when doing so would violate Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 or the other provisions of the federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder. If and to the extent the firm is able to make available or disseminate its own research reports on the Common Stock of a Covered Company pursuant to Rule 137, Rule 138(a) or Rule 139(a) under the Securities Act of 1933 and in reliance on Regulation M under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, then the

firm is also authorized and required to make available or disseminate Independent Research on the Common Stock of such Covered Company (even if the Independent Research does not meet the requirements of such Rule). Notwithstanding this Section III.1.h, if the firm determines, because of legal, compliance or similar concerns, not to furnish or make available its own research reports on the Common Stock of a Covered Company for a limited period of time, it shall not be required to make available the Independent Research on such Covered Company for such period of time.

- i. If, during the period that the firm's obligations to procure and make available Independent Research under this Section III are effective, the firm terminates coverage of the Common Stock of a Covered Company, the firm, through its Independent Consultant, will make reasonable efforts to continue to procure and make available Independent Research on the Common Stock of such company for a period of at least 18 months after termination of coverage (subject to expiration of the firm's obligations under this Section III).
- j. The firm will not be responsible or liable for (i) the procurement decisions of the Independent Consultant (as discussed in Section III.2 [Appointment of Independent Consultant to Oversee the Procurement of Independent Research] of this Addendum) with respect to the Independent Research, (ii) the Independent Research or its content, (iii) customer transactions, to the extent based on the Independent Research, or (iv) claims arising from or in connection with the inclusion of Independent Research ratings in the firm's confirmations and periodic account statements, to the extent such claims are based on those ratings. The firm will not be required to supervise the production of the Independent Research procured by the Independent Consultant and will have no responsibility to comment on the content of the Independent Research. The firm may advise its customers of the foregoing in its discretion.
- k. The Independent Consultant will not be liable for (i) its procurement decisions, (ii) the Independent Research or its content, (iii) customer transactions, to the extent based on the Independent Research, or (iv) claims arising from or in connection with the inclusion of Independent Research ratings in the firm's confirmations and periodic account statements, to the extent such claims are based on those ratings, unless

the Independent Consultant has carried out such duties in bad faith or with willful misconduct. The firm will indemnify the Independent Consultant for any liability arising from the Independent Consultant's good-faith performance of its duties as such.

2. Appointment of Independent Consultant to Oversee the Procurement of Independent Research. Within 30 days of the entry of the final judgment, an Independent Consultant acceptable to the SEC Staff, the NYSE, the NASD, the President of NASAA, the New York Attorney General and the firm shall be named to oversee the procurement of Independent Research from Independent Research Providers. The Independent Consultant will have the final authority (following consultation with the firm and in accordance with the criteria set forth in Section III.3 [Selection of Independent Research Providers] of this Addendum) to procure the Independent Research. The Independent Consultant will not have had any significant financial relationship with the firm during the prior three years and may not have any financial relationship with the firm for three years following his or her work as the Independent Consultant. The Independent Consultant's fee arrangement will be subject to the approval of the Staff of the SEC, the NYSE, the NASD, the President of NASAA, and the New York Attorney General's Office. In the event that an Independent Consultant must be replaced, the replacement shall be acceptable to the Staff of the SEC, the NYSE, the NASD, the President of NASAA, the New York Attorney General's Office and the firm, and shall be subject to these same conditions.
3. Selection of Independent Research Providers. The Independent Consultant will seek to procure research reports on the Common Stock of all Covered Companies from Independent Research Providers. Independent Research Providers may not perform investment banking business of any kind and may not provide brokerage services in direct and significant competition with the firm. In addition, the Independent Consultant will use the following criteria in selecting and contracting with Independent Research Providers to provide Independent Research.

- a. whether and to what extent the Independent Research Provider or any of its affiliates or associated persons is engaged in activities (including, but not limited to, activities involving Covered Companies or their securities), or has a business or other relationship with the firm or any of its affiliates or associated persons, that may conflict or create the appearance of conflict with its preparation and publication of the Independent Research;
 - b. the desirability of multiple coverage of certain Covered Companies (e.g., by size of company, industry sector, companies underwritten by the firm, etc.);
 - c. the extent to which the Independent Research Provider has a client base and revenue stream broad enough to ensure its independence from the firm;
 - d. the utility of the Independent Research Provider's Independent Research to the firm's customers, including the inclusion of ratings and price targets in such research and the extent to which the firm's customers actually use the research; and with respect to surveys or analyses described above in Section III.1.b(ii), the extent to which the Independent Research provides customers with a means of comparing the firm's research reports to those published by other persons and entities, including persons and entities having no association with investment banking activities;
 - e. the quality and accuracy of the Independent Research Provider's past research, including during the term of the Independent Consultant's tenure;
 - f. the experience, expertise, reputation and qualifications (including, as appropriate, registrations) of the Independent Research Provider and its personnel; and
 - g. the cost of the Independent Research, especially in light of the five-year period set forth in Section III.1 above for the firm to make Independent Research available to its investing customers.
4. Disclosure Language. Language substantially to the effect set forth below may be used by the firm and its registered representatives to inform the

firm's customers of the availability of Independent Research:

- a. Disclosure to customers as required by Section III.1.c [Obligation to Make Available subpart c] of this Addendum.

"There is also independent, third-party research available on this company, which you can get at no cost [from our website/hyperlink] or by calling [toll-free number], or which I can arrange to send to you if you would like."

- b. General website and periodic customer account statement disclosure as required by Section III.1.g. [Obligation to Make Available subpart g] of this Addendum.

"Independent, third-party research on certain companies covered by the firm's research is available to customers of the Firm at no cost. Customers can access this research at [our website/hyperlink] or can call [toll-free number] to request that a copy of this research be sent to them."

5. Annual Reporting. The Independent Consultant will report annually to the Staff of the SEC, the NYSE, the NASD, the President of NASAA, and the New York Attorney General's Office on its selection of Independent Research Providers, the Independent Research it has procured, the cost of the Independent Research it has procured to date, and the Independent Consultant's fees and expenses to date.

IV. Investor Education

1. General. The firm will pay a total of \$25,000,000, payable in five equal installments on an annual basis (with the first payment to be made 90 days after the entry of the final judgment), to funds earmarked for investor education. Of this money, a total of \$12,500,000 shall be paid pursuant Citigroup Global's agreement with the SEC, NYSE and NASD. The remainder of the funds earmarked for investor education, in the amount of \$12,500,000, shall be paid to the Investor Education Fund at the Investor Protection Trust, a Wisconsin charitable trust, pursuant to agreement with the Board of Directors of NASAA, to be used for the purpose of investor education as described in Section IV.3.

2. Payments to the Investor Education Fund.

- a. As referenced in Section IV.1 above, Citigroup Global shall pay the amount of \$12,500,000 in five equal annual installment payments as designated by the NASAA Board of Directors to the Investor Education Fund ("the Fund") to be held as a separate fund by the Investor Protection Trust, 411 East Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53202-4497, c/o Quarles & Brady. The amount for investor education to be paid by Citigroup Global to the Fund may be reduced due to the decision of any state(s) not to enter into a settlement with Citigroup Global in a related proceeding.
- b. Citigroup Global shall make the first such installment payment within ninety (90) days after the entry of the final judgment. This payment shall be made by wire transfer to the Investor Protection Trust at US Bank NA, Milwaukee, WI, ABA #075000022 for credit for the Trust Division Account 112-950-027, for further credit to the Investor Protection Trust Account Number 000012891800 together with a cover letter identifying Citigroup Global as a party resolving the Investigation and the payment designated for the Investor Education Fund. Citigroup Global shall simultaneously transmit photocopies of its payment and letter to the President of NASAA, 10 G Street NE, Washington, DC 20002. By making this payment, and those payments referenced in Section IV.2.c. below, Citigroup Global relinquishes all legal and equitable right, title, and interest in such funds, and no part of the funds shall be returned to Citigroup Global. The Fund shall be administered in accordance with the terms of the investor education plan.
- c. Citigroup Global shall make subsequent installment payments annually on or before the month and day of the entry of the final judgment. Such payments shall be made into the Fund at the Investor Protection Trust as described in Section IV.2(b).

3. Purpose of and Limitations on the Use of the Fund.

- a. The Fund (including all installment payments) shall be used to support programs designed for the purpose of investor education and research and education with respect to the protection of investors, and to equip investors with the knowledge and skills necessary to make informed

investment decisions and to increase personal financial literacy. The Investor Protection Trust, in cooperation with NASAA, shall establish an investor education plan designed to achieve these purposes.

- b. No principal or income from the Fund shall:
 - (i) inure to the general fund or treasury of any State;
 - (ii) be utilized to pay the routine operating expenses of NASAA; or
 - (iii) be utilized to pay the compensation or expenses of state officials or state employees except such expenses as are necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Fund.
- c. Monies in the Fund may also be used to pay any taxes on income earned by such Fund. Citigroup Global shall provide the Investor Protection Trust with relevant information and otherwise cooperate with the Investor Protection Trust in fulfilling the Fund's obligations under applicable law.
- d. All fees, costs, and expenses incurred by the Investor Protection Trust in connection with and incidental to the performance of its duties under this Addendum, including the fees, costs, and expenses of any persons engaged to assist it and all administrative fees, costs, and expenses related to the investor education plan, shall be paid out of the Fund.

