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AZ CORP COMMISSION
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8 ORIGINAL

9 BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

10 **COMMISSIONERS**

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Arizona Corporation Commission

DOCKETED

MAR 24 2015

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16 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
17 OF UTILITY SOURCE, LLC, AN
18 ARIZONA CORPORATION, FOR A
19 DETERMINATION OF THE FAIR VALUE
20 OF ITS UTILITY PLANTS AND
21 PROPERTY AND FOR INCREASES IN
22 ITS WATER AND WASTEWATER RATES
23 AND CHARGES FOR UTILITY SERVICE
24 BASED THEREON.

DOCKET NO: WS-04235A-13-0331

POST-HEARING BRIEF

25 Utility Source, L.L.C. ("Company" or "Utility Source"), hereby files its post-
26 hearing brief ("Brief"). This Brief hereby incorporates the Company's Final Schedules
27 filed with the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission") on March 6, 2015.

28 This Brief begins by addressing issues related to the wastewater rate case
component. Next, the Company addresses issues related to the water rates. Finally, the
Company discusses the cost of capital issues.

1 **1.0 WASTEWATER**

2 The Company and Staff have very similar proposals. The Company and Staff
3 agree upon the rate base and operating expenses mostly. The Company's proposed
4 revenue requirement is \$318,237. Staff's proposed revenue requirement is \$305,275.
5 The variances are due to differences in proposed rate of return and "flow through" items
6 such as taxes based upon proposed revenues. The court should follow this approach and
7 adopt the Company's proposed rate base, operating expenses, and rate of return related to
8 wastewater service. Furthermore, the Court should adopt the Company's rate design
9 because it offers both financial stability and has a reasonable chance to actually meet the
10 revenue requirement.
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14 **1.1 Rate Base**

15 If the law and standard rate-making procedures are followed, then the rate base for
16 the wastewater division should be \$825,880. Staff and the Company agree on this
17 amount. The Company believed it was settling the issue when it agreed with Staff's
18 adjustments, which RUCO mostly followed as well earlier in the proceeding.
19
20

21 Staff and the Company arrive at this same amount because they started from the
22 same rightful point - Decision No. 70140. In this decision, the Commission established a
23 rate base and found CIAC in the amount of \$197,973. *See id.* at p. 9. This finding was
24 based upon the recommendation of then-Staff witness Michlik. The Company respected
25 the previous Commission decision and made no changes to CIAC. *See Bourassa's Final*
26 *Schedule B-1.* The numbers were just carried forward from the last rate case. Staff has
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28

1 done the same and used the CIAC balance approved in the prior rate case. Keller
2 Testimony at p. 759, line 16 – 18; *see also* Staff Final Schedule JLK-WW4, line 32.

3
4 Not only is respecting previous decisions standard practice before the
5 Commission, it is the law. A.R.S. § 40-252 states, “[I]n all collateral actions or
6 proceedings, the orders and decisions of the commission which have become final shall
7 be conclusive.” A collateral attack is an effort to obtain a judgment that defeats the first
8 judgment. *See Cox v. Mackenzie*, 70 Ariz. 308, 219 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1950).

9
10 In direct conflict with this law, Nielsen and RUCO have taken the position that
11 this court should make decisions about rate base that the Commission decided in the last
12 rate case. For the first time in its final schedules, RUCO makes a \$109,206 adjustment
13 of “additional unrecorded CIAC”. *See* Final Schedule JMM-7. RUCO also makes a
14 “hook-up fees unrecorded” adjustment of \$361,800. *See* Final Schedule JMM-7.

15
16 Nielsen seems to make this same assertion in his filing dated March 10, 2015. *See id.* at
17 p. 2-3. As the Company has noted from the onset, the Commission’s decision on how to
18 treat then-existing plant decided in Decision No. 70140 are conclusive and cannot be
19 undone now by collateral attack.
20

21
22 Moreover, neither RUCO nor Nielsen provided any credible evidence that the
23 Commission made the wrong decision in the last rate case. For example, RUCO cites the
24 testimony of its witness Michlik as authority for claiming that the Commission-approved
25 rate base still includes \$361,800 in hook-up fees that should be deducted from rate base
26 and treated as CIAC. *See* Final Schedule JMM-7 (References column B – testimony of
27 JMM). RUCO cites Michlik’s testimony for the proposition that there is additional
28

1 unrecorded CIAC in the amount of \$109,206. But nowhere does he ever make such
2 claim. In fact, just the opposite is true. In the previous rate case, Michlik was the
3 Commission staff person who analyzed the Company financials and recommended the
4 rate base the Commission adopted. Put another way, Michlik is now effectively avowing
5 that seven years ago, after thoroughly reviewing the plant then at issue, he made a
6 \$461,006 mistake by overlooking \$361,800 in hook-up fees and missing \$109,206 in
7 contributed plant. With all due respect, how can this court give Michlik's testimony
8 offered now more weight than the testimony and recommendation he offered to the
9 Commission seven years ago when he was responsible for ensuring the rate base included
10 only proven costs?
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14 Similarly, Nielsen's position is not based upon facts; it is conjecture. Nielsen
15 simply speculates that there is "additional unrecorded CIAC" in the rate base the
16 Commission adopted in the last rate case. He also speculates that the Company received
17 \$361,800 in "unrecorded hook-up fees", but there is no proof supporting these
18 accusations.
19
20

21 **1.1.1 Land Rights**

22 Nielsen also challenges the Commission's determination of the value of the land
23 used to provide sewer service. In the prior rate case decision, the Commission
24 established a rate base and found the land value to be \$105,000. This finding was based
25 upon the recommendation of then-Staff witness Michlik. Again, the Company made no
26 changes to CIAC. *See* Bourassa's Final Schedule B-1. The land value was just carried
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1 forward from the last rate case. Staff did the same. Keller at p. 759, line 16 – 18; *see* also
2 Staff Final Schedule JLK-WW4, line 32.

3
4 But Nielsen mistakenly believes that the Commission's earlier decisions can be
5 attacked in this case. Though no changes have occurred, Nielsen believes the Company's
6 original land value cost should be reduced by \$30,476.80. See Nielsen's Notice of Filing,
7 p. 2-3 (Mar. 10, 2015). This is simply wrong.

9 **1.1.2 Small Treatment Plant Is Used and Useful**

10 The Company, Staff, and RUCO all agree that the small treatment plant, which is
11 used to hold and treat sludge, should remain part of rate base. This is based upon a
12 determination by Staff's engineer that the plant is currently used and useful as a sludge
13 storage facility. *See* Thompson testimony at p. 555, lines 20-21. Meanwhile, Nielsen
14 believes this plant is not useful because it is not being used as influent treatment. Despite
15 Nielsen's position, using the plant to continue the process of decomposing and drying the
16 sludge before shipping it to a landfill is extremely useful and saves the customers
17 thousands of dollars in sludge hauling fees each year. Therefore, the Company's position
18 should be adopted.

22 **1.2 Operating Expenses**

23 Staff made the following material adjustments: (1) reduced purchased power by
24 \$207; (2) increased water testing by \$8,858; (3) reclassified \$3,484 of SRP bill payment
25 to rent; (4) reduced auto expense by \$1,750; (5) reduced telephone expense by \$2,366;
26 and (6) removed \$7,145 from miscellaneous expense, reclassifying some to rent. Staff
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1 also proposed \$10,000 in rate case expense. The Company has agreed to these
2 adjustments.
3

4 Meanwhile, following Nielsen's lead mostly, RUCO has proposed several drastic
5 adjustments. Initially RUCO proposed the following: (1) no rate case expense
6 [recovered in a surcharge]; (2) reducing automobile expense by \$1,750; (3) reducing
7 telephone expense by \$2,366; (4) reducing purchased power by \$413; and (5) reducing
8 accounting services by \$8,126. After the hearing RUCO proposed the following
9 adjustments (6) reducing telephone expense by an additional \$1,536; (7) reducing copier
10 expense by \$1,922; (8) reducing the SRP in-lieu rent by \$6,020; (10) reducing auto
11 expense another \$708; and (9) reducing Staples office supplies another \$298.
12
13

14 Nielsen has taken the positions primarily upon the mistaken belief that Utility
15 Source is sharing office and employees with other companies. However, unrefuted
16 testimony is that the Company does not share office space. Testimony of McCleve, p.
17 38, lines 11-12. Admittedly, the Company does allow others like the HOA to use the
18 conference room on occasion, but this is a courtesy, not an office sharing arrangement.
19
20 *Id.* at p. 38, lines 13-25. Likewise, the testimony establishes that Mrs. Parry works for
21 Utility Source, and while she does help people on tasks unrelated to her Utility Source
22 tasks, her primary job is working for the Company. *Id.* at p. 39, lines 1-17. *See* also p.
23 74, lines 1-16. Based upon the fact that Utility Source does not share employees or office
24 space, the proposed adjustments by Nielsen should not be followed.
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1 **1.3 Rate Design**

2 The Company's rate design is patterned after the rate design in the previous rate
3 case and should be adopted. The Company has 320 residential customers and 4
5 commercial customers. Therefore, the Company understands the residential rate design
6 is critical. Therefore, for the typical residential customer, the Company proposes a
7 \$52.00 minimum and \$4.96 per 1,000 gallons of water use per month. This will provide
8 the Company revenue stability and retain the link to water use as Staff has historically
9 wanted.
10

11 Curiously, Staff is recommending a \$50.00 minimum and no commodity charge.
12 Here, the concern is that Staff is piling way too much of the rate increase upon the 4
13 commercial customers. Under Staff's proposal, commercial customers will pay \$11.61
14 per 1,000 gallons of water purchased. It stands to reason that such a high commodity rate
15 will cause water conservation to occur. While water conservation is a sound public
16 policy, here it can leave the Company without sufficient revenues.
17

18 On the other hand, RUCO is proposing a rate design without a monthly minimum.
19 The Company's current rate design does not have a monthly minimum either. This has
20 left the Company in financial trouble during the Winter months when water use drops
21 dramatically. This approach unduly exposes the Company to undue risk when
22 conservation occurs. There is no doubt that with the new water and wastewater rates,
23 conservation will occur, so the rate design needs to ensure that the Company has some
24 revenue stability. Thus, the Company's middle-ground approach of a monthly minimum
25 and commodity charge is the best rate design.
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1 **2.0 WATER**

2 The Company's proposed rates follow common practices and procedures, with one
3 major exception. To soften the rate impact to its customers, Utility Source removed the
4 value of Deep Well 4, which is approximately \$1.5 million, from rate base. With this
5 adjustment, the rate case should have gone forward pursuant to standard rate-making
6 methods. Instead, at the eve of trial Staff came up with a proposal to try and capture
7 revenues from a standpipe constructed one year and eight months after the test year.
8 Defying rate-making standards and logic, Staff creates mismatches by allocating costs
9 and expenses in the 2012 test year to the standpipe that began operating in late 2014.
10 Meanwhile, the intervenors are trying to collaterally attack the rate base adopted by the
11 Commission seven years ago. In light of these positions, the Company is the only party
12 offering a reasonable proposal.
13

14 **2.1 Standpipe Operation**

15 First and foremost, the Company's position on the standpipe operation is clear.
16 The test year is 2012. The standpipe began operating in September 2014. The Company
17 did not include any revenues, investments or expenses related to the standpipe. In other
18 words, the Company's position is that the standpipe operations should not affect the rate
19 case. See Bourassa Testimony of p. 145, line – p. 146, line 19. Neither the post-test year
20 plant nor the revenues derived from that plant should be included in this case. All of the
21 operating expenses and plant that was used and useful during the test year are rightfully
22 allocated under the Company's proposal.
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1 But Staff's proposal is creating a classic mismatch. Staff wants to add the
2 anticipated revenues (which are nothing more than estimates) gained from the standpipe
3 operation into the rate case. Incredibly, Staff is proposing to remove 25% of the mains,
4 50% of the rate case expense, and 25% of other expenses from the test year and allocate
5 those expenses to the projected standpipe customers.
6

7
8 Meanwhile, to his credit, Staff's engineer held his professional opinion and
9 testified that Deep Well 4 is needed to produce water for the standpipe and redundancy.
10 See Thompson Testimony at p. 549, lines 4 – 9. Yet, Staff did not include the Deep Well
11 4 cost of \$1,500,000 in rate base. Similarly, Staff did not include the \$165,000 of
12 investment in the standpipe loading facility either. See Staff's Final Schedules at
13 Schedule JLK-W4 (water). In other words, Staff's position is that the revenue from the
14 standpipe should be counted, but the investment needed to generate that revenue should
15 be ignored.
16
17

18 When considering post-test year plant, typically RUCO and Staff take the
19 positions that the plant should be (1) used and useful within 6 months of the test year, (2)
20 revenue neutral [for existing customers], and (3) the cost must be known and measurable.
21 See Michlik Testimony at p. 441, line 19 – p. 443, line 1. Known and measurable
22 changes are changes in a company's assets and operations that occur after the end of a
23 test year but before rates are set, and that are shown to be reliable and certain. See *Utah*
24 *Power & Light Co. v. Idaho Public Utils. Comm*, 102 Idaho 282, 284, 629 P.2d 678, 680
25 (1981). Here, none of those elements are met.
26
27
28

1 Not only is Staff's proposal inconsistent with common practices, it is simply
2 conjecture. Staff is allocating plant used and useful long before the standpipe was built to
3 its "standpipe customer rates." Staff is allocating expenses incurred during 2012 to the
4 standpipe system when such system was not in place at that time and without a cost of
5 service study. Bourassa Testimony at p. 144, lines 5-6. Staff is projecting revenues
6 based off data collected over a few months. Staff's proposal effectively splits Utility
7 Sources' system into two separate systems. This is extremely odd, violates normal
8 procedures and is clearly not proper rate making.
9
10

11 The Company's position is undeniable and clear - if the revenues of the standpipe
12 are going to be included in the rate base, then the investments of \$1.5 million in Deep
13 Well 4 and \$165,000 in standpipe station construction must also be included in rates. *See*
14 Bourassa Testimony at p. 145.
15
16

17 Finally, the Company is aware that Staff and the intervenors were concerned that
18 the Company might over earn. Therefore, the Company proposed that if its revenues
19 exceeded the revenue requirement by 10%, then the Company would file another rate
20 case.
21

22 **2.2 Rate Base**

23 The Company's position is clear and consistent with the law and common practice
24 at the Commission. The Company proposes a rate base of \$1,499,779. This recognizes
25 that the Company received \$294,745 in CIAC, which was carried forward from Decision
26 No. 70140. Importantly, at the outset of the rate case, to ease the burden on its customers
27 the Company voluntarily removed Deep Well 4 and its related improvements from
28

1 consideration, which amounted to a \$1,488,899 reduction in rate base. During the rate
2 case discovery process, Utility Source agreed with Staff's adjustment removing \$5,885 in
3 deposits from rate base. Before its decision to grab the standpipe revenues, the Company
4 and Staff had consistent proposals.

6 **2.2.1 Land Rights and Plant**

7
8 The Company does agree with all of the parties that the \$92,000 adjustment to
9 remove shallow wells 1 and 3 from rate base. But there are still issues to be addressed,
10 unfortunately. As he does with the wastewater plant, Nielsen challenges the
11 Commission's determination of the value of the land used to provide water service. In
12 the prior rate case decision, the Commission established a rate base and found the land
13 value to be \$210,000. Again, the Company made no changes; the land value was simply
14 carried forward. *See Bourassa's Final Schedule B-2 (water)*. Nielsen also asserts the fire
15 hydrants and some of the water distribution system were CIAC. However, there is no
16 evidence to support this assertion. Again, the Company simply carried the rate base
17 forward. Nielsen also claims the Company was given \$201,000 in hookup fees by
18 developers and that amount should be deducted from the rate base set in Decision No.
19 70140. But as the Company has repeatedly explained to Nielsen, the purpose of this rate
20 case is not to relitigate issues decided seven years ago. Making the adjustments proposed
21 by Nielsen would be an improper collateral attack on a previous Commission decision.
22 *See Cox v. Mackenzie, 70 Ariz. 308, 219 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1950)*.

1 **2.3 Operating Expenses**

2 The Company accepted Staff's previous adjustments to operating expenses. The
3 Company continues to support its operating expenses set forth in its final schedules. The
4 Company does not support Staff's across the board 25% reduction to the 2012 operating
5 expenses proposed by Staff. Those expenses were incurred and established in 2012 and it
6 is nonsense to believe those costs are going to go away because the standpipe is now
7 operational.
8

9
10 As explained above in the wastewater section, the adjustments proposed by
11 Nielsen and RUCO are improper. Again, the Company believes rate case expense should
12 be included in rates, not a surcharge. As previously explained, Mrs. Parry works for
13 Utility Source full time; she does not split her time with any other business. The
14 Company disputes the final adjustments proposed by RUCO set forth in RUCO Final
15 Schedule JMM-17 and proposals by Nielsen.
16
17

18 **2.4 Fire Flow**

19 As the Company explained, the fire flow issues have been resolved. McCleve
20 Testimony at p. 35, line 18 – p. 36, line 14.
21

22 **2.5 Rate Design**

23 The Company continues to support its water rate design. See Company Final
24 Schedule H-3. These rates offer the Company rate stability while encouraging
25 conservation.
26

27 **2.6 BMPs**

28 The Company still opposes any requirement to adopt BMPs.

1 **3.0 COST OF CAPITAL**

2 The Company recommends a cost of equity of 11% based on recent analyses.
3
4 Company expert Bourassa testified that the range of DCF, CAPM, and Build-up Method
5 analyses is 9.0% to 11.6% with a mid-point of 10.3%. A return on equity of 11.0% for
6 Utility Source, given its size and greater risk compared to the public traded water utilities,
7 is conservative. The Company's recommended capital structure consists no debt and
8 100% common equity. Based on the Company's recommended cost of equity and capital
9 structure, the Company's weighted cost of capital is 11.0%, as shown in Exhibit A-1,
10 Rejoinder Schedule D-1.
11
12

13 The Company's position recognizes the significant business and investment risk
14 facing small utilities like the Company. *See* Bourassa Testimony at p. 156, line 7 – p.
15 158, line 2. As Bourassa noted, small utility companies often fail to earn their authorized
16 rate of return when compared to large utilities. *Id.* at p. 158, lines 3-11. Therefore,
17 Bourassa recommends a 70 point adjustment to recognize the fact that small utilities face
18 far more risk than large utilities and the Commission should recognize this fact. *See*
19 Bourassa Testimony at p. 782, line 8 – p. 783, line 13.
20
21

22 Staff and RUCO, however, purport to treat small utilities like a large company or
23 worse. As everyone knows, unlike a large company, a small company cannot sell bonds
24 and there is no dispute that banks typically do not loan money to small water companies
25 in Arizona. *See, e.g.,* Mease Testimony at p. 506, line 11 – p. 507, line 16; Cassidy
26 Testimony at p. 601, line 6 – p. 602, line 15. Further, small water companies, like Utility
27 Source, do not have access to the publicly traded equity markets. This means it is
28

1 extremely difficult for small water companies to raise capital, which increases risk. More
2 importantly, large utility market returns for the last 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year periods
3 range from approximately 12.6% to 11.8%. Bourassa Testimony at p. 784, lines 19-23.
4 These large company returns are much higher than those proposed by Staff and RUCO.
5

6 What is equally striking is that not only are Staff's and RUCO's cost of capital
7 recommendations far below the returns of large companies, but both actually had to make
8 substantial adjustments to their models to raise their recommendations because the results
9 from their models were far too low. Staff is recommending a cost of capital of 9.8%.
10 However, Staff's models produced such a low number that Staff added an "economic
11 assessment adjustment" of 60 basis points to reach that number. *See Cassidy Testimony*
12 *at p. 614, line 24 – p. 615, line 18. Similarly, RUCO's proposed cost of capital of*
13 *9.25% includes a 70 point upward adjustment. Again, this is because the models RUCO*
14 *used produced a result that was way too low. See Mease Testimony at p. 508, line 20 – p.*
15 *509, line 16.*
16
17
18

19 Thus, the Company's models produced a 10.3% result that was below the earnings
20 of large companies, and when the Company added 70 basis points, the rate of return was
21 still below, but near the large company earnings. Meanwhile, both Staff and RUCO used
22 models that produced unreasonably low numbers, so they made 60 and 70 basis point
23 adjustments so their recommendations would seem somewhat rational. But despite their
24 efforts, clearly the Company's models are more accurate and its recommendation is the
25 most reasonable.
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