

ORIGINAL

NEW APPLICATION



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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

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Arizona Corporation Commission

COMMISSIONERS

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AZ CORP COMMISSION
DOCKET CONTROL

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OCT 17 2012

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In the matter of:
MARK DANA HUGHES, CRD# 1843511,
and DOLLY A. HUGHES, husband and
wife,
and
LEGACY FINANCIAL ADVISORS,
L.L.C., CRD# 114029, an Arizona limited
liability company,
Respondents.

DOCKET NO. S-20864A-12-0439

NOTICE OF OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING
REGARDING PROPOSED ORDER TO
CEASE AND DESIST, ORDER FOR
RESTITUTION, ORDER OF REVOCATION,
ORDER FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
PENALTIES, AND ORDER FOR OTHER
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

NOTICE: EACH RESPONDENT HAS 10 DAYS TO REQUEST A HEARING

EACH RESPONDENT HAS 30 DAYS TO FILE AN ANSWER

The Securities Division ("Division") of the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission") alleges that respondents Mark Dana Hughes and Legacy Financial Advisors, L.L.C. have engaged in acts, practices, and transactions that constitute violations of the Arizona Investment Management Act, A.R.S. § 44-3101 *et seq.* ("IM Act").

I.

JURISDICTION

1. The Commission has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article XV of the Arizona Constitution and the IM Act.

....

....

1 **II.**

2 **RESPONDENTS**

3 2. Mark Dana Hughes (CRD# 1843511) (“Hughes”) is a married man believed to be
4 residing in Tucson, Arizona and Pinos Altos, New Mexico. At all times relevant, Hughes resided in
5 Tucson, Arizona.

6 3. At all relevant times Hughes has been the spouse of Dolly A. Hughes.

7 4. Dolly A. Hughes may be referred to hereafter as “Respondent Spouse.” Respondent
8 Spouse is joined in this action under A.R.S. § 44-3291(C) solely for purposes of determining the
9 liability of Hughes’ and Dolly A. Hughes’ marital community.

10 5. At all relevant times Hughes has been acting for his own benefit, and for the benefit or
11 in furtherance of the marital community with Respondent Spouse.

12 6. On or about April 7, 2008, Legacy Financial Advisors, (CRD# 114029), which was
13 owned and operated by Hughes as a sole proprietorship, became licensed as an investment adviser in
14 Arizona. Prior to this date, Legacy Financial Advisors had been registered with the Securities and
15 Exchange Commission and noticed filed with the Commission.¹

16 7. On or about December 8, 2009, Hughes changed the form of his business from a sole
17 proprietorship to an Arizona limited liability company named Legacy Financial Advisors, L.L.C.
18 Legacy Financial Advisors, L.L.C. was located in and operated from Tucson, Arizona. For the
19 purposes of this Notice the sole proprietorship and the Arizona limited liability company will be
20 collectively known as “LFA”.

21 8. Hughes was LFA’s sole owner, member, managing member, compliance officer and
22 investment adviser representative.

23 9. Hughes or LFA may each be referred to as “Respondent.”
24

25 ...

26 ¹ Hughes registered the business names Legacy Financial Advisors and Legacy Financial Advisors Inc. with the SEC. The notice filing status with the Commission terminated on April 29, 2008.

1 risk. If the underlying index moves in the opposite direction than expected, there will be a loss of
2 funds. Third, the underlying index itself may be risky. For example, an index consisting of small
3 and/or mid-sized capitalized companies present greater investment risk than found with larger more
4 established companies.²

5 15. Some of LFA's clients were principally conservative to moderately conservative
6 investors. These clients described or characterized their investment objectives to Hughes in a
7 variety of ways including telling Hughes they were either risk adverse, had limited resources, that
8 they could ill-afford principal loss or that they did not have sufficient annual income and or assets
9 to warrant investment in securities that were speculative or high-risk. Some of LFA's clients had
10 moderately aggressive investment objectives when they began their relationship with LFA,
11 however, life events caused some of these more aggressive investors to change their investment
12 objectives to conservative which they clearly communicated to LFA/Hughes.

13 ...

14 _____
15 ² To better understand the risks associated with ETFs it is instructive to review the Financial Industry Regulatory
16 Authority's ("FINRA") June 2009, Regulatory Notice 09-31 regarding non-traditional ETFs; ETFs that are leveraged
17 and inverse exchange-traded funds. FINRA noted that these ETFs are "highly complex financial instruments that are
18 typically designed to achieve their stated objectives on a daily basis." Because of the nature of the ETFs, their long-
19 term performance may differ considerably from the daily objective. Therefore, FINRA concluded "inverse and
20 leveraged ETFs that are reset daily typically are unsuitable for retail investors who plan to hold them for longer than
21 one trading session...."

22 FINRA provided the two following examples of the downside risk of these types of ETFs for the time period between
23 December 1, 2008, and April 30, 2009:

- 24 • The Dow Jones U.S. Oil & Gas Index gained 2 percent, while an ETF seeking to deliver twice the index's
25 daily return fell 6 percent and the related ETF seeking to deliver twice the inverse of the index's daily return
26 fell 26 percent.
- An ETF seeking to deliver three times the daily return of the Russell 1000 Financial Services Index fell 53
percent while the index actually gained 8 percent. The related ETF seeking to deliver three times the inverse
of the index's daily return declined by 90 percent over the same period.

27 As a result, FINRA said if ETFs are to be recommended, then they "must be suitable and based on a full understanding
28 of the terms and features of the product recommended." The suitability determination requires a review of the
29 customer's financial status, tax status, investment objectives, and other information about the client. FINRA also refers
30 to its Regulatory Notice regarding fair dealing with customers with new financial products. FINRA observed that
31 every effort should be made to make customers aware of the pertinent information regarding such products and that
32 each customer's financial situation, trading experience, ability to meet the risks involved with such products should be
33 considered before recommending these types of products.

34 FINRA is the brokerage industry's self-regulatory organization operating under the supervision and oversight of the
35 United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

1 THE ETFs TRADED BY LFA/HUGHES

2 16. Almost all of the securities traded by Hughes in LFA's client accounts involved
3 leveraged and/or inverse ETFs.³ Each of these ETFs was designed to correspond to a multiple of
4 the inverse of the daily price performance of an underlying index. The majority of transactions
5 effected in LFA client accounts involved the following inverse and/or leveraged ETFs:

- 6
- 7 • EDC - Direxion Daily Emerging Markets Bull 3x Shares – the underlying index is
the MSCI Emerging Markets IndexSM.
 - 8 • EDZ - Direxion Daily Emerging Markets Bear 3x Shares – the underlying index is
the MSCI Emerging Markets IndexSM.
 - 9
 - 10 • ERX - Direxion Daily Energy Bull 3x Shares – the underlying index is the Energy
Select Sector Index.
 - 11
 - 12 • ERY - Direxion Daily Energy Bear 3x Shares– the underlying index is the Energy
Select Sector Index.
 - 13
 - 14 • FAS - Direxion Daily Financial Bull 3X Shares – the underlying index is the Russell
1000A® Financial Service Index.
 - 15
 - 16 • FAZ - Direxion Daily Financial Bear 3x Shares– the underlying index is the Russell
1000A® Financial Service Index.
 - 17
 - 18 • TNA - Direxion Daily Small Cap Bull 3x Shares - the underlying index is the
Russell 2000® Index.
 - 19
 - 20 • TYH - Direxion Daily Technology Bull 3X Shares⁴ - the underlying index is the
Russell 1000® Technology Index.
 - 21
 - 22 • TYP - Direxion Daily Technology Bear 3X Shares⁵ - the underlying index is the
Russell 1000® Technology Index.
 - 23
 - 24 • TZA - Direxion Daily Small Cap Bear 3x Shares – the underlying index is the
Russell 2000® Index.

23 ...

24 ³ Hughes made an insignificant number of trades in other ETFs and non-leveraged securities. The following is a partial
25 list: DJP – Dow Jones UBS Commodity Total Return Index, an ETF; ACAS (American Capital) is a stock; JNK -
SPDR Barclays Capital High Yield; PHK – Pimco High Yield Fund, a mutual fund; VXX – I path S&P 500 VIX Short
26 Term Futures, an ETF; and XKN – Lehman ABS Corp 7.70 CorTS 2001.

⁴ TYH trades under a new symbol: TECL.

⁵ TYP trades under a new symbol: TECS.

- 1 • URE - ProShares Ultra Real Estate 2x Shares – the underlying index is the Dow Jones U.S. Real Estate Index.
- 2 • TBT – ProShares Ultra Short 20+ Year Treasury 2x Shares – the underlying index is the Barclays Capital U.S. 20+ Year Treasury Index

3
4 17. The prospectuses pertaining to these ETFs explicitly state that they employ
5 leveraging and that the ETFs should not be expected to achieve their stated objectives when held
6 longer than one day. One example of an ETF that Hughes traded for his clients was TZA. TZA is
7 a 3x leveraged, inverse ETF. It does not invest in equity securities; in fact, it is 100 percent
8 invested in derivatives. Regarding the derivatives, the TZA prospectus says TZA “uses investment
9 techniques such as futures and forward contracts, options and swaps, which may be considered
10 aggressive.”

- 11 18. The TZA (“Fund”) prospectus offered the following as important information:

12 The pursuit of daily leveraged goals means that the Fund is riskier
13 than alternatives that do not use leverage because the Fund’s
14 objective is to magnify the performance of the [Russell 2000] Index.
15 The pursuit of daily leveraged investment goals means that the return
16 of the Fund for a person longer than a full trading day may bear no
resemblance to -300% of the return of the Index for such longer
period because the aggregate return of the Fund is the product of the
series of daily leveraged returns for each trading day.

- 17 19. Regarding TZA’s investment objective, the TZA prospectus said:

18 The Fund seeks daily investment results, before fees and expenses, of
19 300% of the inverse (or opposite) of the performance of the Russell
20 2000® Index (“Index”). **The Fund seeks daily leveraged
investment results and does not seek to achieve its stated
investment objective over a period of time greater than one day.**
21 The Fund is different and much riskier than most exchange-traded
funds.

22 **The Fund is designed to be utilized only by knowledgeable
23 investors who understand the potential consequences of seeking
daily leveraged investment results, understand the risks
24 associated with shorting and the use of leverage, and are willing
to monitor their portfolios frequently. The Fund is not intended
25 to be used by, and is not appropriate for, investors who do not
intend to actively monitor and manage their portfolios.** (Emphasis
26 in original).

1 20. Besides the risk associated with inverse and leveraging, there is also the risk with the
2 underlying market Index. The TZA prospectus said, "Investing in the securities of small and/or
3 mid capitalization companies involves greater risks and the possibility of greater price volatility
4 than investing in more-established, larger capitalization companies."

5 CLIENTS

6 21. Client HM - HM was retired and had instructed Hughes to manage his retirement
7 funds conservatively. HM told Hughes this was all the money he had, other than his pension and a
8 small amount of money in another account, and that he was not a risk taker. Furthermore, he told
9 Hughes this money was earmarked to pay his mortgage, and he wanted to preserve those funds.

10 22. Hughes created an Investment Policy Statement ("IPS") for HM as he did with many
11 of LFA's clients based on their discussions. The IPS essentially laid out an investment strategy for
12 the client which included an asset allocation pie chart for the client's investment program. In the
13 case of HM and other clients, Hughes did not follow the asset allocation chart he created for the
14 client. In fact, Hughes totally disregarded the IPS and HM's instructions. Hughes traded almost
15 exclusively and often in ETFs. Hughes' trading in HM's account resulted in a loss of \$66,720.78
16 over a period of ten months.

17 23. HM contacted Hughes when he saw the first month's losses. Hughes told HM
18 "don't worry about it" and "remember the 7 year curve." The next month and then for subsequent
19 months HM's account value kept declining. HM kept calling Hughes and Hughes repeated the
20 same statements - "don't worry about it" and "remember the 7 year curve." Finally, after a number
21 of calls from HM, Hughes told the former client not to look at his statements anymore.

22 24. Client RJ - Another client RJ (husband and wife) had been LFA clients since
23 approximately 2000. At that time they were younger and had a moderate to moderately aggressive
24 risk tolerance. However, in 2008 RJ's husband had a heart attack. RJ then contacted Hughes
25 instructing him to implement a more conservative investment strategy because their LFA account
26 consisted of their retirement funds and they could not afford to incur any losses.

1 25. Hughes disregarded RJ's instruction trading almost exclusively and frequently in
2 ETFs. As a result, their portfolio suffered losses of \$234,317.24.

3 26. Client HC - HC (husband and wife) received a settlement from a Phoenix investment
4 advisor because of that advisor's inappropriate conduct involving their investment account. When
5 they met Hughes they told him they were not risk takers, were conservative to moderately
6 conservative investors, and were "gun-shy" after what had happened with the Phoenix advisor.
7 Hughes assured them that they would have a conservative portfolio.

8 27. Like LFA's other clients, Hughes disregarded HC's instructions. Once again
9 Hughes traded in almost exclusively in ETFs. As a result, their portfolio suffered losses of
10 \$10,487.97.

11 28. Client CJ - CJ (husband and wife) began using LFA's services in or about 2000 or
12 2001. At the time their risk tolerance was aggressive and their account portfolio consisted of two
13 small Roth IRA accounts.

14 29. In 2009, CJ told Hughes that he had lost his job. At that time, CJ gave LFA \$50,000,
15 which represented all of his investment funds asking Hughes for a growth strategy. Later when CJ
16 noticed his account was "losing money" he contacted Hughes. In response, Hughes stated they
17 should "stay the course" explaining that although the market was growing he expected a market
18 crash, which would result in CJ profiting.

19 30. As with LFA's other clients, Hughes traded almost exclusively in ETFs in CJ's
20 account producing steep losses. As a result, CJ's portfolio suffered losses of \$29,280.29. CJ
21 terminated his client relationship with LFA and Hughes because Hughes lost too much money and
22 did not do as he was instructed.

23 31. For these four clients their portfolios suffered combined losses of \$340,806.30.

24 ...

25 ...

26 ...

1 HOLDING ETFs BEYOND THE RECOMMENDED HOLDING PERIOD

2 32. Knowing the risks, Hughes more often than not actively bought and sold the ETFs
3 on the same day for his personal account. If he held onto positions, not much was at stake. On
4 occasion Hughes would hold a large position, but, typically, Hughes would hold only a small
5 quantity of shares and a corresponding low dollar value of the position for those ETFs he traded.

6 33. Hughes employed a different approach when trading ETFs for LFA clients. Even
7 though the prospectuses cautioned that these types of ETFs were meant to be traded daily, Hughes
8 would generally hold his client positions for days, if not months.

9 OVERCONCENTRATION OF ETFs IN CLIENT ACCOUNTS

10 34. Beginning in or about May 2012, Hughes began the process of closing LFA's
11 advisory relationship with LFA clients by revoking the power of attorney given to him by clients to
12 trade and collect fees. In other words, LFA and Hughes would no longer have discretion to trade
13 and manage client accounts.

14 35. On or about June 29, 2012, Hughes sent an email with an attached letter to
15 approximately eleven clients informing of his decision to "suspend my practice until further
16 notice." On July 6, 2012, Hughes filed on behalf of LFA Form ADV-W to withdraw from licensure
17 in Arizona disclosing the reason for withdrawing as "No longer in business or closing business."

18 36. In his email and letter to clients, Hughes stated he "purchased three or four
19 investments in each or [sic] your accounts that I think you could own for the foreseeable future.
20 Some produce income and the allocation should benefit from a long-term slowly improving
21 economy and rising interest rates." For at least one client, Hughes merely concentrated the client's
22 assets in two highly volatile ETFs which only served to further increase the investment risk to the
23 client. Hughes' actions were the exact opposite of what he represented to clients.

24 37. The LFA's clients identified in this Notice were never told that Hughes would be
25 trading in leveraged ETFs that exposed them to outsized risks given their investment objectives,
26 risk tolerances and express investment instructions, that he would primarily trade in these ETFs for

1 their accounts despite being conservative investors, that he would trade often as he did in their
2 accounts, that he would cause client accounts to hold ETFs for longer periods than recommended,
3 and that he would not follow the disclosures regarding allocation practices as made in his ADV.
4 Additionally, these clients did not understand the trading activity shown on their monthly account
5 statements.

6 **LFA'S AND HUGHES' AGGREGATE (BLOCK) TRADING ALLOCATION DISCLOSURES AND**
7 **PRACTICES**

8 38. In Form ADV Part II Item #9, LFA disclosed that it or a related person “[b]uys or
9 sell for itself securities it also recommended to clients.”⁶ This disclosure triggered a requirement
10 that LFA, explain “when the applicant or a related person engages in these transactions...what
11 restrictions, internal procedures, or disclosures are used for conflicts of interest in those
12 transactions.”

13 39. Investment advisors disclose their advisory business practices to their clients
14 through regulatory Form ADV filings. The procedures through which an investment adviser
15 ensures it complies with regulatory requirements and its disclosed practices are usually
16 memorialized in a supervisory and/or compliance manual. In its Form ADV Part II filings, LFA
17 made disclosures to its clients and prospective clients about how LFA handled LFA's and its
18 associated individuals' participation or interests in client transactions including aggregated
19 transactions. LFA also maintained Written Supervisory Procedures and a Compliance Manual
20 (collectively referred to herein as the “WSP/Compliance Manual”), which governed how it
21 conducted its affairs to ensure compliance with its Form ADV disclosed practices.

22 40. In Form ADV, Schedule F, Item 9(E), LFA explained that it had outlined procedures
23 it or its associated persons⁷ had to follow if LFA or its associated persons bought or sold securities
24 identical to those recommended to for the client accounts because of the inherent conflict of

25 _____
26 ⁶ A “related person” is defined as “an advisory affiliate and any person under common control with your firm.” See
glossary of terms for the Form ADV at <http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-instructions.pdf>

⁷ Associated person is the same as a related person.

1 interest.⁸

2 41. LFA's also disclosed that it would aggregate trades⁹ for itself with client trades. In
3 aggregating orders LFA set forth certain conditions that need be met. Some of those conditions
4 were as follows:

5 a. "LFA will prepare, before entering an aggregate order, a written statement
6 ('Allocation Statement') specifying the participating client accounts and how it
7 intends to allocate the order among those clients."

8 b. "If the aggregated order is filled in its entirety, it will be allocated among clients in
9 accordance with the Allocation Statement; if the order is partially filled, it will be
10 allocated pro-rata based on the Allocation Statement."

11 c. "[T]he order may be allocated on a basis different from that specified in the
12 Allocation Statement if all client accounts receive fair and equitable treatment and
13 the reason for different allocation is explained in writing and is approved by LFA's
14 compliance officer no later than one hour after the opening of the markets on the
15 trading day following the day the order was executed."

16 42. From at least 2008 through November 2011, LFA used the services of TD
17 Ameritrade, Inc. ("TDA") to trade on behalf of and custody Hughes and LFA's clients' accounts.
18 After November 2011, LFA used the services of Scottrade, Inc. ("Scottrade"). While with TDA
19 Hughes bought and sold securities for LFA's clients' accounts and his personal account.¹⁰ Almost
20 all trades were made utilizing a single LFA omnibus block account with Hughes being the sole
21 individual allocating the buys and sells to his personal and LFA's clients' account.¹¹

22
23 ⁸ In the WSP/Compliance Manual the same procedures are found under 7.4 Aggregation of Orders.

24 ⁹ An aggregated order is the same as block trading.

25 ¹⁰ Hughes personal account was held jointly with his spouse.

26 ¹¹ A block account is a vehicle that simplifies trading by aggregating trade orders for the same securities involving a number of clients. Once the trade orders are filled, which may take place in one purchase or sale or multiple purchases or sales over a period of the day, the adviser then allocates the trades to the customer accounts according to a pre-trade allocation statement.

1 43. Hughes had discretionary trading authority over all client accounts, which meant he
2 had total and unrestricted control over the trades and allocations. The decisions Hughes could make
3 included which securities to buy and sell, how many shares to buy and sell, which clients would
4 own which securities, how many shares of a particular security a client would own, and at what
5 price to buy and sell the securities. Since the clients had no visibility into Hughes' daily trading
6 practices and how he allocated trades from the LFA block account, LFA's procedures, as disclosed
7 to clients, required that he prepare pre-trade Allocation Statements.

8 44. Hughes, using the LFA block account, traded heavily in the aforementioned volatile
9 leveraged ETFs. When asked how he ensured LFA's disclosed trading and allocation practices
10 were implemented and followed so as to prevent inequitable treatment of its clients, Hughes
11 testified before the Division that there "isn't anything to prevent it, do it, or verify it."¹² In fact,
12 contrary to LFA's trading and allocation practice disclosures, neither LFA nor Hughes prepared
13 any allocation statements prior to the start of trading or at any time thereafter.

14 45. Hughes explained that he allocated shares using two factors, "overall performance
15 and recent performance." Hughes testified that if a client received a winning trade on one day, then
16 the next day a winning trade will not be allocated to this same client because of the prior day's
17 winning allocation. Another client, one who did not receive a winning trade the day before, will
18 then receive the next day's winning trade instead.

19 46. Hughes also testified that he allocated shares based upon a client's overall situation
20 which, in the example he provided, is inconsistent with his disclosures. For example, he testified
21 that, "rightly or wrongly, I have done this in the past" explaining how he allocated two winning
22 trades, one for \$1.00 per share gain and the second for \$1.20 per share gain. He allocated the \$1.20
23 per share gain to the smaller account solely based on account size, "because it makes a bigger bang
24 in a smaller account because it's a higher percentage gain than I will [sic] with a larger account."

25
26 ¹² In early January 2012, Hughes appeared before the Division pursuant to a Division subpoena for an Examination Under Oath ("EUO"). At a second appearance in February 2012, Hughes invoked his Fifth Amendment right and provided no further testimony.

1 47. At no time did LFA or Hughes prepare allocation statements in connection with
2 aggregated orders or explain in a writing, approved by LFA's compliance officer (Hughes) no later
3 than one hour after the opening of the markets on the trading day following the day the order was
4 executed, the reason for different allocations.

5 **C. OTHER MATERIAL DISCLOSURES**

6 **LICENSING STATUS DISCLOSURE**

7 48. LFA's WSP/Compliance Manual requires that individuals associated with LFA
8 providing investment advisory services be licensed as investment adviser representatives before
9 providing advisory services to clients. LFA's Form ADV Part II, Schedule F, Item 1D states that
10 "Individuals associated with LFA will provide its investment advisory services. These individuals
11 are appropriately licensed...."

12 49. When LFA was first licensed as an investment adviser in Arizona on April 7, 2008,
13 LFA was a sole proprietorship. As a sole proprietorship LFA and Hughes were one and the same
14 thus, Hughes was not required to license as an investment adviser representative under the IM Act.

15 50. In December 2009, when Hughes changed LFA's organizational form converting
16 LFA to an LLC, LFA became a separate and distinct entity from Hughes. At that time Hughes was
17 not associated with a federal covered adviser nor exempt from licensure, thus, he was required to be
18 licensed as an investment adviser representative in association with LFA. Hughes never licensed as
19 an investment adviser representative in association with LFA.

20 **IV.**

21 **VIOLATION OF A.R.S. § 44-3151**

22 **(Transactions by Unlicensed Investment Advisers**

23 **or Investment Adviser Representatives)**

24 51. Hughes transacted business in Arizona as an investment adviser representative while
25 not licensed or in compliance with Article 4 of the IM Act.

26

1 nature of the investment advisory services being offered when allocation statements were not
2 prepared at any time before and after block trading occurred as disclosed in its Form ADV filings
3 and its WSP/Compliance Manual; that Hughes was properly licensed to provide investment
4 advisory services when he was not licensed; and that Hughes engaged in fraudulent conduct when
5 Hughes provided investment advisory services to LFA's clients without reasonably determining
6 that the investment advisory services provided were suitable for LFA's clients based on the
7 information from the clients.

8 VI.

9 VIOLATION OF A.R.S. § 44-3241

10 (Fraud in the Provision of Investment Advisory Services)

11 56. Hughes engaged in a transaction or transactions within or from Arizona involving the
12 provision of investment advisory services in which Hughes, directly or indirectly: (i) employed a
13 device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (ii) made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state
14 material facts that were necessary in order to make the statements made not misleading in light of the
15 circumstances under which they were made; (iii) misrepresented professional qualifications with the
16 intent that the client rely on the misrepresentation; or (iv) engaged in transactions, practices, or courses
17 of business that operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit. Hughes' conduct includes, but is not
18 limited to, the following:

19 a. Hughes misled HM when Hughes repeatedly minimized and misled HM as to
20 the effect trading was having on HM's account.

21 b. Hughes informed clients he had placed them in investments they could own for
22 the foreseeable future but in reality, he substantially increased their investment risk by concentrating
23 their accounts in highly leveraged ETFs meant to be traded daily, not held long term.

24 c. Hughes principally traded in unsuitable highly volatile leveraged ETFs for
25 LFA's clients.

26

IX.

ANSWER REQUIREMENT

Pursuant to A.A.C. R14-4-305, if a Respondent or a Respondent Spouse requests a hearing, the requesting respondent must deliver or mail an Answer to this Notice of Opportunity for Hearing to Docket Control, Arizona Corporation Commission, 1200 W. Washington, Phoenix, Arizona 85007, within 30 calendar days after the date of service of this Notice. Filing instructions may be obtained from Docket Control by calling (602) 542-3477 or on the Commission's Internet web site at <http://www.azcc.gov/divisions/hearings/docket.asp>.

Additionally, the answering respondent must serve the Answer upon the Division. Pursuant to A.A.C. R14-4-303, service upon the Division may be made by mailing or by hand-delivering a copy of the Answer to the Division at 1300 West Washington, 3rd Floor, Phoenix, Arizona, 85007, addressed to Aikaterine Vervilos.

The Answer shall contain an admission or denial of each allegation in this Notice and the original signature of the answering respondent or respondent's attorney. A statement of a lack of sufficient knowledge or information shall be considered a denial of an allegation. An allegation not denied shall be considered admitted.

When the answering respondent intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an allegation, the respondent shall specify that part or qualification of the allegation and shall admit the remainder. Respondent waives any affirmative defense not raised in the Answer.

The officer presiding over the hearing may grant relief from the requirement to file an Answer for good cause shown.

Dated this 17 day of October, 2012.


Matthew J. Neubert
Director of Securities