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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

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2011 JAN 18 P 3:42
AZ CORP COMMISSION
DOCKET CONTROL

IN THE MATTER OF THE JOINT NOTICE AND)	DOCKET NOS. T-01051B-10-0194
APPLICATION OF QWEST CORPORATION,)	T-02811B-10-0194
QWEST COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, LLC,)	T-04190A-10-0194
QWEST LD CORP., EMBARQ)	T-20443A-10-0194
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. D/B/A CENTURY)	T-03555A-10-0194
LINK COMMUNICATIONS, EMBARQ)	T-03902A-10-0194
PAYPHONE SERVICES, INC. D/B/A)	
CENTURYLINK, AND CENTURYTEL)	
SOLUTIONS, LLC FOR APPROVAL OF THE)	
PROPOSED MERGER OF THEIR PARENT)	
CORPORATIONS QWEST COMMUNICATIONS)	
INTERNATIONAL INC. AND CENTURYTEL,)	
INC.)	

POST HEARING BRIEF OF

MCLEODUSA TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES INC.

D/B/A PAETEC BUSINESS SERVICES

JANUARY 18, 2011

Arizona Corporation Commission

DOCKETED

JAN 18 2011

(PUBLIC VERSION)

DOCKETED BY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Introduction..... 1

Summary Regarding Issues Identified by Judge Martin 4

Discussion..... 7

I. Standard of Review: The Proposed Merger may be Approved only Subject to such Conditions Necessary to Protect the Public Interest 7

II. Recent History demonstrates that ILECC Mergers such as the Proposed Merger in this Case Pose Substantial Risks of Failure and Harm to Customers..... 9

III. CenturyLink’s Recent Acquisition of Embarq further Demonstrates and Increases the Risks Associated with its Acquisition of Qwest..... 13

IV. The Proposed Merger’s Risks are Further Accentuated by CenturyLink’s Lack of Wholesale Experience at Volumes Comparable to Qwest’s and the Absence of any Experience with Qwest’s BOC Obligations 18

V. The Proposed Merger’s Risks Fall Primarily on Qwest’s Wholesale Customers and Competition 22

VI. Additional Conditions are needed to Protect Against Deterioration of CLEC Access to, and Functionality of, Qwest’s Operations Support Systems (“OSS”)..... 24

A. High Quality OSS is Critical to the Ability of CLECs to Provide Competitive Local Services..... 24

B. The Record Establishes a High Risk of OSS Degradation following the Merger . 26

C. Uncertainty has been Exacerbated by the Lack of Information Regarding Post-Merger OSS Integration Plans 31

D. Additional Conditions are Necessary..... 33

1. Continuance of Qwest OSS for at least three years 34

2. Clarification of commitment to provide “functionally equivalent” access 37

3. Third party testing 39

4. Costs of Unifying Joint Applicants’ OSS 40

Conclusion 41

1 McLeodUSA Telecommunications Services, Inc. d/b/a PAETEC Business Services, hereby
2 files its Post-Hearing Brief in the above-captioned docket.

3 **INTRODUCTION**

4 McLeodUSA Telecommunications Services, Inc. d/b/a PAETEC Business Services
5 (“PAETEC”) respectfully submits its post-hearing brief regarding the Joint Application of Qwest
6 Communications International, Inc. and CenturyLink, Inc. (collectively, the “Joint Applicants”) for
7 approval of a proposed merger under which CenturyLink will assume control of the Qwest
8 operating companies.

9 All mergers create uncertainty and carry with them the risk of failure and harm to not only
10 shareholders, but also customers. The documented problems and failures of recent similar mergers
11 between ILECs demonstrate the particular risks associated with mergers of the kind being
12 considered here. In response to the concerns that the CLECs have expressed about the risks of the
13 transaction and the potential for harm to competition, CenturyLink points to what it calls its “track
14 record” of previous acquisitions. The evidence shows, however, that CenturyLink’s past
15 acquisitions have not been free from problems and certainly cannot be taken as any sort of
16 guarantee of success here. To the contrary, the evidence shows, for example that CenturyLink has
17 experienced significant integration problems particularly relating to systems conversions in
18 connection with its acquisition of a much larger company, Embarq, only a year ago. That evidence
19 further shows that CenturyLink has not yet completed its integration efforts relating to the Embarq
20 acquisition and that such efforts are likely to continue well into 2011. Finally, the evidence shows
21 that this transaction, in terms of its scale and scope, is not like any transaction that CenturyLink
22 has completed previously. CenturyLink’s lack of experience with anything close to Qwest’s much
23 larger wholesale service volumes and unique BOC responsibilities means that this transaction, to a
24 very great extent, represents uncharted territory for CenturyLink.

25 The risks of the transaction are particularly unique for CLECs. CLECs will continue to
26 depend on Qwest for essential wholesale services and facilities that CLECs need to provide
27

1 competitive local service to the vast majority of their respective end users, while Qwest remains
2 the dominant competitor of CLECs in the retail market for business customers. As the
3 Commission Staff aptly observed, the proposed merger presents the potential for irreparable harm
4 to the competitive environment.¹ The stakes are undeniably high and require that the merger be
5 approved, if at all, subject to substantial conditions designed to effectively mitigate the risks of
6 harm to competition and the public interest.

7 On November 24, the Joint Applicants entered into a settlement agreement with the
8 Commission Staff and the Residential Utility Consumer Office (“Staff Settlement”). The Staff
9 Settlement was largely modeled on a settlement that had previously been entered into between the
10 Joint Applicants and one of the CLEC intervenors, Integra Telecom (“Integra Settlement”),
11 although the Staff Settlement also included certain modifications to the Integra Settlement that
12 were designed to provide some additional protections. The commitments reflected in those
13 settlements address a number of the concerns that PAETEC has about the proposed merger and
14 PAETEC agrees that those commitments are necessary to protect the public interest. Accordingly,
15 PAETEC urges the Commission to adopt the commitments set forth in the Integra Settlement and
16 the Staff Settlement as conditions to approval of the Proposed Merger.

17 However, in at least one important area – regarding Operations Support Systems (“OSS”) –
18 those commitments fall short. In particular, the Integra Settlement and the Staff Settlement permit
19 the merged company, subject to certain restrictions, to replace Qwest’s OSS, upon which PAETEC
20 and other CLECs rely to provide service to their end user customers, after only 24 months
21 following the closing of the transaction. This time period is less than the three to five year period
22 over which the company expects to cut costs in order to realize an anticipated \$575 million in
23 operating synergies. And it is insufficient to protect CLECs against deterioration of access to, and
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25 ¹ Ex. S-2 (Fimbres Direct) at page 16, lines 7-10 (“Staff sees the wholesale and regulatory conditions (see
26 Attachment 1) as precautions to limit the harm that could result to the competitive environment which,
27 once damaged, would be impossible to repair given the pace at which telecommunications technology is
evolving and the industry is moving.”)

1 functionality of, Qwest's OSS, thus exposing CLECs, as well as competition, to substantial risk of
2 harm. Further, although the Staff Settlement contains additional language that is not found in the
3 Integra Settlement that requires the merged company to provide OSS that is "functionally
4 equivalent" to that currently used by Qwest, that language does not provide sufficient clarity or
5 assurance that PAETEC will continue to receive the degree of electronic "flow through" that it
6 enjoys today when using Qwest's systems. Finally, the Staff Settlement does not require that any
7 replacement of the Qwest OSS be subject to third party testing to assure that such replacement
8 does not adversely impact CLECs or their ability to effectively compete.

9 In order to assure that competition is adequately protected from at least an OSS
10 perspective, PAETEC urges the Commission to condition approval of the proposed merger on the
11 following additional or clarified commitments regarding OSS:

- 12 (1) a commitment to maintain Qwest's existing OSS for at least three years to
13 match the Joint Applicants' 3-5 year synergy period;
- 14 (2) a commitment that any change in OSS will not adversely impact the
15 operations of CLECs' back office systems;
- 16 (3) a commitment to, in connection with changes to Qwest OSS, to conduct
17 third party testing to assure that specific components of wholesale OSS
18 service quality, including support, data, billing, functionality, performance,
19 electronic flow through and electronic bonding, are not degraded; and
- 20 (4) a commitment that any costs resulting from the modification or
21 replacement of the Qwest OSS, including the costs of making the OSS
22 functionally equivalent to the existing Qwest OSS, will be considered
23 costs of the transaction and will not be charged to CLECs.

24 Indeed, it appears that the Joint Applicants and Staff believe that second proposed condition above
25 is covered by the "functionally equivalent" in Condition 19 of the Settlement Agreement.
26 However, even if that is the case, it would be administratively efficient for the Commission to
27 clarify that condition as PAETEC proposes in this proceeding in order to avoid unnecessary
disputes in the future.

1 which have significant competition from the cable providers.”⁶ Rather than a “knee-jerk reaction,”
2 as suggested by the RUCO Staff witness,⁷ there is nothing to suggest that these analyses are
3 anything other than what they appear to be: a reasoned and reasonable evaluation of the risks
4 presented by the transaction. The risks discussed by the ratings agencies are similar to the risks
5 identified in testimony provided on behalf of the CLECs. See, *infra*, pages 17-18. The
6 Commission certainly must consider these risks as part of any complete evaluation of the public
7 interest.

8 **2. Should the Commission be concerned about CenturyLink’s capability to**
9 **integrate with Qwest in a technically sound manner, in light of testimony**
10 **regarding CenturyLink’s lack of experience as a BOC operating in major**
11 **urban areas?**

12 Notwithstanding CenturyLink’s assertion that all of its previous integration efforts have
13 been successful,⁸ the evidence shows CenturyLink has experienced numerous and significant
14 problems in its efforts to integrate Embarq. These problems have caused CenturyLink to fail to
15 meet service quality measures and have had an adverse impact on wholesale customers. See, *infra*,
16 pages 13-22. These problems call into serious question CenturyLink’s technical capabilities to
17 manage the even greater challenges associated with integrating a much larger company, Qwest.

18 **3. Should the Commission be concerned about the lack of post-merger**
19 **integration plans?**

20 CenturyLink argues that it possesses particular skill and experience in integrating
21 companies that alleviate any risk associated with the transaction.⁹ At least in the critical area of
22 OSS, there is no evidence that any of the integration planning efforts that CenturyLink has touted
23 as its standard process have taken place. Further, CenturyLink’s claims about its track history of
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25 ⁶ Ex. CLT-1 (Glover Direct), Ex. JG-4.

26 ⁷ Transcript, Vol. 2, page 497, lines 1-5.

27 ⁸ Ex. CTL-4 (Schafer Direct) at page 5, lines 25-27.

⁹ Transcript, Vol. 1, page 172, lines 3-5 (Glover).

1 acquisitions wholly ignore the fact that this transaction, in terms of its scale and scope, is unlike
2 any transaction that CenturyLink has been involved in previously. See, *infra*, pages 18-22, 31-33.
3 Vague assurances cannot substitute for conditions that will effectively protect the public interest.

4 **4. Is it appropriate to rely almost entirely on a settlement entered into by one**
5 **CLEC (Integra) as the basis for wholesale conditions to protect all CLECs?**

6 Different CLECs operate differently, and the conditions that one CLEC, Integra, finds
7 acceptable will not necessarily provide adequate protection for all CLECs. PAETEC, in particular,
8 has presented evidence that its systems use a greater degree of automation and rely more heavily
9 on e-bonding with Qwest's OSS than is true for Integra. Integra's reliance on manual processes
10 means that future changes to Qwest's OSS, should those changes degrade the functionality, access
11 and robustness of the e-bonding capabilities, will not impact Integra to the degree that such
12 changes could impact the automated processes used by PAETEC. See, *infra*, page 36. Integra's
13 willingness to accept CenturyLink's commitment to not retire or modify Qwest's OSS for two
14 years after closing does not provide sufficient protection for PAETEC.

15 **5. Should third party testing be required?**

16 Nondiscriminatory access to ILEC OSS that is efficient, reliable and accurate is critical to
17 the ability of CLECs to effectively compete. Qwest's OSS went through strenuous third party
18 testing in connection with Qwest obtaining authorization to provide interLATA service. In the
19 absence of commercial volumes of wholesale orders, such third party testing is the best indicator
20 that the ILEC OSS are operationally ready. CenturyLink has not previously handled anything
21 approaching the volumes of orders handled on a regular basis by Qwest and, absent third party
22 testing, there is no way to be sure that any OSS that CenturyLink might introduce to replace Qwest
23 OSS will provide the same levels of functionality and reliability. See, *infra*, pages 39-40.

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1 DISCUSSION

2 I. **STANDARD OF REVIEW: THE PROPOSED MERGER MAY BE APPROVED**
3 **ONLY SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE**
4 **PUBLIC INTEREST**

5 Under clear precedent, the Commission must consider whether the proposed reorganization
6 in this docket meets the requires of Rule 803.C of the Commission's Public Utility Holding
7 Companies and Affiliated Interests Rules, A.A.C. R14-2-801 through -806 ("Affiliated Interests
8 Rules") *and* whether the proposed reorganization is in the public interest.

9 The Commission has the legal authority to review the Companies' proposed
10 reorganization, given its authority over public service corporations pursuant Article 15, Section 3
11 of the Arizona Constitution, Title 40 of the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and its Affiliated
12 Interests Rules. Although CenturyTel, Inc. and Qwest Communications International, Inc. are not
13 public service corporations as defined in Article 15, Section 2 of the Arizona Constitution, the
14 telephone operating subsidiaries named in the Arizona Joint Application are public service
15 corporations subject to the Commission's authority and its Affiliated Interests Rules.¹⁰

16 Under the Commission's Affiliated Interests Rules, the proposed reorganization must
17 satisfy Rule 803.C, which states:

18 At the conclusion of any hearing on the organization or reorganization of a utility
19 holding company, the Commission may reject the proposal if it determines that it
20 would *impair the financial status of the public utility*, otherwise *prevent it from*
attracting capital at fair and reasonable terms, or *impair the ability of the public*
*utility to provide safe, reasonable and adequate service.*¹¹

21 These three factors are clearly important for the Commission to take into account during its
22 review.

23 However, Rule 803.C is merely one aspect of inquiry required of the Commission in
24 response to a proposed merger or acquisition. The Commission also must consider the *public*
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26 ¹⁰ See, Ex. JA-1 (Joint Application) at p. 2, fn. 2.

27 ¹¹ A.A.C. R14-2-803.C (emphasis added).

1 interest. In Decision No. 67454 (January 4, 2005), which denied the proposed merger of
2 Unisource Energy Corporation with Saguaro Utility Group, L.P., the Commission expressly
3 addressed the standard of review for a proposed merger, acquisition or reorganization under the
4 Affiliated Interests Rules.¹² The Commission noted that Rule 803.C set only a minimum standard
5 for consideration of transactions under the Affiliated Interest Rules.¹³ The Commission found that
6 it also “must act in the public interest,” that the inquiry into the public interest was “broad” and
7 that it should “examine all the evidence available in determining what is in the public interest.”¹⁴
8 The Commission also concluded that “The public interest requires that the Commission apply the
9 Affiliated Interest Rules in a manner that will maximize protection to ratepayers.”¹⁵

10 The Commission has reiterated this requirement in other decisions concerning
11 reorganizations affecting public service corporations and has typically imposed conditions in order
12 to ensure that approval of a proposed reorganization will serve the public interest.¹⁶ In approving
13 proposed reorganizations, the Commission has expressly stated in the context of a proposed
14 reorganization that “Approval of the transaction proposed in the Application would serve the
15 public interest only if conditions are imposed to provide adequate protection to ratepayers,”¹⁷ and
16 has adopted conditions as part of its approval of a proposed transaction.¹⁸

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19 ¹² *In the Matter of the Reorganization of Unisource Energy Corporation*, Docket No. E-0423-OA-03-0933,
20 Opinion and Order, Decision No. 67454, January 4, 2005, at p. 49, Conclusion of Law No. 5.

21 ¹³ *Id.* at p. 28.

22 ¹⁴ *Id.* at p. 49, Conclusion of Law No. 5.

23 ¹⁵ *Id.* at p. 49, Conclusion of Law No. 6.

24 ¹⁶ *In the Matter of the Joint Notice of Intent Under A.A.C. R14-2-803 for an Initial Public Offering and
25 Restructuring of Global Water Resources, LLC by Global Water – Santa Cruz Water Company, et al*,
26 Docket Nos. W-20446A-08-0247 *et al*, Order, Decision No. 70980, May 5, 2009, at pp. 10-11,
27 Conclusions of Law Nos. 3, 6 and 7.

¹⁷ *Id.* at p. 11, Conclusion of Law No. 6.

¹⁸ *See, e.g., id.; In the Matter of Arizona-American Water Company, Inc., for a Finding of No Jurisdiction,
or for a Waiver of the Affiliated Interests Rules Pursuant to A.A.C. R14-2-806, Or, in the Alternative, for
Approval of an Affiliated Interests Transaction Pursuant to A.A.C. R14-2-801 Et Seq.*, Docket Nos. SW-
01303A-06-027 *et al*, Opinion and Order, Decision No. 69344, February 20, 2007, at p. 9, Conclusion of
Law No. 5.

1 Finally, the Commission has recognized that “the individual circumstances of each case
2 influence the scope and breadth of the ‘public interest’ inquiry.”¹⁹ In this case, it is important to
3 consider that the Commission has repeatedly supported and facilitated telecommunications
4 competition. For example, the Commission has opposed Qwest’s forbearance petitions at the FCC
5 due to concerns about the adverse impact on available wholesale services and the detrimental
6 impact on competition. A critical aspect of the public interest in the proposed merger/acquisition
7 in this docket is the potential impact on Qwest’s obligations under the 1996 Telecommunications
8 Act and on wholesale service – which could severely harm competition unless appropriate
9 safeguards and conditions are imposed.

10 **II. RECENT HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT ILEC MERGERS SUCH AS THE**
11 **PROPOSED MERGER IN THIS CASE POSE SUBSTANTIAL RISKS OF**
12 **FAILURE AND HARM TO CUSTOMERS.**

13 Mergers and acquisitions are inherently risky and unpredictable.²⁰ As Dr. August Ankum,
14 an expert economist testifying on behalf of PAETEC and other CLECs, explained, most mergers
15 fail to successfully achieve their expected benefits and many result in, or are followed by, serious
16 problems that harm both shareholders and customers.²¹ Indeed, the majority of mergers (two out
17 of three) fail, according to both the testimony of Dr. Ankum and the academic literature.²²
18 Mergers between ILECs in the telecommunications industry have proven to be particularly risky,
19 as illustrated by three recent ILEC mergers similar to the Proposed Merger in this case: (1)
20 Hawaiian Telecom’s acquisition of Hawaii’s BOC, Verizon Hawaii; (2) FairPoint’s acquisition of
21 Verizon operations in northern New England; and (3) Frontier’s acquisition of 4.8 million Verizon
22 lines in 14 states. Dr. Ankum’s testimony documents substantial post-merger problems with these

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25 ¹⁹ *In the Matter of the Reorganization of Unisource Energy Corporation*, Docket No. E-0423-OA-03-0933,
Opinion and Order, Decision No. 67454, January 4, 2005, at p. 29.

26 ²⁰ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 5, lines 14-17.

27 ²¹ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 5, line 17 – page 6, line 15.

²² Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 5, line 17 – page 6, line 15, fn. 4.

1 transactions and an “enormous gulf between the anticipated benefits claimed by company
2 management and . . . ensuing realities.”²³

3 Rather than achieving the benefits projected by management, these mergers resulted in an
4 array of serious problems, including severe service quality declines and OSS failures.²⁴ Hawaiian
5 Telecom, for example, experienced significant slow-downs in call answer and handling times in its
6 customer service centers as well as (a) billing errors; (b) missed deadlines for special access circuit
7 orders; (c) delays porting telephone numbers; and (d) lack of a functioning electronic interface for
8 wholesale customers to submit and monitor trouble tickets following its merger.²⁵ In December
9 2008, Hawaiian Telecom filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, listing \$1.4 billion in assets
10 and \$1.3 billion in debts.²⁶

11 Similar to the Hawaiian Telecom transaction, FairPoint experienced “widespread
12 disruptions to wholesale customers due to OSS system failures, order fall-outs, and manual
13 processing work-arounds” following its acquisition of Verizon exchanges.²⁷ In addition,
14 FairPoint’s retail service declined to a point that triggered maximum payments under Vermont’s
15 retail service quality plan.²⁸ Prior to securing regulatory approval of its transaction, Fairpoint
16 offered a long list of expectations, assurances and commitments related to expected synergies,
17 integration costs, cash flow and services.²⁹ A little over two years following closure of the
18 FairPoint transaction, the Vermont Public Service Board stated that: “it is abundantly clear that
19 FairPoint failed to realize any of [its] forecasts.”³⁰ The New Hampshire Public Utilities
20 Commission concluded similarly that:

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²³ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 29, lines 12 – page 31, line 1, Ex. AA-2.

²⁴ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 29, line 12 – page 31, line 1, Ex. AA-2.

²⁵ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 30, lines 12-14; Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 91, lines 1-9.

²⁶ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 91, lines 10-13.

²⁷ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 30, lines 15-18.

²⁸ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 30, lines 15-16.

²⁹ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 92, line 9 - page 93, line 22.

³⁰ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 93, lines 24-28.

1 Fairpoint has failed to meet the obligations it made in 2008 to the states of New
2 Hampshire, Maine and Vermont and their citizens. Among other things, FairPoint
3 made promises about service quality, relations with wholesale competitors and
4 broadband build-out, and committed itself to performance superior to Verizon . . .
5 . Due to FairPoint's widespread operational shortcomings arising from its
6 systems cutover, however, residential and business customers, as well as
7 wholesale customers and competitors who rely on FairPoint services, endured
8 even poorer service quality than was the case under Verizon.³¹

9 Like Hawaiian Telecom and FairPoint, Frontier has also experienced "wholesale OSS
10 failures, ordering delays, understaffed access order centers [and] trouble report backlogs"
11 following its acquisition of Verizon exchanges.³²

12 These examples provide compelling illustrations of the risks and uncertainties associated
13 with ILEC mergers such as the one in this case. They also demonstrate that claims of synergy
14 savings are notoriously unreliable and are often overtaken by operational problems and
15 unexpectedly high integration costs. For example, FairPoint expected to realize \$60-75 million in
16 annual net cost savings through efficiency improvements in back-office and OSS systems.
17 Contrary to the company's pre-merger claims, those synergies never materialized. Instead,
18 FairPoint experienced severe operational difficulties and cost over-runs during its post-transaction
19 efforts to integrate the legacy Verizon exchanges.³³ As disclosed in FairPoint's 10-K Report three
20 years after its merger, rather than achieve its anticipated \$60-75 million dollars in annual synergy
21 savings, FairPoint incurred nearly \$30 million in cost over-runs while experiencing operational
22 problems that "required significant staff and senior management attention diverting their focus
23 from other efforts."³⁴

24 Similarly, Hawaiian Telecom expected to realize operational efficiencies by creating new
25 back office systems to replace Verizon's legacy systems just as CenturyLink is likely to do
26 following its acquisition of Qwest.³⁵ Far from achieving its anticipated synergies, Hawaiian
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³¹ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 98, lines 11-22.

³² Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at Ex. Joint CLECs AA-2, page 2.

³³ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 36, lines 1-13; Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct), page 91, line 14 - page 97,
line 3.

³⁴ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 36, lines 13-20.

³⁵ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 34, lines 10-12.

1 Telecom's deployment of those new systems produced over \$33 million in cost-overruns. As Dr.
2 Ankum observed, Hawaiian Telecom's deployment of its new systems, rather than produce
3 efficiencies, actually "contributed to the financial downfall of the company."³⁶ The Hawaiian
4 Telecom example not only illustrates the common failure of merged companies to achieve
5 expected merger benefits, but also demonstrates the extent to which mergers can harm the
6 companies they were expected to benefit. Even in the short time since closing on its acquisition of
7 Verizon exchanges, Frontier is experiencing some of the same problems as FairPoint and
8 Hawaiian Telecom, indicating that Frontier does not appear to be on track to realize its projected
9 500 million dollars in annual operating expect savings.³⁷

10 Ultimately, post merger problems and failures drove both Hawaiian Telecom and FairPoint
11 to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions.³⁸ Hawaiian Telecom's Chapter 11 filing reported a
12 negative 29.3% rate of return.³⁹ Facing similar financial distress, FairPoint's Chapter 11
13 reorganization plan included cut-backs to its broadband commitments and the elimination of a cap
14 on DSL rates that FairPoint had agreed to as part of its merger.⁴⁰ In both instances, the mergers
15 were preceded by claims of expected efficiencies and synergies. Yet those synergies never
16 materialized and were, instead, eclipsed by operational problems and high integration costs that
17 ultimately led both merged companies to file Chapter 11 petitions.

18 Like the Hawaiian Telecom and FairPoint mergers, the proposed merger in this case
19 involves a smaller ILEC purchasing a much larger one based on lofty but vague claims of expected
20 synergies, efficiencies and other benefits. However, the documented failure and experiences of
21 these two recent mergers serves as a warning with respect to the public interest implications of the
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24 ³⁶ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 34, line 20 - page 35, line 25.

25 ³⁷ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 37, lines 5-18.

26 ³⁸ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 28, lines 4-9.

27 ³⁹ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 30, lines 27-28.

⁴⁰ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 30, lines 5-10.

1 proposed merger in this case. Those two mergers illustrate plainly that the risks of the proposed
2 merger are not theoretical and pose a serious threat to Arizona consumers and local competition.

3 **III. CENTURYLINK'S RECENT ACQUISITION OF EMBARQ FURTHER**
4 **DEMONSTRATES AND INCREASES THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH ITS**
5 **ACQUISITION OF QWEST.**

6 CenturyLink touts its alleged track record of acquisitions, asserting that "In each instance,
7 the integration has been successful. Billing, financial, and customer care system conversions have
8 been executed smoothly and in accordance with established timeframes."⁴¹ The evidence,
9 however, tells a different story. In fact, CenturyLink has already demonstrated a record of post-
10 merger integration problems in the short time following its acquisition of Embarq.

11 First, the challenges of integrating Embarq led CenturyLink, soon after the completion of
12 the Embarq merger, to request a waiver of the FCC's one business day number porting
13 requirement on the ground that compliance would disrupt the ongoing systems changes related to
14 the CenturyTel/Embarq merger. Competitive carriers are highly dependent on the ILEC's ability
15 to "port" a customer (i.e., switch a customer, with that customer's existing telephone number from
16 the ILEC, to a new carrier). The porting interval – the amount of time that it takes the ILEC to
17 switch the customer to a new service provider – is critically important to CLECs' ability to
18 effectively compete.⁴² In support of its request for waiver of the one day porting requirement,
19 CenturyLink asserted that complying with the porting requirement would require integration
20 efforts to be suspended, resulting in service disruptions, delays and errors causing – according to
21 CenturyLink – "incalculable additional costs."⁴³ CenturyLink's confessed inability to meet the
22 FCC's porting requirements provides reason for concern about the priority CenturyLink places on
23 its competitive obligations and about CenturyLink's ability to timely and accurately handle large
24 volumes of porting requests.⁴⁴

25 ⁴¹ Ex. CTL-4 (Schafer Direct) at page 5, lines 25-27.

26 ⁴² Ex. Cox-1 (Howell Direct) at page 4, line 24-page 5, line 2.

27 ⁴³ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 76, lines 8-14.

⁴⁴ Ex. Cox-1 (Howell Direct) at page 5, lines 9-14.

1 CenturyLink has also experienced serious post-merger problems with its Embarq systems
2 integration in North Carolina. As reported by the Communications Workers of America
3 (“CWA”), the Embarq transaction resulted in a number of serious operational, service-affecting
4 problems in North Carolina. Some of the problems that the CWA described in its testimony
5 include:

- 6 • “workers...being dispatched to incorrect locations for service”⁴⁵
- 7 • “workers reported being dispatched for service with insufficient or incorrect
8 information”⁴⁶
- 9 • longer out of service periods and longer delays in initiating service⁴⁷
- 10 • differing and confusing software that dispatches/assigns technicians⁴⁸
- 11 • “the systems do not appear to be interconnected or coordinated”⁴⁹
- 12 • negative impacts on work flow⁵⁰
- 13 • “inefficiencies in the new systems”⁵¹
- 14 • “insufficient training and resources”⁵² and
- 15 • consumer frustration about installation and service appointments not being met and
16 long hold times.⁵³

17 CenturyLink does not dispute the testimony provided by the CWA witness. Rather,
18 CenturyLink’s witness, Mr. Schafer, acknowledged, at least to some extent, the problems that
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20 ⁴⁵ Gurganus Direct Testimony at page 5, lines 3-4; filed in Docket Control on September 27, 2010.

21 ⁴⁶ Gurganus Direct Testimony at page 5, lines 13-14; filed in Docket Control on September 27, 2010.

22 ⁴⁷ Gurganus Direct Testimony at page 5, lines 7-10; filed in Docket Control on September 27, 2010.

23 ⁴⁸ Gurganus Direct Testimony at pages 5-6; filed in Docket Control on September 27, 2010.

24 ⁴⁹ Gurganus Direct Testimony at page 6, lines 16-17; filed in Docket Control on September 27, 2010.

25 ⁵⁰ Gurganus Direct Testimony at pages 7-8; filed in Docket Control on September 27, 2010.

26 ⁵¹ Gurganus Direct Testimony at page 8, line 8. *See also*, Gurganus Direct Testimony at p. 9 (“I also
27 received a report that the new CenturyLink systems are so inefficient (improper orders, bad tickets, delays
from being on hold while calling in for information that should have been included on the work orders)
that tasks that should take a tech one hour to complete are taking as long as three hours...some of the new
systems require a lot of manual override.”); filed in Docket Control on September 27, 2010.

⁵² Gurganus Direct Testimony at page 4, line 14; filed in Docket Control on September 27, 2010.

⁵³ Gurganus Direct Testimony at page 10; filed in Docket Control on September 27, 2010.

1 arose in connection with the conversion of legacy Embarq systems in North Carolina.⁵⁴
2 Specifically, CenturyLink admits that certain electronic records failed to load correctly on
3 approximately 2,000 of a total of 11,500 “devices”⁵⁵ (i.e., a point where outside plant facilities are
4 aggregated).⁵⁶ This problem, which first arose in May, was a very labor intensive and time-
5 consuming one to fix,⁵⁷ and was not fully remedied until late November or early December.⁵⁸
6 CenturyLink acknowledges that the problems encountered in North Carolina resulted in lower
7 service level metrics,⁵⁹ an admission that is further supported by service quality reports obtained
8 from the North Carolina Public Utilities Commission website. That evidence reflects failure by
9 CenturyLink companies in North Carolina – Carolina Telephone and Telegraph and Central
10 Telephone -- to meet service quality objectives in the areas of “business office answer times,”
11 “repair service answer times,” and “out-of-service troubles cleared within 24 hours.”⁶⁰ Although
12 CenturyLink has attempted to downplay the impact of the conversion on service quality,⁶¹ Mr.
13 Schafer also noted that a third CenturyLink company in North Carolina, MEBTEL, did not
14 experience the same service quality issues.⁶² When asked about any reasons for this difference
15 between MEBTEL, on the one hand, and North Carolina Telephone and Telegraph and Central
16 Telephone, on the other, Mr. Schafer stated that the difference was that MEBTEL did not
17 experience a systems conversion.⁶³ What this shows is that the conversion was not just one of
18 many factors contributing to service quality issues, the conversion was the *key* factor.

21 ⁵⁴ Hearing Ex. CTL-5 (Schafer Rebuttal Testimony) at page 7, line 7-page 8, line 15; filed in Docket
22 Control on September 27, 2010.

23 ⁵⁵ Ex. CTL-5 (Schafer Rebuttal) at page 8. lines 7-13.

24 ⁵⁶ Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 124, lines 2-7 (Schafer).

25 ⁵⁷ Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 124, lines 9-12. (Schafer)

26 ⁵⁸ Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 128, lines 5-8, p. 129, lines 10-14 (Schafer).

27 ⁵⁹ Ex. CTL-5 (Schafer Rebuttal) at page 10, lines 16-18.

⁶⁰ See Ex. PLT-6; see also Transcript Vol. 1, page 132 line 16-page 133, line 19 (Schafer).

⁶¹ See. e.g., Ex. CLT-5 (Schafer Rebuttal) at page 10, line 16-page 11, line 2.

⁶² See Ex. PLT-6.

⁶³ Transcript, Vol. 1, page 139, lines 15-24 (Schafer).

1 Nor does the evidence support CenturyLink's claim that its previous integration efforts
2 have been executed "in accordance with established timeframes."⁶⁴ Prior attempts by CenturyLink
3 to integrate systems were neither on-time nor on-budget. CenturyTel stated in its 2001 10-K that
4 "The Company is in the process of developing an integrated billing and customer care system" and
5 completion ... is expected to occur in early 2003." However, only two years later, an industry
6 publication reported that CenturyTel's billing system integration efforts had required "substantially
7 more time and money to develop than originally anticipated" and estimated a cost overrun of
8 between \$50 million and \$60 million.⁶⁵ This same publication stated:

9 [T]here is no assurance that the system will be completed in accordance with this
10 schedule or budget, or that the system will function as anticipated. If the system
11 does not function as anticipated, the company may have to write-off part or all of
its remaining costs and further explore its other billing and customer care system
alternatives.⁶⁶

12 In its 2003 10K, CenturyTel acknowledged that "the system remains in the development stage and
13 has required substantially more time and money to develop than originally anticipated. The
14 Company currently expects to complete all phases of the new system no later than mid-2005. In
15 addition, the Company expects to incur additional costs related to completion of the project,
16 including (i) approximately \$15 million of customer service related and data conversion costs."
17 Therefore CenturyTel's integrated billing and customer care system implementation was delivered
18 over two years later than planned and additional operational costs were incurred as a result.⁶⁷

19 Cox Telecom, which has firsthand experience with CenturyLink's efforts to integrate
20 Embarq in Nevada, has provided testimony that further contradicts the rosy picture painted by that
21 CenturyLink attempts to paint. As Kim Howell of Cox Telecom states:

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24 ⁶⁴ Ex. CTL-4 (Schafer Direct) at page 5, lines 25-27.

25 ⁶⁵ Ex. PTL-1 (Gates Direct) at page 78, lines 6-8, citing *Financial Watch: Integration Costs Loop Over
OSS Deployments*, Billing and OSS World, October 1, 2003.

26 ⁶⁶ Ex. PTL-1 (Gates Direct) at page 78, lines 8-14, citing *Financial Watch: Integration Costs Loop Over
OSS Deployments*, Billing and OSS World, October 1, 2003.

27 ⁶⁷ Ex. PTL-1 (Gates Direct) at page 78, line 15-page 79. line 3.

1 The integration of Embarq and the transition to CenturyLink EASE OSS has been
2 and continues to be problematic. Today in Nevada, the EASE system has
3 negatively affected our response time for customer orders to switch phone service
4 from CenturyLink to Cox. At times of high volume, our submitted orders will
5 sometimes time-out, crash or experience other problems. We are frequently on
6 the phone with CenturyLink representatives trying to recover orders that are lost
7 in translation. We continue to be frustrated with the inability to meet our
8 customer's requests on a timely basis and be competitive with CenturyLink when
9 our orders are lost in their operating system. We have found in many cases we are
10 having to call our customers back and push the installation date out as a result of
11 the points of failure in the CenturyLink system.⁶⁸

12 Cox also observes that CenturyLink is very slow to address OSS problems and that the number of
13 issues has not materially decreased over time.⁶⁹ Along these same lines, Mr. Gates attaches to his
14 testimony comments submit to the FCC by tw telecom and Socket Telecom recounting problems
15 they experienced in 2009 – including system outages that prevented the submission of LSRs,
16 inability to complete pre-ordering, and slow response times – during CenturyLink's transition of
17 wholesale customers in legacy Embarq territory from one ordering system to another.⁷⁰

18 Even more troubling is the fact that the Qwest acquisition comes immediately after the
19 Embarq transaction and *before* the Embarq integration has been completed. CenturyLink's
20 acquisition of Qwest immediately following its acquisition of Embarq is the largest in a rapid
21 series of ever-larger CenturyLink acquisitions. As Dr. Ankum testified, this "presents disturbing
22 similarities to the experience of WorldCom and other failed acquisitions."⁷¹ Indeed, Moody's
23 Rating Service gave CenturyLink a negative rating outlook based on the risks associated with
24 CenturyLink's effort to acquire Qwest immediately following its acquisition of Embarq, stating:

25 The negative rating outlook . . . reflects the considerable execution risks in
26 integrating a sizeable company so soon after another large acquisition [Embarq in
27 July 2009].⁷²

⁶⁸ Ex. Cox-2 (Howell Surrebuttal) at page 12, lines 10-20.

⁶⁹ Ex. Cox-2 (Howell Surrebuttal) at page 13, lines 9-18.

⁷⁰ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 77, line 17-page 78, line 2; Exhibit TG-5.

⁷¹ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 11, lines 1-3.

⁷² Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 45, fn. 76.

1 Similarly, another ratings agency, Standard & Poor's observed that "integration efforts will be
2 difficult given the size of the combined company and CenturyTel's integration of previously
3 acquired Embarq will likely not be complete until the end of 2001."⁷³ CenturyLink recognized
4 these risks associated with the Embarq transaction in its own S-4 filing with the SEC, stating:

5 [CenturyLink/Qwest] integration initiatives are expected to be initiated before
6 CenturyLink has completed a similar integration of its business with the business
7 of Embarq, acquired in 2009, which could cause both of these integration
8 initiatives to be delayed or rendered more costly or disruptive than would
9 otherwise be the case.⁷⁴

9 Therefore, the Embarq transaction not only serves an example of problems CenturyLink is likely to
10 have with the proposed merger; it also increases the risk of problems with the proposed merger
11 given the short time between the two transactions.

12 **IV. THE PROPOSED MERGER'S RISKS ARE FURTHER ACCENTUATED BY**
13 **CENTURYLINK'S LACK OF WHOLESALE EXPERIENCE AT VOLUMES**
14 **COMPARABLE TO QWEST'S AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXPERIENCE**
15 **WITH QWEST'S BOC OBLIGATIONS.**

15 The challenges associated with Embarq acquisition pale in comparison to the challenges
16 associated with CenturyLink's acquisition of Qwest, which is over twice the size of Embarq⁷⁵ and
17 subject to unique additional BOC responsibilities CenturyLink and Embarq have never had.⁷⁶ As
18 Dr. Ankum observed:

19 To be sure, the challenge of integrating and running Qwest, with its unique BOC
20 obligations, comparatively enormous customer based, substantial wholesale
21 responsibilities, and complex set of operational support systems, is particularly
22 daunting and far beyond anything CenturyLink has faced to date.⁷⁷

24 _____
25 ⁷³ Ex. CLT-1 (Glover Direct), Ex. JG-4.

26 ⁷⁴ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 77, lines 7-13, quoting CenturyLink Form S-4 at page 16.

27 ⁷⁵ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 11, lines 14-17.

⁷⁶ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 23, line 8 - page 24, line 7.

⁷⁷ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 12, lines 4-8.

1 The merger risks noted above are further accentuated by the fact that CenturyLink lacks anything
2 close to Qwest's experience in providing wholesale services to CLECs -- either at Qwest's
3 wholesale volumes or under Qwest's special BOC obligations. As Dr. Ankum testified:

4 I have already noted that most mergers are not successful, even as measured by
5 the ultimate impact of the merger on shareholders. Yet more troubling in this case
6 is the fact that CenturyTel is seeking to acquire a much larger Bell Operating
7 Company ("BOC") while it is still integrating the recently acquire Embarq, a
8 company that was already about four times larger than the original CenturyTel. If
the successful outcome of mergers is generally in question, the outcome of this
one is particularly so.⁷⁸

9 A Commission Staff witness, Mr. Fimbres, echoes the concerns expressed by Dr. Ankum:

10 Until recently with the acquisition of Embarq, CenturyLink's operations have been
11 focused on rural areas. Qwest is a large ILEC serving many large metropolitan
12 areas in its 14 state region. Qwest is also a BOC and subject to § 271 obligations.
13 CenturyLink has no experience with § 271 obligations. For this reason, conditions
regarding Qwest's obligations are critical to ensure that it continues to meet its
obligations in this regard.⁷⁹

14 PAETEC shares these concerns. CenturyLink's traditional focus of operations on less
15 densely populated areas⁸⁰ means that it has not faced the level of competition and wholesale
16 service demand that ILECs such as Qwest have faced operating in larger metropolitan areas.⁸¹
17 Collectively, this lack of experience and exposure to the operational needs of wholesale customers
18 with high volume of transactions raises profound doubts about the company's ability to meet the
19 demands of wholesale customers operating in more densely populated urban and suburban areas
20 served by Qwest. CenturyLink's acquisition of a much larger ILEC and lack of experience with
21 Qwest's wholesale volumes and responsibilities magnify the risks otherwise inherent in ILEC
22 mergers such as this one.

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⁷⁸ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 10, lines 9-15.

⁷⁹ Ex. S-2 (Fimbres Direct) at page. 10, lines 18-22.

⁸⁰ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 23, line 15 – page 24, line 7.

⁸¹ See, e.g., Ex. CLT-1 (Glover Direct), Ex. JG-4 (Qwest acquisition "increases the company's exposure to higher density markets, which have significant competition from cable providers").

1 CenturyLink and Qwest cannot process number porting requests quickly, and efficiently, following
2 the merger, competitors and competition will suffer.

3 Most competitors also rely upon the incumbent for wholesale facilities, including
4 unbundled network elements and other wholesale products, that enable them to reach end-user
5 customers. Without these facilities, competitors cannot offer competitive services. Unfortunately,
6 CenturyLink also lacks experience provisioning these facilities. Mr. Gates testified that CLECs
7 purchase a total of *****BEGIN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL** [REDACTED] **END HIGHLY**
8 **CONFIDENTIAL***** UNE loops from CenturyLink in Arizona,⁸⁷ and *****BEGIN HIGHLY**
9 **CONFIDENTIAL** [REDACTED] **END HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL***** from CenturyLink
10 nationally.⁸⁸ In contrast, CLECs purchase *****BEGIN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL** [REDACTED] **END**
11 **HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL***** UNE loops from Qwest in Arizona alone.⁸⁹

12 Similar data also shows that CenturyLink processes far fewer requests for enhanced
13 extended links (EELs)⁹⁰ and collocation⁹¹ than Qwest. Collectively, these data show that
14 CenturyLink does not currently process anything close to the same volume of orders from
15 wholesale customers or competitors that Qwest currently processes. As such, CenturyLink will
16 soon be controlling an exponentially larger wholesale operation than it has operated to date.

17 Further, CenturyLink will be acquiring Arizona's BOC, which has wholesale
18 responsibilities and obligations with which CenturyLink has no experience. In particular, BOCs
19 are held to additional duties under Sections 271 and 272 of the Act which underlie their legal right
20 to operate in the interLATA market. The obligations under sections 271 and 272 include a number
21 of provisions that support competition, and which cannot be ignored if this transaction is
22 approved. However, that is precisely what may happen.

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25 ⁸⁷ Ex. PLT-1CF (Gates Direct) (Highly Confidential) at page 24, line 16 - page 25, line 1.

26 ⁸⁸ Ex. PLT-1CF (Gates Direct) (Highly Confidential) at page 25, lines 8-9.

27 ⁸⁹ Ex. PLT-1CF (Gates Direct) (Highly Confidential) at page 25, lines 9-11.

⁹⁰ Ex. PLT-1CF (Gates Direct) (Highly Confidential) at page 25, line 13 - page 26, line 3.

⁹¹ Ex. PLT-1CF (Gates Direct) (Highly Confidential) at page 26, lines 4-12.

1 CenturyLink's lack of experience and exposure to wholesale customers at anything close to
2 the levels experienced by Qwest is well established and beyond genuine dispute. As Joint CLEC
3 witness, Mr. Gates, explained, the Joint Applicants' own data shows that by a number of different
4 measures, CenturyLink's wholesale experience is significantly less than Qwest's. For example,
5 CenturyLink processed a total of *****BEGIN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED] END HIGHLY**
6 **CONFIDENTIAL***** number porting requests from competitors in Arizona in 2009⁸² and
7 *****BEGIN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED] END HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL*****
8 number porting requests from competitors company-wide (i.e., legacy Embarq plus legacy
9 CenturyTel) during 2009.⁸³ In contrast, Qwest processed *****BEGIN HIGHLY**
10 **CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED] END HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL***** number porting requests
11 from competitors in Arizona **BEGIN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED] END HIGHLY**
12 **CONFIDENTIAL** ports company-wide *in the first half of 2010 alone.*⁸⁴

13 In other words, Qwest processes, on average, *****BEGIN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED]**
14 **END HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL***** times more number porting requests in Arizona alone than
15 CenturyLink does throughout its entire territory nationwide.⁸⁵ On a company-wide basis, Qwest
16 processes **BEGIN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED] END HIGHLY**
17 **CONFIDENTIAL** number ports than does CenturyLink.⁸⁶ As the Commission knows, number
18 porting is essential for competition because consumers expect to retain their telephone numbers
19 when they switch from the ILEC to a competitive provider. If consumers cannot retain their phone
20 number or ensure that their telephone numbers will transfer immediately and seamlessly when
21 changing providers, then consumers will be reluctant to change providers. Therefore, if

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24 ⁸² Ex. PLT-1CF (Gates Direct) (Highly Confidential) at page 24, lines 12-14.

25 ⁸³ Ex. PLT-1CF (Gates Direct) (Highly Confidential) at page 24, lines 14-16.

26 ⁸⁴ Ex. PLT-1CF (Gates Direct) (Highly Confidential) at page 24, line 14 – page 25, line 1.

27 ⁸⁵ Ex. PLT-1CF (Gates Direct) (Highly Confidential) at page 25, lines 1-3.

⁸⁶ Ex. PLT-1CF (Gates Direct) (Highly Confidential) at page 25, lines 3-5.

1 As Mr. Gates testified, in large part because of its duties as a BOC, Qwest has operated for
2 many years in a manner that satisfies its state-approved performance assurance plans (or otherwise
3 pay penalties for failing to do so) and allows it to continue providing interLATA services pursuant
4 to authority granted under section 271.⁹² In contrast, CenturyLink has *never* had to perform to
5 those standards.

6 **V. THE PROPOSED MERGER'S RISKS FALL PRIMARILY ON QWEST'S**
7 **WHOLESALE CUSTOMERS AND COMPETITION.**

8 Any merger has, as its ultimate objective, the goal of increasing shareholder value.⁹³
9 However, private shareholder interests do not necessarily align with the public interest that the
10 Commission is obligated to protect in its review of telecommunications mergers. To the contrary,
11 as Dr. Ankum observed, "an ILEC's pursuit of profit and increased shareholder value through the
12 acquisition of another ILEC inherently conflicts in many ways with the Commission's mandate to
13 promote the public interest and competition."⁹⁴ As Dr. Ankum explains, "[T]he risks and gains of
14 a merger are not evenly distributed among all stakeholders,"⁹⁵ rather, a merger's risks fall
15 disproportionately on captive customers, such as CLECs, that have no alternatives for essential
16 facilities they need to compete:

17 CenturyLink's and Qwest's shareholders, for example, can sell their shares if they
18 anticipate that things will go awry, or alternatively hold on to their shares to
19 recoup whatever benefits they may anticipate: It is a risk-return tradeoff each
20 shareholder is free to either assume or walk away from. However, this freedom of
21 choice does not exist for other captive stakeholders. Specifically, retail customers
22 in captive segments of retail markets have little or no choice and neither do
23 wholesale customers, such as CLECs, who critically depend on the Joint
24 Petitioners for interconnection, loops, transport, collocation and a variety of other
25 wholesale network inputs. That is, captive retail and wholesale customers will not

26 ⁹² See, e.g., Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 23, lines 10-12; page 31, lines 3-14; page 44, line 1 – page
27 45, line 20.

⁹³ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 22, lines 1-4.

⁹⁴ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 22, lines 10-12.

⁹⁵ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 8, lines 22-23.

1 only reap no gains if the proposed transaction is successful, they may experience
2 great harm when things go awry (as they have in so many of these ventures).⁹⁶

3 As Mr. Gates explained, Qwest's "market power not only extends to wholesale services such as
4 UNEs, interconnection and collocation required of ILECs pursuant to Section 251(c) of the Act,
5 but also to other wholesale services provided by the ILECs, such as special access, as evidenced by
6 supracompetitive rates ILECs are currently charging for special access in areas where they have
7 received special access pricing flexibility."⁹⁷

8 In this case, the merged company's pursuit of over \$600 million in synergies, at the same
9 time it faces substantial post-merger integration costs and inevitable merger-related operational
10 problems, creates a substantial risk to the public interest -- particularly to wholesale customers and
11 local competition. All businesses strive to minimize their costs, increase their market share and
12 maximize their revenues. However, the merged company's pursuit of an aggressive synergy target
13 in the face of substantial integration costs will place enormous additional pressure on the merger
14 company to achieve these ends. Further, the merged company will have a strong incentive to
15 realize these synergies through cuts in the wholesale services that the company provides to the
16 CLECs, with whom the merged company will compete. To that end, the FCC noted in its *Local*
17 *Competition Order*, "An incumbent LEC also has the ability to act on its incentive to discourage
18 entry and robust competition by not interconnecting its network with the new entrant's network or
19 by insisting on supracompetitive prices or other unreasonable conditions for terminating calls from
20 the entrant's customers to the incumbent LEC's subscribers."⁹⁸ With respect to the operation of
21 these incentives on the post-merger company, Dr. Ankum has observed:

22 ⁹⁶ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 9, lines 3-13; see also Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 16, lines 10-
23 14 ("In rejecting Qwest's recent petition for forbearance in the Minneapolis, Denver, Seattle, and Phoenix
24 metropolitan statistical areas ('MSAs'), the FCC concluded that '[t]he record does not reflect any
25 significant alternative sources of wholesale inputs for carriers in the four MSAs.'").

26 ⁹⁷ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 17, lines 4-9.

27 ⁹⁸ *In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of*
1996; First Report and Order, CC Docket No. 96-98, FCC 96-325, Released August 8, 1996 ("*Local*
Competition Order") at ¶ 10; see also Transcript Vol. 1, p. 201, lines 2-11 (retail service more possible
than wholesale service)(testimony of M. Williams).

1 Trimming wholesale costs not only saves money on services that are not subject to
2 significant competition, it does so without the likelihood of revenue
3 repercussions: *i.e.*, the cost savings directly improve the bottom line. That is,
4 there are added incentives to cut costs in segments of the companies' operations
5 that are not subject to competitive pressures: most notably, the wholesale business
6 charged with meeting the Section 251 and Section 271 obligations under the
7 Telecommunications Act of 1996. In sum, this dynamic places post-merger
8 CenturyLink at odds with captive CLEC wholesale customers.⁹⁹

9 As an ILEC and as Arizona's BOC, Qwest owns and controls the vast majority of the
10 State's core telecommunications infrastructure, which is ubiquitously deployed and ultimately
11 connected to every residence and business throughout Qwest's broad service area. That
12 infrastructure not only provides the platform for Qwest's service to its own retail customers, but
13 also serves as the network platform on which competitive providers -- *i.e.*, CLECs -- depend for
14 access to their end-user retail customers.

15 **VI. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT AGAINST
16 DETERIORATION OF CLEC ACCESS TO, AND FUNCTIONALITY OF,
17 QWEST'S OPERATIONS SUPPORT SYSTEMS ("OSS").**

18 **A. High Quality OSS Is Critical To The Ability Of CLECs To Provide
19 Competitive Local Services.**

20 The FCC defines OSS to include five functions: (1) pre-ordering, (2) ordering, (3)
21 provisioning, (4) maintenance and repair, and (5) billing.¹⁰⁰ OSS includes all of the computer
22 systems, databases and personnel that an ILEC uses to perform internal functions necessary for
23 these five functions.¹⁰¹ The ability of a CLEC to access the ILEC systems and databases on a
24 nondiscriminatory basis to review customer information and submit and review orders is
25 absolutely vital to the efficient operation of the industry. The systems must be efficient, reliable
26 and accurate. Inefficient systems that require extensive manual intervention, for instance, would
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⁹⁹ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at page 42, line 19 – page 43, line 6.

¹⁰⁰ *In the Matter of Application by Qwest Communications International, Inc. for Authorization To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in the States of Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC Docket No. 02-314, FCC 02-332, Released December 23, 2002 (“*Qwest 9 State 271 Order*”) at ¶ 33.

¹⁰¹ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 32, line 17 – page 33, line 2.

1 make doing business with the ILEC difficult, more costly, and more prone to error because of the
2 increased manual nature of the work.¹⁰²

3 The FCC has determined OSS to be a “network element.”¹⁰³ Consequently, a CLEC must
4 be permitted nondiscriminatory access to an ILEC’s OSS functions in order to provide pre-order
5 information to potential customers, sign up customers, place orders for services or facilities, track
6 the progress of its orders to completion, obtain relevant billing information from the ILEC, and
7 obtain prompt repair and maintenance services for its customers.¹⁰⁴ Further, OSS was one of the
8 first issues that the FCC had to address in Section 271 proceedings. Specifically, the FCC
9 concluded that it:

10 [G]enerally must determine whether the access to OSS functions provided by the
11 RBOC to competing carriers sufficiently supports each of the three modes of
12 competitive entry strategies established by the Act: interconnection, unbundled
network elements, and services offered for resale.¹⁰⁵

13 The FCC found that CLECs would be “severely disadvantaged, if not precluded altogether, from
14 fairly competing,” if they did not have nondiscriminatory access to OSS.¹⁰⁶ As the Commission
15 Staff witness observed:

16 The number one issue is the change in access to critical wholesale services and the
17 decline in competitiveness that would result from changes to OSS services that
18 could impact CLECs disproportionately compare to Qwest’s retail organizations.
19 The OSSs are essential, for example, in the ordering, installation and repair of
unbundled network elements (“UNEs”) , one of which is the last mile loop
20 essential to many CLECs using wholesale services.¹⁰⁷

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23 ¹⁰² Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 33, lines 2-4.

¹⁰³ *Local Competition Order* at ¶ 516.

24 ¹⁰⁴ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 31, line 18 – page 32, line 2.

25 ¹⁰⁵ *Application of Ameritech Michigan pursuant to § 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,*
to provide In-Region, Inter-LATA services in Michigan, CC Docket 79-137, Memorandum Op. and Order,
Released August 19, 1997 (“*Ameritech Michigan 271 Order*”) at ¶ 133.

26 ¹⁰⁶ *Local Competition Order* at ¶ 518.

27 ¹⁰⁷ Ex. S-2 (Fimbres Direct) at page 11, lines 7-12.

1 Qwest itself has described its existing OSS as playing “a crucial role in the transactions
2 between Qwest and all CLECs”¹⁰⁸ and “the lifeblood of...Qwest’s wholesale operation...”¹⁰⁹

3 **B. The Record Establishes A High Risk Of OSS Degradation Following The**
4 **Merger.**

5 Joint Applicants have provided no concrete detail regarding their plans with respect to the
6 integration of the CenturyLink and Qwest systems.¹¹⁰ They admittedly have no integration plan;
7 rather they can only point to a process that they intend to use to determine how to integrate. At
8 this point, the uncertainty about what will happen to the OSS after the merger is remarkable,
9 particularly given the critical import of OSS for fair and effective competition in Arizona.

10 The evidence that has been provided on this issue provides the Commission ample reason
11 for concern that the merger will have an adverse impact on the OSS functionalities and capabilities
12 available to CLECs who currently use Qwest’s systems. The evidence shows that the Joint
13 Applicants expect to reduce expenses by \$575 million in operating costs synergies to be realized
14 over a period of three to five years following the merger.¹¹¹ Further, it is undisputed that the
15 company intends to realize cost savings as a result of eliminating duplicate OSS as it moves to a
16 “single system.”¹¹² [***HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BEGINS

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22 ¹⁰⁸ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 32, lines 12-14, citing Qwest Post Hearing Brief, Utah Docket 07-
2263-03 at p. 75.


23 ¹⁰⁹ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 32, lines 12-14, citing Surrebuttal Testimony of Renee Albersheim, on
behalf of Qwest Corp., Utah Docket 07-2263-03, August 10, 2007, at p. 39.

24 ¹¹⁰ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 36, line 6 - page 38, line 23.

25 ¹¹¹ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 27, line 14 – page 28, line 2.


26 ¹¹² Transcript, Vol. 1, page 142, line 17-page 143, line 2 (Schafer) (“long-run” plan to have a single set of
systems); see also Transcript, Vol. 2, page 303, lines 16-23 (Hunsucker) (“goal of the company, is to
create efficiencies by trying to get to one single system.”); Vol. 2 page 304, line 23-page 305, line 8 (cost
is one of the factors motivating company’s desire to go to a single OSS platform).

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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ENDS*]**

The elimination of duplicative functions (or headcount) and systems will impact wholesale operations. *****HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BEGINS**



HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

ENDS*]**¹¹⁵

The evidence further shows that to replace Qwest OSS with CenturyLink OSS would cause substantial harm to CLECs' ability to effectively compete. First, only Qwest's OSS has a track record of handling the commercial volumes in Qwest's legacy territory. Significantly, Qwest, unlike CenturyLink, went through the Section 271 approval process and, as part of that process, Qwest's OSS, CMP and supporting processes and data, were thoroughly tested to ensure that they provided the nondiscriminatory access.¹¹⁶ According to Qwest, the collaborative OSS test "was

¹¹³ Ex. PLT-2CF (Gates Surrebuttal) (Highly Confidential) at page 17, line 15 – page 18, line 1.

¹¹⁴ Ex. PLT-1CF (Gates Direct) (Highly Confidential) at page 28, lines 3-11, citing CenturyLink Response to Integra Arizona Data Request #52(a), Highly Confidential Attachment 52a.

¹¹⁵ Ex. PLT-2CF (Gates Surrebuttal) (Highly Confidential) at page 29, line 12 – page 30, line 8.

¹¹⁶ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct), at page 42, line 13 – page 45, line 20 (describing in detail third party testing of Qwest's OSS); Ex. S-2 (Fimbres Direct), page 11, lines 14-16 ("Qwest's OSS were subject to in-depth review during the Arizona § 271 proceeding. This was a lengthy proceeding which spanned several years and was designed to ensure that Qwest met its obligations under §§ 271 and 272 of the 1996 Act.")

1 the most comprehensive and collaborative of all of the OSS tests conducted to date.”¹¹⁷
2 CenturyLink’s OSS comes with nothing approaching the degree of scrutiny that Qwest’s OSS has
3 had.

4 The overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that Qwest’s OSS provide CLECs with
5 greater functionality than is available through CenturyLink’s OSS. As the Commission Staff
6 witness states, “Qwest’s OSS appear to be superior to both the Embarq and CenturyLink systems.
7 It would be unacceptable, given the substantial time invested by the Commission and others in the
8 Qwest 14 state region during the § 271 process, for CenturyLink to adopt changes to Qwest’s
9 support systems that are inferior to what is now available.”¹¹⁸ Similarly, Cox’s witness, Mr.
10 Howell, states:

11 It is Cox’s experience that Qwest’s OSS is in many respects superior to the
12 Embarq system CenturyLink is in the process of integrating, so it is troubling that
13 the Joint Applicants have, to my knowledge, been unwilling to firmly commit to
14 using the Qwest OSS in Qwest’s legacy territories for a substantial post-merger
15 time period, and to commit that at no point will the service levels made possible
16 by the Qwest OSS be degraded even if the entity eventually goes to a unified OSS
17 throughout its territories.¹¹⁹

18 A chart comparing the capabilities of the Qwest and CenturyLink OSS accompanies Mr.
19 Haas’ testimony¹²⁰ at Exhibit WAH-2. Unlike Qwest’s OSS, which provides real-time processing,
20 EASE offers only “batch” order processing.¹²¹ Qwest’s OSS – called IMA -- uses drop down
21 menus that expedite address validation for pre-ordering, unlike CenturyLink’s OSS, which
22 requires that the customer’s address be input exactly as it appears in EASE.¹²² Additionally,

23 ¹¹⁷ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 42, line 17 – page 43, line 1, citing Brief of Qwest Corp., WC Docket
24 No. 02-148, June 13, 2002, at page 111.

25 ¹¹⁸ Ex. S-2 (Fimbres Direct) at page 15, lines 8-11; see also PLT-1 (Gates Direct), page 35, lines 2-4
26 (“[T]he existing Qwest OSS and its functionality are more well-documented, and preferred by carriers such
27 as Charter that use both of the merging companies’ systems, than the existing CenturyLink OSS.”)

¹¹⁹ Cox -1 (Howell Direct) at page 4, lines 14-19.

¹²⁰ Ex. PAETEC-1 (Haas Settlement Testimony).

¹²¹ Ex. PAETEC-1 (Haas Settlement Testimony) at page 5, lines 24-25.

¹²² Ex. PAETEC-1 (Haas Settlement Testimony) at page 5, line 25-page 6, line 1.

1 Qwest's IMA, unlike CenturyLink's EASE, saves the validated address so that it can be used to
2 automatically populate the LSR.¹²³ IMA, unlike EASE, allows customer service record
3 information to be downloaded to PAETEC's back office systems for use in sales, order
4 preparation, and establishing a customer's account in various systems.¹²⁴ IMA, unlike EASE,
5 enables a CLEC to confirm on a pre-order basis the availability of specific products and services at
6 a prospective customer's address. EASE permits service availability to be determined only after
7 the CLEC has submitted an actual order, which forces the CLEC to incur the time and expense of
8 submitting an order only to learn that the requested service is not available at the customer's
9 location.¹²⁵

10 One very significant difference between Qwest's OSS and CenturyLink's OSS that affects
11 a wide variety of CLEC operations is the difference to which those systems accommodate "e-
12 bonding" that allows the automated, real-time transfer of information between the CLEC and ILEC
13 systems. Qwest's OSS uses an e-bonding system for Local Service Requests ("LSRs") used to
14 order unbundled loops that allows faster and more accurate exchange of information and forms
15 than CenturyLink's systems.¹²⁶ This e-bonding functionality reduces costs and delays by
16 eliminating manual process errors and the re-processing that such errors require.¹²⁷

17 PAETEC's internal system, for example, routes Qwest line loss data received through the
18 XML interface directly into PAETEC's billing system, which results in the termination of billing
19 for end users for whom the line loss data has been received via the interface without manual
20 intervention. The interconnectivity of systems has effectively eliminated the "billing after
21 downgrade" issues that plagued CLECs and end users that existed for a number of years. A

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23 ¹²³ Ex. PAETEC-1 (Haas Settlement Testimony) at page 6, lines 3-5.
24 ¹²⁴ Ex. PAETEC-1 (Haas Settlement Testimony) at page 6, lines 6-10.
25 ¹²⁵ Ex. PAETEC-1 (Haas Settlement Testimony) at page 6, lines 10-16.
26 ¹²⁶ Ex. Cox -1 (Howell Direct), page 5, lines 15-17; see also Ex. Cox-1 (Howell Direct), page 5, lines 18-22
27 ("Qwest allows electronic submission of LSRs and ASRs through e-bonding and a web-based portal, respectively. CenturyLink, even in the Embarq territories, does not have e-bonding for most LSRs, and uses a more manual, non-interactive internet ordering processes for ASRs for interconnection trunks.")
¹²⁷ Ex. Cox -1 (Howell Direct) at page 5, lines 17-18.

1 similar linkage is made by PAETEC between Qwest's OSS interfaces and the PAETEC's own
2 systems for directory listings to ensure accurate directory listings for the CLECs' customers.¹²⁸

3 Trouble ticket reporting is another example. PAETEC, for example, has established
4 electronic bonding capability with Qwest that allows automated escalation of the trouble ticket,
5 and automated resolution or closing of the trouble ticket and notification to the customer. In other
6 words, by establishing the electronic bonding with Qwest, a CLEC trouble ticket can go from
7 "open" to "closed" with little or no intervention by the CLEC's technicians. These automated
8 capabilities are possible because PAETEC undertook a substantial effort to develop its own back
9 end systems and processes and then code, test and link those systems and processes to Qwest's
10 systems and interfaces. These CLEC back end systems would be subject to change if the merged
11 company changed Qwest's legacy OSS post-transaction, and could require CLECs to revert to
12 significantly less efficient manual processes if the modified OSS offered by the merged company
13 does not afford CLECs access to the same degree of the merged company's back end systems and
14 data via the electronic interface.¹²⁹

15 A decrease in functionality available from Qwest's systems would have a profoundly
16 adverse impact on CLECs. Not only would CLECs have to expend significant time and money
17 testing the CenturyLink replacement systems, but they would also have to materially modify their
18 own systems. For instance, the CLECs have built their own interfaces to electronically bond
19 directly to the existing Qwest systems. These CLEC systems would need to be modified, at
20 significant expense, by the CLEC to work with the new replacement system.¹³⁰ PAETEC, in
21 particular, has invested significant amounts in its own systems to automate a large number of pre-
22 order, order, billing and trouble ticket management functions over the course of several years.¹³¹
23 The automation of these functions has allowed PAETEC to reallocate a significant number of

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25 ¹²⁸ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 53, line 18 – page 54, line 9.

26 ¹²⁹ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 55, line 18 – page 56, line 11.

27 ¹³⁰ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 52, lines 11-15.

¹³¹ Ex. PAETEC-1CF (Haas Settlement Testimony) (Confidential) at page 3, lines 19-page 4, line 15.

1 employees to other assignments and function and to provide more timely ordering, provisioning,
2 repairs and other services for its customers.¹³² Any change to Qwest's OSS that reduces degrades
3 the e-bonding functionality of those systems will force PAETEC to incur substantial costs to
4 assign employees to manually perform tasks that are completed in an automated fashion today.¹³³

5 During the third-party testing of Qwest's OSS, a "pseudo-CLEC" (Hewlett Packard or
6 "HP") was hired to act as a CLEC (or "to live the CLEC experience"¹³⁴). HP was charged with
7 establishing electronic bonding with Qwest, ensuring that Qwest provided the necessary
8 information and tools to electronically interface with Qwest's OSS, and determine whether
9 Qwest's systems were operationally ready to handle the volumes and types of orders CLECs would
10 submit through the business-to-business electronic interfaces. Likewise, KPMG Consulting tested
11 Qwest's testing environments. If CenturyLink attempted to modify the CLEC-facing OSS
12 interfaces in Qwest's territory, all of the work done by the third-party testers during the third-party
13 test, and the work done by CLECs to establish these business-to-business interfaces would be
14 undermined. This work would need to be performed all over again to ensure that the replacement
15 system provides the same functionality and at the same quality as Qwest's system.¹³⁵

16 **C. Uncertainty Has Been Exacerbated By The Lack Of Information Regarding**
17 **Post-Merger OSS Integration Plans.**

18 The Staff witness regarding OSS issues expresses concern that "CenturyLink and Qwest
19 have presented very little information explaining how the post-merger company would change its
20 operations without impacting its wholesale obligations."¹³⁶ In Arizona as well as other states, the
21 Joint Applicants have been asked about their post-merger OSS integration plans and in each
22 instance the Joint Applicants have provided a boilerplate response that "integration planning is in
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24 ¹³² Ex. PAETEC-1 (Haas Settlement Testimony) at page 4, lines 18-22.

25 ¹³³ Ex. PAETEC-1 (Haas Settlement Testimony) at page 8, line 16-page 9, line 3.

26 ¹³⁴ Draft Final Report of KPMG Consulting, Qwest Communications OSS Evaluation, Version 1.1, April
27 26, 2002 ("KPMG 4/26/02 OSS Report") at page 10.

¹³⁵ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 54, line 10 – page 55, line 2.

¹³⁶ S-2 (Fimbres Direct) at page 14, lines 6-7.

1 the early stages” and “decisions have not been made at this time.”¹³⁷ The strategic value of such a
2 nonresponse to these questions is obvious: A decision cannot be criticized if it has not been made.
3 But it also puts the Commission in the untenable position of having to take “on faith” the Joint
4 Applicants’ assurances that the transaction will not result in harm.

5 The central element of CenturyLink’s excuse for its failure to provide any detail regarding
6 its integration plans is its claim that “having done this several times before, we have what we call a
7 standard playbook in terms of integration.”¹³⁸ In order to encourage confidence in that “standard
8 playbook,” the Joint Applicants offered two documents that it claimed provided “pretty detailed
9 information about how CenturyLink goes about doing integration planning.”¹³⁹ The problem with
10 this claim is that, even now, the record contains no information about how this supposed “standard
11 playbook” applies to the OSS integration challenges presented by this proposed merger. This is
12 because the key OSS witness for the Joint Applicants – indeed, the only OSS witness for the Joint
13 Applicants¹⁴⁰ – was all but completely unfamiliar with these documents, having only seen them for
14 the first time in connection with preparing to testify at the hearing.¹⁴¹

15 Although these documents identify specific integration-related tasks and set forth a
16 timeline for accomplishing those tasks, CenturyLink’s OSS witness was unable to testify whether
17 any of the identified tasks had been completed, or even started, or whether the specified timelines
18 were being met.¹⁴² CenturyLink’s OSS witness stated that he had not seen a comparison of
19 CenturyLink’s OSS and Qwest’s OSS and was unaware of whether such a comparison even
20 exists.¹⁴³ Although the capacity of systems to provide electronic flow through is a crucial
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22 ¹³⁷ See Hearing Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 36, line 6-page 38, line 23.

23 ¹³⁸ Transcript, Vol. 1, page 172, lines 3-5 (Glover).

24 ¹³⁹ Transcript, Vol. 1, page 168, lines 1-23; Ex. CTL-10CF.

25 ¹⁴⁰ Transcript, Vol. 1, page 185, lines 12-17; page 188, lines 1-5 (Glover); Transcript, Vol. 2, page 301,
lines 12-23 (Hunsucker).

26 ¹⁴¹ Transcript, Vol. 2, page 309, lines 14-23; page 317, lines 13-21 (Hunsucker).

27 ¹⁴² Transcript, Vol. 2, page 310, lines 9-13, page 312, line 8-page 314, line 14; page 316, line 19-page 317,
line 4; page 324, line 18-page 325, line 13 (Hunsucker).

¹⁴³ Transcript, Vol. 2, page 320, lines 4-18 (Hunsucker).

1 consideration in evaluating OSS, CenturyLink's OSS witness had no knowledge of how Qwest's
2 and CenturyLink's systems compare with respect to flow through.¹⁴⁴ Nor could CenturyLink's
3 OSS witness explain why, in the description of the current evaluation status of Qwest's major
4 systems, as reflected in the alleged "playbook," there was no mention of Qwest OSS.¹⁴⁵

5 In short, CenturyLink's self-described "standard playbook" can provide no confidence
6 regarding integration of OSS, in light of the lack of any evidence that CenturyLink has, in fact,
7 been following that playbook in its integration planning. Moreover, since it is indisputable that
8 this transaction is unlike any prior transaction undertaken by CenturyLink, especially with regard
9 to absorbing an RBOC with statutory obligations to provide nondiscriminatory access to OSS,
10 relying on the CenturyLink "standard playbook" is a meaningless assurance since acquiring an
11 RBOC is not a "play" that CenturyLink has ever run before.

D. Additional Conditions are Necessary.

12 Condition 19 of the Staff Settlement addresses OSS issues. That Condition, although
13 providing valuable protection for CLECs and, more importantly, for competition, does not go far
14 enough. In order to assure that CLECs' current ability to access Qwest's OSS is not adversely
15 impacted by the merger, PAETEC recommends that Condition 19 be modified to provide as
16 follows:
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19 19. In Qwest ILEC service territory, after the Closing Date, the Merged Company
20 will use and offer to wholesale customers the legacy Qwest Operational Support
21 Systems ("OSS") for at least three years, or until July 1, 2014, whichever is later,
22 and thereafter provide a level of wholesale service quality that is not less than that
23 provided by Qwest prior to the closing Date, with functionally equivalent support,
24 data, functionality (including functionality affecting the operations of CLEC back
25 office functionality as of the Closing Date), performance, electronic flow through
26 and electric bonding. After the period noted above, the Merged company will not
27 replace or integrate Qwest systems without first establishing a detailed transition
plan and complying with the following procedures:

¹⁴⁴ Transcript, Vol. 2, page 312, lines 13-22 (Hunsucker).
¹⁴⁵ Transcript, Vol. 2, page 325, lines 14-22; see also Ex. CTL-10CF.

1 Besides protecting competition in Arizona – and the Arizona customers that have
2 benefitted from that competition -- the one additional year for retaining the Qwest OSS does not
3 unduly delay any “integration” of the systems, particularly given the lack of a specific integration
4 plan. CenturyLink’s statement that it is under no time pressure for OSS integration and the
5 expressed 3-5 year “synergy” period. Moreover, the proposed parenthetical simply clarifies the
6 intent of the “functionally equivalent” phrase of the Condition and appears to comport with
7 CenturyLink’s basic interpretation of that phrase.¹⁴⁶ Such clarification will minimize future
8 disputes on this critical issue.

9 In addition, to assure that CLECs are not adversely impacted by changes that the merged
10 company may make to Qwest’s OSS, the Commission should require third party testing of any
11 replacement OSS that the company seeks to implement.

12 **1. Continuance of Qwest OSS for at least three years.**

13 First, the Commission should direct the merged company to add at least a year to the time
14 period in the Staff Settlement for which the merged company will continue to use and offer the
15 Qwest OSS, such that the OSS will be used and offered for at least three years. Mr. Gates
16 explained that because CenturyLink has estimated synergy savings to be achieved over a three-to-
17 five year period, evidence in the record shows that the greatest risk to CLECs of CenturyLink
18 degrading access to OSS is during that three-to-five year window.¹⁴⁷ Recognizing that Qwest has
19 referred to OSS as the “lifblood” of its wholesale operations,¹⁴⁸ modifying or degrading Qwest’s
20 wholesale OSS is one way in which the merged company may attempt to find synergy savings. If
21 CenturyLink failed to maintain and invest in Qwest’s OSS, or deliberately degraded certain aspects
22 of those systems, CenturyLink could save money (increase synergies) and disadvantage its
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25 ¹⁴⁶ Transcript, Vol. 2, page 331, lines 1-21 (Hunsucker).

26 ¹⁴⁷ Ex. PLT-3 (Gates Settlement Testimony) at page 10, line 8 – page 12, line 5.

27 ¹⁴⁸ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 35, lines 12-14, citing Surrebuttal Testimony of Renee Albersheim, on behalf of Qwest Corp., Utah Docket 07-2263-03, August 10, 2007, at page 39.

1 competitors that rely upon these critical systems. Of course, this would also result in harm to
2 competition as well as the public's interest in a competitive local telecommunications market.
3 Adding a year to the period of time for which the company agrees to continue using the Qwest
4 OSS will provide CLECs with time necessary to do their own planning and systems development
5 work that will be necessitated by any significant changes.¹⁴⁹

6 As the record demonstrates, if CLEC access to OSS is degraded due to integration failures
7 or attempts to find synergy savings, competitors will be disadvantaged in attempting to compete
8 with CenturyLink. Indeed, the systems integration problems experienced following recent mergers
9 is evidence of the problems that OSS integration failures can have on competitors, and ultimately
10 end user customers.¹⁵⁰ A commitment to continue operating the Qwest OSS for *less than* three
11 years – or less than the time period during which CenturyLink will be aggressively pursuing
12 synergy cost savings – significantly increases the potential that the merged company target OSS
13 systems, processes, and support relied upon by CLECs for elimination.

14 It took more than three years just to test and evaluate Qwest's OSS to determine if it was
15 sufficient to meet the requirements of Section 271.¹⁵¹ So, if the merged company decides to
16 modify or replace Qwest's OSS, it is reasonable to assume that it will take at least three years (i) to
17 decide which OSS the merged company intends to use going forward, (ii) to make changes to
18 Qwest's OSS, (iii) to test and evaluate the new OSS to ensure that it can handle the commercial
19 volumes in Qwest's territory and provide CLECs a meaningful opportunity to compete, (iv) to
20 allow cooperative testing of the systems with the CLECs to ensure that they meet the CLEC needs;
21 and (v) for CLECs to develop internal systems to interface with the new OSS systems.¹⁵²

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25 ¹⁴⁹ Transcript, p. 89, line 6-page 90, line 19 (Gates).

26 ¹⁵⁰ Ex. PLT-4 (Ankum Direct) at pages 26-37 and Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at pages 86-106.

27 ¹⁵¹ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct), Ex. TG-2 at page 2.

¹⁵² Ex. PLT-3 (Gates Settlement Testimony) at page 12, line 18-page 13, line 4.

1 Significantly, Commission Staff had previously also urged the Commission to adopt such a
2 three year commitment.¹⁵³ In testifying in support of the Staff Settlement, which reduced the
3 commitment to two years, Mr. Abinah described the CLEC request for a three year commitment as
4 “reasonable,”¹⁵⁴ but stated that the Staff Settlement represented a “compromise.”¹⁵⁵ Staff has not,
5 however, identified any corresponding benefit that it believes it gained through this
6 compromise.¹⁵⁶

7 Nor does the fact that a two year OSS commitment was acceptable to one CLEC – Integra
8 – provide any assurance that a two year commitment will appropriately protect the interests of all
9 CLECs. In entering into its settlement agreement, Integra represented only its own interests, not
10 those of other CLECs.¹⁵⁷ No other CLECs were involved in the negotiations that culminated in
11 that agreement.¹⁵⁸ Obviously there are differences among CLECs such that what will be
12 acceptable to one CLEC will not necessarily be adequate for all CLECs. For example, PAETEC
13 has implemented much more extensive back office automation than has Integra, which relies more
14 on manual processes to complete various tasks that PAETEC has automated.¹⁵⁹ Integra’s reliance
15 on manual processes means that future changes to Qwest’s OSS, should those changes degrade the
16 functionality, access and robustness of the e-bonding capabilities, will not impact Integra to the
17 degree that such changes could impact the automated processes used by PAETEC.¹⁶⁰

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19 ¹⁵³ See Ex. S-2 (Fimbres Direct) at page 30, lines 8-11; Ex. S-3 (Fimbres Surrebuttal) at page 16, lines 22-
20 page 17, line 15.

21 ¹⁵⁴ Transcript, Vol. 3, p. 562, line 16 (Abinah).

22 ¹⁵⁵ Transcript, Vol. 3, p. 562, lines 1-21 (Abinah).

23 ¹⁵⁶ To the extent that it might be contended that the broadband investment commitment (see Staff
24 Settlement, Condition 17) provides such a benefit, such a claim is not supported by the record. There is no
25 evidence that this investment commitment provides anything beyond what the company would have
26 invested anyway, absent such a commitment. Unlike investment commitments entered into by the Joint
27 Applicants in other states (for example, Minnesota), the Staff Settlement does not require the company to
invest in broadband in unserved or underserved areas. See Transcript, Vol. 3, page 559, lines 3-18
(Abinah).

¹⁵⁷ Transcript, Vol. 2, page 432, line 24-page 433, line 6 (Denney).

¹⁵⁸ Transcript, Vol. 2, page 437, lines 9-17 (Denney).

¹⁵⁹ Ex. PAETEC-1 (Haas Settlement Testimony) at page 7, lines 8-13.

¹⁶⁰ Ex. PAETEC-1 (Haas Settlement Testimony) at page 7, lines 13-17.

1 Finally, the Joint Applicants cannot reasonably contend that the addition of one more year
2 to the OSS commitment will be burdensome. CenturyLink has repeatedly asserted that it is under
3 no time pressure to complete systems integration – indeed, CenturyLink has touted this as one of
4 the advantages of the transaction.¹⁶¹ Further, CenturyLink has apparently not even begun the work
5 necessary to determine what, if any changes, it would make to the Qwest OSS;¹⁶² thus, there is no
6 basis for it to claim that it has any particular need to make such changes within three years of the
7 closing. Moreover, to the extent that it is the case, as CenturyLink has claimed, that its synergy
8 estimates do not include any cost savings associated with systems integration,¹⁶³ adding a year to
9 the OSS commitment will not adversely impact the company’s ability to meet its synergy
10 projections.

11 **2. Clarification of commitment to provide “functionally equivalent”**
12 **access.**

13 Second, the Commission should include the additional language proposed by PAETEC to
14 assure that changes made to Qwest’s OSS to not diminish the ability of CLECs to use those
15 systems, including any diminishment of functionality that adversely affects CLEC back office
16 systems. The Staff Settlement provision regarding OSS requires the merged company provide
17 “functionally equivalent support, data, functionality, performance, electronic flow through and
18 electronic bonding.”¹⁶⁴ This requirement, although an improvement over the Integra Settlement
19 Agreement, does not go far enough in assuring that CLECs will not experience a diminishment in
20 their ability to use automated systems such as those that PAETEC has implemented. This is
21 because it has become apparent that CenturyLink takes the position that its OSS is functionally

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23 ¹⁶¹ Transcript, Vol. 1, page 44, line 23-page 45, line 1 (Glover) (“We are not trying to rush into this. The
24 benefit is Qwest today is a stand-alone entity with stand-alone OSS, stand-alone retail billing systems.
And so it is not like we have to be in a rush to convert systems and so forth.”)

25 ¹⁶² Transcript, Vol. 2, page 289, lines 11-17 (Hunsucker); see also Transcript, Vol. 2, page 310, lines 9-13,
page 312, line 8-page 314, line 14; page 316, line 19-page 317, line 4; page 324, line 18-page 325, line 13;
page 346, lines 15-19. (Hunsucker).

26 ¹⁶³ Transcript, Vol. 1, page 183, lines 13-16 (Glover).

27 ¹⁶⁴ Ex. S-1 (Abinah Settlement Testimony) at Condition 19.

1 equivalent to Qwest's OSS, notwithstanding the numerous deficiencies discussed above.¹⁶⁵
2 Particularly in light of CenturyLink's advocacy to the FCC, there is plainly a need for clarity
3 regarding the scope of the merged company's obligation to maintain "functionally equivalent"
4 systems, particularly as it relates protecting against any adverse impact that OSS changes may have
5 on CLEC back office systems.

6 The clarification proposed by PAETEC appears to be consistent with what both the Joint
7 Applicants and the Staff have described as their intent. Thus, Mr. Hunsucker, on behalf of the
8 Joint Applicants stated:

9 [W]hat the settlement agreement does, we will provide a level of service that is
10 not less than, and we will provide the same, functionally equivalent support data
11 flow-through, et cetera. So we will be required to provide functionally equivalent
12 electronic flow-through.¹⁶⁶

13 Similarly, Mr. Abinah testified for Staff that:

14 [F]unctionally equivalent means the same at least, but if there is room for
15 improvement, it should have the ability to do that after consultation with the
16 CLEC. So it just means the same but have the room for improvement.¹⁶⁷

17 No party has contended that the post-merger company should have the ability to implement
18 changes to Qwest's OSS that adversely affect CLECs' ability to use their back office systems,
19 including the same degree of automated functionality that they have today.

20 The clarification that PAETEC proposes is a modest one – the addition of the following
21 language to further describe the merged company's obligation to provide "functionally equivalent"
22 OSS: "including functionality affecting the operations of CLEC back office functionality as of the
23 Closing Date." Although this proposed change is modest, it is also very important, in light of the
24 concerns outlined above regarding the impact that OSS changes may have on CLEC systems. To

25 ¹⁶⁵ Ex. PAETEC-1 (Haas Settlement Testimony) at page 10. lines 9-22.

26 ¹⁶⁶ Transcript, Vol. 2, page 331, lines 7-12 (Hunsucker).

27 ¹⁶⁷ Transcript, Vol. 3, page 558, lines 17-21 (Abinah).

1 the extent that the Joint Applicants continue to object to this language, this should be a red flag
2 regarding CenturyLink's intentions.

3 **3. Third party testing.**

4 A degradation of the levels of service provided under the Qwest OSS today would
5 represent a significant step backwards. Qwest's OSS was subjected to an extensive third-party test
6 conducted over a three-year period for the express purpose of determining whether Qwest's OSS
7 satisfied the nondiscriminatory access requirement under Section 271 of Act.¹⁶⁸ That third party
8 testing revealed hundreds of problems that were addressed, and later resolved, through OSS
9 improvements and re-testing. Millions of dollars of investment and countless person hours went
10 into this process.¹⁶⁹ Ultimately, because of those investments and the continued review and
11 oversight of state commissions like this one, Qwest ultimately received 271 authority to provide
12 in-region interLATA services.

13 The FCC has previously concluded that the most probative evidence that OSS functions are
14 operationally ready is actual commercial usage. To that end, the FCC said:

15 The most probative evidence that OSS functions are operationally ready is actual
16 commercial usage. Absent sufficient and reliable data on commercial usage, the
17 Commission will consider the results of carrier-to-carrier testing, independent
18 third-party testing, and internal testing in assessing the commercial readiness of a
19 BOC's OSS. Although the Commission does not require OSS testing, a
20 persuasive test will provide us with an objective means by which to evaluate a
21 BOC's OSS readiness where there is little to no evidence of commercial usage, or
22 may otherwise strengthen an application where the BOC's evidence of actual
23 commercial usage is weak or is otherwise challenged by competitors. *The
24 persuasiveness of a third-party review, however, is dependent upon the
25 qualifications, experience and independence of the third party and the
26 conditions and scope of the review itself. If the review is limited in scope or
27 depth or is not independent and blind, the Commission will give it minimal
weight.*¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 122, lines 3-6, and Exhibit TG-2.

¹⁶⁹ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 122, lines 6-11.

¹⁷⁰ Qwest 9 State 271 Order, Appendix K "Statutory Requirements" at page K-16 (emphasis added).

1 Internal OSS testing that is not independent and blind is inferior to a truly independent
2 third-party test in determining a BOC's OSS commercial readiness. Though CenturyLink claims
3 that it extensively tests its own OSS, this testing does not involve third-party testing.¹⁷¹ This
4 means that CenturyLink's OSS testing is not independent or blind, and would therefore, be a step
5 backwards for Qwest OSS that has undergone years of extensive and verifiable third-party testing.
6 CenturyLink has specifically said that it does not intend to engage in third-party testing post-
7 merger for any replacement OSS that replaces an existing Qwest OSS.¹⁷²

8 In contrast, CenturyLink's OSS has not been third-party tested,¹⁷³ nor has it handled actual
9 commercial volumes in Qwest's region. Replacing Qwest's legacy OSS with CenturyLink's
10 legacy (or new) OSS would lead to backsliding on Qwest's 271 obligations because Qwest would
11 no longer be providing the nondiscriminatory access to OSS that was a quid pro quo for 271
12 approval. As discussed above, the evidence shows that when CenturyLink's existing OSS are
13 compared to Qwest's existing OSS, CenturyLink's OSS: have inferior functionality, do not
14 support as many services, have not been third-party tested, and have never processed the
15 commercial volumes experienced in Qwest's legacy territory.

16 4. Costs of Unifying Joint Applicants' OSS.

17 In addition to adding these additional protections to the OSS conditions, an equally
18 important principle needs to be clarified by the Commission should it approve the proposed
19 transaction – any costs Joint Applicants incur to modify its OSS should be considered costs of the
20 transaction and thereby, prohibited from charging CLECs additional fees or charges related to
21 OSS. As noted by PAETEC witness Haas, the settlement agreements with Integra and Staff are
22 silent with respect to OSS related costs. Thus, while Joints Applicants claim they have committed
23

24 ¹⁷¹ Ex. PLT -1 (Gates Direct) at page 122, line 17-page 123, line 4.

25 ¹⁷² Minnesota Docket P-421, et al./PA-10-456, Hearing Transcript Volume 2B (public) at pp. 88-89 (“Q.
26 No. Is it your – should you migrate the Qwest properties onto the CenturyLink OSS, would you engage in
27 third-party testing before that went live? A. We would not engage in third-party testing.” (Hunsucker))

¹⁷³ Ex. PLT-1 (Gates Direct) at page 122, line 17, citing CenturyLink Response to Integra Arizona Data
Request #18.

1 to meet the needs of PAETEC by retaining the same level of existing functionality in any modified
2 OSS, the Joint Applicant's have made no commitment that it will not seek to have CLECs bear the
3 costs of fulfilling its obligation. The commitment that a future unified OSS will be "functionally
4 equivalent" to the Qwest OSS rings hollow if the Joint Applicants are permitted to impose new
5 costs or charges on CLECs to access the modified unified system. Given that the EASE system
6 provides significantly less functionality than already exists in the Qwest OSS, it is likely that the
7 Joint Applicants will be required to enhance EASE to become functionally equivalent. Since
8 moving to EASE would be a choice made by Joint Applicants, they, and they alone, should bear
9 the cost of making such enhancements. Thus, the Commission should make it crystal clear that
10 Joint Applicants will not be allowed to impose new or additional costs on CLECs for accessing the
11 Joint Applicants OSS and supporting databases to meet its obligation to provide an OSS that is
12 functionally equivalent to the Qwest OSS.

13 CONCLUSION

14 In order to the meet the "Public Interest" standard for approving the proposed merger, the
15 Commission must impose conditions to ensure continuing viable competition in Arizona and to
16 mitigate potential harm to the competitive providers and their customers. Although the Settlement
17 Agreement contains certain conditions to address these concerns, the Settlement Agreement still
18 lacks conditions that are critical to minimize adverse impacts to effective competition. In order to
19 ensure that Arizona consumers continue to benefit from competition, PAETEC requests that the
20 Commission include three additional commitments -- or clarifications to Settlement Agreement
21 conditions -- as conditions to approval of the proposed merger:

- 22 1. a commitment to maintain Qwest's existing OSS for at least three years to match
23 the Joint Applicants' 3-5 year synergy period;
- 24 2. a commitment that any change in OSS will not adversely impact the operations of
25 CLECs' back office systems; and
- 26 3. commitment to, in connection with changes to Qwest OSS, to conduct third party
27 testing to assure that specific components of wholesale OSS service quality,

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
1 including support, data, billing, functionality, performance, electronic flow through
and electronic bonding, are not degraded.

2 4 a commitment that any costs resulting from the modification or
3 replacement of the Qwest OSS, including the costs of making the OSS
4 functionally equivalent to the existing Qwest OSS, will be considered
costs of the transaction and will not be charged to CLECs.

5 These commitments will not create an undue burden on the Joint Applicants, require them to
6 modify the terms of their merger or interfere with their presently undetermined integration plans .
7 However, without these conditions, competition in Arizona will be harmed and the merger will not
8 be in the public interest.

9 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of January 2011.

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
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