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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

Arizona Corporation Commission

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Commissioner

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF )  
BROOKS FIBER COMMUNICATIONS OF )  
TUCSON, INC. FOR ARBITRATION OF )  
THE RATES, TERMS AND CONDITIONS )  
OF INTERCONNECTION WITH US WEST )  
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. PURSUANT )  
TO SECTION 252(b) OF THE TELE- )  
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 )

DOCKET NO. U-3009-96-479  
DOCKET NO. E-1051-96-479

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**CLOSING STATEMENT OF BROOKS FIBER COMMUNICATIONS OF TUCSON, INC.**

Brooks Fiber Communications of Tucson, Inc. ("BFC-Tucson"), hereby submits its written closing statement ("Closing Statement") pursuant to the direction of the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission") Arbitrators in the above-captioned matter. As part of its Closing Statement, BFC-Tucson will identify those portions of its pre-filed written testimony that address issues discussed herein. Where appropriate, BFC-Tucson will also provide citations to the arbitration hearing transcript.

**I. INTRODUCTION**

BFC-Tucson and US WEST Communications, Inc. ("US WEST"), have been successful, to varying degrees, in resolving a number of the issues identified in the original BFC-Tucson Petition. In some instances, that "resolution" simply has meant that a final decision on a still contested issue has been deferred by the Commission to another phase of the arbitration proceedings (e.g., final pricing issues, performance standards and measures, liquidated damages, etc.). For the most part, this Closing Statement will not address issues

1 resolved during negotiations with US WEST or deferred to a later hearing.<sup>1</sup>

2 In its Closing Statement, BFC-Tucson has taken issues outstanding at the time of the  
3 arbitration hearing and divided them into the following categories:

- 4 1) Pricing Issues;
- 5 2) Collocation Issues;
- 6 3) Unbundling Issues; and,
- 7 4) Contractual Issues.<sup>2</sup>

8 Certain of these issues have already been litigated and decided in prior arbitration  
9 proceedings involving US WEST and TCG Phoenix ("TCG Arbitration"), MFS  
10 Communications Company, Inc. ("MFS Arbitration"), and AT&T Communications of the  
11 Mountain States, Inc. ("AT&T Arbitration"). BFC-Tucson will not extensively reargue  
12 those issues in its Closing Statement but will urge the Arbitrator to either adopt or reject its  
13 previous rulings on such issues based on the evidence in this proceeding.

## 14 II. PRICING ISSUES

### 15 A. Unbundled Loops - (Final Matrix Issue #25)

16 BFC-Tucson realizes that the Commission has consistently adopted \$21.67 as  
17 the recurring monthly charge for unbundled local loops. Therefore, BFC-Tucson and US  
18 WEST have agreed on this monthly rate pending a final decision in the consolidated  
19 arbitration proceeding on costing studies and pricing ("Cost/Price Proceeding"). BFC-  
20 Tucson and US WEST have not reached agreement on the non-recurring charges ("NRC's")  
21 for unbundled loops, which are included in BFC-Tucson's general discussion of NRC's.

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23  
24 <sup>1</sup> BFC-Tucson will, however, urge interim resolutions of these issues along the lines  
25 decided in prior arbitrations or in conformance with the evidence presented herein.

26 <sup>2</sup> BFC-Tucson will also identify these issues as they appear on the final issue matrix ("Final  
Matrix") filed jointly this day by US WEST and BFC-Tucson.

1           **B. Construction Charges - (Final Matrix Issue # 4)**

2           Both the 96 Telecommunications Act ("Act") and the Federal Communications  
3 Commission ("FCC") Order on Interconnection ("FCC Order") impose an obligation of  
4 cost-based interconnection charges on incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILEC's") such as  
5 US WEST. US WEST'S tariffs for construction charges are based on interconnection for  
6 IXC's, not competitive local exchange companies ("CLEC's") and further, the non-recurring  
7 and recurring elements that it wishes to impose for equal and reciprocal compensation are  
8 implicit in the balance struck by "bill and keep." CLEC's also have to engage in  
9 construction in order to receive and route traffic originated by ILEC customers. There is no  
10 demonstration that either party will bear more costs to interconnect than the other at this  
11 point, and no extraordinary requirement to compensate should be imposed absent such a  
12 demonstration. Therefore, Brooks urges the Commission to adopt the same position on  
13 construction charges as in the TCG Arbitration at page 20 and the MFS Arbitration at page  
14 10. See BFC-Tucson Ex. No. 3 at pp. 13, 15, 17, and 23.

15           **C. Non-Recurring Charges - (Final Matrix Issue # 16)<sup>3</sup>**

16           NRC's are incurred both for resale of bundled retail services and for the  
17 purchase of unbundled network elements. At the very least, high non-recurring charges to  
18 new entrants, such as proposed by US WEST, represent a barrier to entry if not "trued-up"  
19 to some cost-based measurement. To maintain a level playing field, new entrants should  
20 only have to bear interim NRC's that are comparable to those that new customers of US  
21 WEST must pay until both the NRC's to retail customers and to new entrants can be reset at  
22 what the Commission determines to be appropriate cost levels. Therefore, these charges  
23 should not exceed those charged retail customers for comparable services, and both interim  
24 and final NRS's should include volume discounts and, in the case of resale services, a

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26 <sup>3</sup>Excepting the NRC for INP, concerning which there has been an agreement on interim  
prices as set forth herein at page 5.

1 wholesale discount. See BFC-Tucson Ex. No. 1 at pp. 15-16; Ex. No. 2 at pp. 20-22; and  
2 Ex. No. 3 at p. 19.

3 **D. Resale Discount - (Final Matrix Issue #'s 14 and 26)**

4 1. Resale Restrictions:

5 BFC-Tucson can accept the same resale restriction required by the  
6 Commission in the TCG, MFS, and AT&T Arbitrations, and believes it has reached  
7 agreement on this point with US WEST.

8 2. Resale Discount:

9 BFC-Tucson and US WEST have agreed to an across-the-board interim  
10 discount of 17% on recurring charges, as found in prior arbitration decisions. However,  
11 BFC-Tucson believes this interim discount should be increased to at least 20% for NRC  
12 associated with resale services because all the physical provisioning costs included in NRC's  
13 are avoided in the case of resale. See BFC-Tucson Ex. No. 1 at p. 15.

14 **E. Bill and Keep - (Final Matrix Issue # 27)**

15 BFC-Tucson recommends adoption of bill and keep for the two year period  
16 set forth in the Commission's regulations and in the TCG Arbitration. See BFC-Tucson Ex.  
17 No. 1 at p. 11.

18 **F. Interim Number Portability - (Final Matrix Issue #'s 11 and 12)**

19 BFC-Tucson and US WEST have come to an interim resolution of this issue  
20 pending a final order in the Cost/Price Proceeding. This interim resolution covers both cost  
21 recovery and terminating access charge division and is set forth in the Final Matrix. The  
22 interim resolution will be subject to true-up at the conclusion of Cost/Price Proceeding both  
23 as to the rates for INP itself and the rates and elements to be included in access charge  
24 division.



1 given the responsibility to review and determine what specific equipment may be collocated,  
2 if collocation is objected to by the ILEC on the grounds that it is switching equipment.

3 In the AT&T Arbitration, the recommended decision to the Commission  
4 allows AT&T to locate, without restriction, RSM's in collocated offices. Id. at 6. BFC-  
5 Tucson witness Johnson presented compelling testimony as to why such collocation of  
6 RSM's was appropriate for each of the following reasons:

- 7 1) it reduces BFC-Tucson's costs;
- 8 2) it reduces US WEST's costs;
- 9 3) it improves quality of service for both US WEST and BFC-Tucson  
10 customers;
- 11 4) it improves network efficiency;
- 12 5) it reduces traffic on the US WEST tandem; and,
- 13 6) it reduces traffic on US WEST's direct trunking.

14 See Arbitration Transcript ("TR") at pp. 30-49 and p. 76, ln. 24-p. 77, ln. 22; pp. 195-201;  
15 and p. 202, ln. 23 - p. 203, ln. 16 and also BFC-Tucson Ex. No. 1, pp. 5-10 and BFC-  
16 Tucson Ex. No. 3, pp. 13 and 15.

17 **B. Resizing of Trunks - (Final Matrix Issue # 6)**

18 There is no provision of the Act, the FCC's Order, or of the Commission's  
19 regulations that requires resizing of interconnection trunks by US WEST. However,  
20 resizing, if done reasonably and rationally, will allow US WEST to utilize the  
21 interconnection trunking and ports on switches more efficiently. BFC-Tucson's position  
22 would allow the resizing to occur based upon a reasonable but very short range look at  
23 reasonably projected traffic volumes. U S WEST'S original position would use past traffic  
24 volumes, which will never be representative of volumes in the immediate future (especially  
25 during BFC-Tucson's early "ramp-up" period), to inappropriately resize trunking. This  
26 would cause CLEC's to incur these unnecessary costs twice, once to downsize the

1 interconnection and then again to resize it upward shortly thereafter in order to  
2 accommodate the same growth in traffic clearly predictable at the time the original resizing  
3 was required by US WEST. This premature downward resizing could also cause traffic  
4 blocking on the public switched network as traffic grows, which is obviously not good for  
5 customers. See BFC-Tucson Ex. No. 3 at pp. 14-15; and also TR at p. 117, ln. 5 - p. 119,  
6 ln. 5; and p. 201, ln. 8 - p. 202, ln. 22. To resolve this issue, BFC-Tucson and US WEST  
7 have subsequently agreed on a compensatory mechanism should already established trunks  
8 fail to be utilized as projected by BFC-Tucson, which mechanism is set forth in the Final  
9 Matrix.

#### 10 11 **IV. UNBUNDLING ISSUES**

##### 12 **A. Recombination of Unbundled Elements - (Final Matrix Issue #18)**

13 The issue here is whether U S WEST may restrict the ability of a CLEC to  
14 combine unbundled network elements. It is clear from the Act that US WEST may not  
15 unreasonably restrict the use of elements of service. Properly priced unbundled elements  
16 will allow U S WEST to recover the appropriate costs of its network elements, and if other  
17 carriers can combine those elements in ways that make their network less costly or more  
18 efficient, the Act and the FCC Order allow them to do so at §§ 51.309 and 51.315. This  
19 has also been the consistent position of the Commission in the MFS, TCG and AT&T  
20 Arbitrations. US WEST presented no new arguments in the BFC-Tucson arbitration  
21 supporting a different conclusion as to BFC-Tucson. See BFC-Tucson Ex. No. 3 at p. 20.

##### 22 **B. Tandem Office Designation - (Final Matrix Issue #2)**

23 U S WEST desires to charge two elements of switching to BFC-Tucson - one  
24 for tandem switching and one for end office switching, with the tandem rate the higher of  
25 the two. As BFC-Tucson witness Johnson amply demonstrated, BFC-Tucson's switch  
26 performs the same functions in terminating the calls as U S WEST'S two switches do, and

1 thus BFC-Tucson should be able to charge U S WEST the same two elements of switching  
2 in the absence of bill and keep or in the case of intraLATA toll. Under a bill and keep  
3 scenario, the designation of a switch as one or the other is fairly irrelevant for purposes of  
4 local traffic compensation.<sup>4</sup> However, it may have an impact on compensation for intra- or  
5 interLATA toll and the associated access charges to IXC's and other local exchange  
6 companies. Moreover, the designation of BFC-Tucson's switch as tandem in the initial  
7 stages of its network development will eventually be important factor in determining whether  
8 there is reciprocal and equal compensation. In the absence of a cost study demonstrating  
9 that asymmetric compensation is warranted, the Commission should adopt policies which  
10 support reciprocal and equal compensation [FCC Rule 51.711(b) and 51.713].

11 BFC-Tucson realizes that the MFS and TCG Arbitrations have come to different  
12 conclusions on this issue. However, BFC-Tucson's situation is clearly distinguishable from  
13 that of MFS. Specifically, the testimony in this arbitration proceeding demonstrated that:

- 14 1) BFC-Tucson's tandem switch provides all the same functions and services as  
15 US WEST's tandem;
- 16 2) BFC-Tucson's tandem switch will allow any US WEST customer within BFC-  
17 Tucson's authorized service area to access any BFC-Tucson customer and vice  
18 versa;
- 19 3) BFC-Tucson's collocated end offices will serve some 82% of US WEST  
20 business customers and 68% of US WEST residential customers within BFC-  
21 Tucson's authorized service area; and,
- 22 4) BFC-Tucson's fiber network (either constructed or under construction) far  
23 exceeds that of MFS, both in absolute terms and in relation to their respective  
24 service area.

25 In addition, the FCC Order at 106 states that the Commission, when deciding the  
26 classification of the new entrant's switch as either end office or tandem, "shall also consider  
whether new technologies (e.g., fiber ring or wireless networks) perform functions similar

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<sup>4</sup> A BFC-Tucson proposal to defer, in any agreement, the issue of the classification of BFC-Tucson's switch until after the end of "bill and keep" was rejected by US WEST.

1 to those performed by an incumbent LEC's tandem switch." See BFC-Tucson Ex. No. 1 at  
2 pp. 11-14; BFC-Tucson Ex. No. 3 at p. 12, Section III, Part 3-V. D. 1.; and also TR at p.,  
3 50 and at p. 62, ln. 20 - p. 65, ln. 5.

4 **C. Enhanced Services Exemption - (Final Matrix Issue #3)**

5 BFC-Tucson and US WEST have resolved this issue along the lines set forth  
6 in the Final Matrix.

7  
8 **V. CONTRACTUAL ISSUES**

9 **A. Most Favorable Terms and Conditions - (Final Matrix Issue #21)**

10 Brooks would add a "most favorable terms and conditions" paragraph. Aside  
11 from Paragraphs 1310 and 1311 of the FCC Order, Section 252(i) of the Act requires that  
12 each individual network service or element be provided on a non-discriminatory basis.

13 BFC-Tucson witness Ken Solomon provided lengthy testimony on why such a  
14 contractual provision is necessary to prevent undue discrimination and that it is a common  
15 feature in agreements relating to industries facing rapidly declining costs or which are  
16 otherwise in an unsettled state. See BFC-Tucson Ex. No. 2 at pp. 22-34.

17 **B. Expedited Installs - (Final Matrix Issue #19)**

18 This issue is a practical one and involves both service quality and pricing  
19 concerns. Brooks believes it should have the opportunity, at its request, to expedite related  
20 installation orders on the same day at the same time rather than having to schedule separate  
21 times in the day for related orders to be worked. US WEST has refused to commit to  
22 expedite installations or even to commit to standard intervals for installation, claiming that  
23 these issues will have to be addressed next year in the quality of service proceeding.

24 BFC-Tucson also should not be charged both the tariff NRC and US WEST's  
25 installation labor rate when a coordinated installation (or "cutover") takes place (as US  
26 WEST'S proposed agreement would require). The latter charge reflects US WEST's actual

1 time incurred in making whatever expedited installations as are requested by BFC-Tucson.  
2 To charge BFC-Tucson for both is duplicative and could well lead to double recovery. This  
3 issue is very significant to BFC-Tucson because it anticipates that the great majority of BFC-  
4 Tucson's customers will be hooked up through such coordinated cutovers. See BFC-Tucson  
5 Ex. No. 3 at p. 20; and also TR at p. 119, ln. 17 - p. 120, ln. 16.

6 **C. Service Quality Standards/Liquidated Damages - (Final Matrix Issue #20)**

7 The FCC Order at 225, 314 and 970 allows carriers to request and receive  
8 better service from the ILEC than it provides its general retail customers as long as they are  
9 willing to pay for it. Any final Commission decision in this matter should expressly clarify  
10 this point.

11 BFC-Tucson also urges the Commission to adopt its proposed performance criteria  
12 and liquidated damage provisions pending a final determination on these issues sometime  
13 next year in yet another generic consolidated phase of the various arbitration proceedings  
14 pending before this Commission. It would be especially appropriate to require specific  
15 performance standards for an ILEC with as dismal a record of service as U S WEST.  
16 Indeed, BFC-Tucson has similar liquidated damages clauses in its agreements with other  
17 ILEC's such as Ameritech. The issue of liquidated damages, as opposed to penalties,  
18 reduces the dispute over what should a penalty be in each case and eliminates the need for  
19 reporting and monitoring each element of service performance.

20 BFC-Tucson's proposed liquidated damage level is based upon the valuation of other  
21 local exchange companies' business and upon a revenue stream analysis. The level of  
22 liquidated damages should be set such that the ILEC has no incentive to perform badly in  
23 order to regain a customer. In addition, US WEST's proposed "limitation of liability"  
24 language is of concern to BFC-Tucson. BFC-Tucson does not believe that the ILEC can or  
25 should shelter itself from liability for antitrust or other penalties imposed by regulatory  
26 bodies.

1           The Commission must realize and take into consideration the particular vulnerability  
2 of new entrants such as BFC-Tucson to irreparable damage caused by poor US WEST  
3 service. The old saying that you never get a second chance to make a good first impression  
4 goes double in the telecommunications business - especially when you are a new company in  
5 town trying to compete with an over 100 year old monopoly provider with near universal  
6 name recognition. At the same time, proving specific damages in a court of law can be  
7 problematic (customers are not excited about being drawn into contractual disputes between  
8 telephone companies) and such a remedy may well fail to capture the loss by BFC-Tucson of  
9 future business due to a bad but undeserved reputation for poor service caused by US  
10 WEST's deficiencies. See BFC-Tucson Ex. No. 1 at pp. 19-21.

11           **D.     Billing Period for Resold Service - (Final Matrix Issue #17)**

12           BFC-Tucson and US WEST have agreed on compromise language as set forth  
13 in the Final Matrix.

14           **E.     Notice of Commencing Business - (Final Matrix Issue #23)**

15           There is no obligation under the Act for CLEC's to report to ILEC's what  
16 customers or when the CLEC begins to serve residential customers and US WEST has  
17 presented no evidence as to why such an obligation should be imposed on BFC-Tucson.  
18 Such information is available upon request by the Commission at the time it considers a  
19 Section 271 (of the Act) application by an ILEC seeking interLATA authority. BFC-Tucson  
20 should not have to provide its network data to US WEST for any reason other than assuring  
21 network integrity. See BFC-Tucson Ex. No. 3 at p. 13.

22           **F.     Acknowledgement of Reserved Issues - (Final Matrix Issue #24)**

23           There is also no obligation under the Act for CLEC's to acknowledge any  
24 position taken by ILEC's with regard to network imbalances, universal service or any other  
25 position taken with regard to pending matters before this Commission, the courts or the  
26 FCC. As with the above issue, US WEST has presented no evidence supporting inclusion

1 of such purely self-serving language in any BFC-Tucson/US WEST agreement. See BFC-  
2 Tucson Ex. No. 3 at p. 13.

## 3 4 VI. CONCLUSION

5 BFC-Tucson is a small facilities-based carrier authorized by this Commission to  
6 serve the Metro-Tucson area. The positions taken by BFC-Tucson throughout its long and  
7 difficult negotiations with US WEST and throughout these arbitration proceedings have  
8 consistently been with the following principles in mind:

- 9 1) minimize the costs of interconnection and resale to BFC-Tucson and its  
10 customers;
- 11 2) require no increased costs to US WEST for which BFC-Tucson is not willing  
12 to pay;
- 13 3) maximize the efficient use of both the BFC-Tucson and US WEST integrated  
14 network;
- 15 4) provide the highest quality of service to BFC-Tucson customers without  
16 degrading existing US WEST service; and,
- 17 5) provide contractual incentives (where market incentives do not exist and  
18 traditional regulatory oversight would be inadequate) for US WEST to live up  
19 to the commitments made to BFC-Tucson.

20 BFC-Tucson's positions are also consistent with many of the prior rulings of the  
21 Commission in the TCG and MFS Arbitrations and with the recommended decision in the  
22 AT&T Arbitration. BFC-Tucson urges the Commission to adopt each of the BFC-Tucson  
23 positions as set forth herein and in the Final Matrix.  
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 22nd day of November, 1996.

SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.


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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The original and three (3) copies of the foregoing document were filed with the Hearing Division of the Arizona Corporation Commission, with a copy to Docket Control, on the 22nd day of November, 1996, and service was completed by hand-delivering or faxing a copy of the foregoing document this 22nd day of November, 1996, to all parties of record herein.

  
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Dody Nunley