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**BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION**

RENZ D. JENNINGS  
CHAIRMAN  
MARCIA WEEKS  
COMMISSIONER  
CARL J. KUNASEK  
COMMISSIONER


IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPETITION )  
IN THE PROVISION OF ELECTRIC )  
SERVICES THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF )  
ARIZONA. )

DOCKET NO. U-0000-94-165

**NOTICE OF FILING**

Staff hereby gives notice of filing its Summary of Workshop on Electric Industry Restructuring which was held August 12, 1996.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of August, 1996.

  
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Arizona Corporation Commission  
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Original and ten (10) copies of the foregoing were filed this 21st day of August, 1996, with:

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Arizona Corporation Commission  
**DOCKETED**


AUG 21 1996

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M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Parties to Electric Industry Restructuring  
Docket No. U-0000-94-165

FROM: David Berry  
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
DATE: August 1996

RE: SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP ON ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING

Enclosed is the Staff summary of the workshop on electric industry restructuring held on August 12, 1996.

**SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP ON  
ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING  
AUGUST 12, 1996**

**Docket No. U-0000-94-165**



**August 19, 1996**

**Arizona Corporation Commission  
Utilities Division  
1200 W. Washington  
Phoenix, Arizona 85007**

**SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP ON  
ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING  
AUGUST 12, 1996  
Docket No. U-0000-94-165**

The Commission established Docket No. U-0000-94-165 to investigate the introduction of retail competition into the electric industry. Among the activities of the Commission in this docket have been: an introductory workshop held in September 1994; a series of task force meetings held during 1995; an October 1995 report summarizing the task force discussions; solicitation of comments on implementation of electric industry restructuring with comments filed in June 1996; and a July 1996 Staff summary of the comments.

On August 12, 1996, the Commission conducted a workshop to explore and obtain feedback on a small number of options for introducing retail electric competition. Staff will use the results of the workshop to help it draft a proposed rule to introduce retail electric competition. Table I indicates the parties who participated in the workshop. To facilitate discussions, participants were divided into three groups. Each group met separately but discussed similar issues. Staff members moderated each of the discussion groups. This report summarizes the major points raised during the discussions.

The focus of discussion was the phasing-in of retail electric competition. Although some parties have advocated that full competition start as of a given date, there are many practical and financial matters that must be dealt with as competition is introduced. Therefore, most parties support a phasing in of competition. There is little support for a pilot program to test how competition might be implemented.

Topics reviewed in the workshops were:

*The Competitive Market*

- ◆ Competitive services
- ◆ Unbundled services
- ◆ Types of competitive contracts
- ◆ Access to customer information
- ◆ Pace of competition
- ◆ Participation by residential and small commercial consumers in early phases of competition
- ◆ Selection of participants in the early phases of competition
- ◆ Reciprocity

*Consumer Protection*

- ◆ Effects of competition on ratepayers not in the competitive market
- ◆ Service quality

- ◆ Standard offer service for nonparticipants
- ◆ Billing procedures and filing requirements

*Stranded investment*

*Corporate Responsibility*

- ◆ Protection of system benefits.
- ◆ Renewables
- ◆ Employee relations

*Administrative Matters*

- ◆ Certificates of Convenience and Necessity
- ◆ Confidentiality
- ◆ Coordination with the Legislature

## THE COMPETITIVE MARKET

### Competitive Services

In a competitive market, it is expected that generation would be competitively provided. Thus, Arizona utilities, other utilities, independent power producers, and self generators would provide the generation of electricity. Distributed generation, where the generation is located at or near the point of consumption, could also be provided competitively. Generation services could be sold directly to consumers or to middle-men such as aggregators, who, in turn, sell the electricity to consumers. There may also be power marketers and other wholesalers in the generation market.

Suppliers of generation may operate their own plants, may purchase under long term or short term contracts from other generators, and may purchase some supplies on the spot market.

Transmission, distribution, and ancillary services would probably continue to be provided by incumbent utilities at regulated rates. Such services would be unbundled from traditional utility service and priced on a disaggregated or unbundled basis. However, competitors may enter these markets. If competition does arise, some utilities argued that market-based pricing ought to be used in lieu of regulated rates.

Aggregators are likely to emerge, especially to serve smaller consumers, including residential consumers. These companies would obtain generation, transmission, distribution, and

ancillary services in the marketplace and supply bundled electric service to consumers. Some parties asked whether aggregation would be statewide or would occur only in certain geographic areas.

### **Unbundled Services**

Utilities would offer transmission, distribution, and ancillary services on an unbundled basis. Thus, consumers could be served by other generators and they or their agents could purchase the necessary transmission, distribution and ancillary services to provide useful electric service.

Utilities pointed out that there is no experience with unbundled electric services, including ancillary services. Thus, there will be some imprecision and uncertainty in setting rates for regulated, unbundled services. The open access transmission tariffs developed under FERC Order 888 will provide some guidance in setting unbundled rates. However, there will be distribution services, possibly including some ancillary services, that still must be dealt with if retail competition is authorized. The question of what ancillary services are required to be provided and by whom was raised. Some ancillary services may be provided competitively.

Some parties prefer to see regional transmission rates, perhaps set by an independent system operator.

Some parties were unclear as to who would provide future transmission lines. Utilities may continue to provide additions to transmission capacity, but other parties may also enter the transmission market. Further, if greater use of distributed generation results, the need for additional transmission capacity may be reduced.

With competition, some services would be rebundled by competitive suppliers as part of their marketing strategies.

### **Types of Competitive Contracts**

It was argued that, because of the surplus of energy currently available, consumers would not enter into long term contracts to purchase electricity, thereby resulting in: a) a failure by existing suppliers to cover their average costs of existing plants from competitive sales, and b) absence of construction of new power plants. This result typically occurs in markets with excess capacity and reflects the absence of a need for significant new capacity additions. However, some consumers are entering into long term contracts with utilities sufficient to cover utilities' long run marginal costs and some consumers are purchasing on-site generation.

### **Access to Customer Information**

Incumbent utilities may have an advantage over market entrants because the utilities have customer information. If that information is withheld from competing suppliers, the utilities may exercise undue market power. For example, one complaint was raised that, even though a customer has given permission to have billing information given to a competitor, the utility could provide it in a form that it is not useful.

### **Pace of Competition**

Workshop participants discussed the trade-off between an early start to competition (with the attendant stranded costs) versus a later start and lower stranded costs because of the ability of the utility to mitigate some stranded costs over time. Some consumers prefer to start competition earlier and advocate that the Commission set a date for the start of competition, rather than wait until most stranded costs have been mitigated.

Some parties contend that introduction of competition requires consumer education so that smaller consumers understand their choices and recognize fraudulent sales pitches. It was argued that rapid introduction of competition would reduce the opportunity for consumer education and increase the chances for dissatisfaction or confusion.

Experience in the gas industry suggests that it may take about 10 years to resolve many of the practical implementation problems as competition is introduced. Costs are likely to be shared among consumers and utilities. Further, there can be large financial impacts of the transition to a competitive market.

### **Participation by Residential and Small Commercial Consumers in Early Stages**

To ensure that residential and small commercial consumers have an equal opportunity to obtain less expensive power, some consumer groups believe that every class of consumers should be able to participate simultaneously at the onset of competition.

However, utilities are concerned about the adequacy of metering smaller consumers so that consumers (or their suppliers) are properly billed and so that the utility does not provide imbalance, scheduling, or other services without compensation. Until technological upgrades are made and the complexities of extensive metering and accounting systems are resolved, small consumers may not be able to participate in the competitive market. One utility indicated that the cost of installing such metering would be \$85 million in its service territory and about three times that amount state-wide. If load shapes of small consumers were to be assumed instead of metered, improper allocation of costs could occur.

Large industrial consumers contend that they are standing ready to receive alternative power supplies and should not have to wait for other consumer classes to have that capability.

The solution for some appeared to be in establishing an optimal time period before all customer classes are allowed to participate. Although rapid advancements in research and development could make the technology available sooner for smaller consumers, it would be expensive if implemented too soon and could impose formidable cost barriers.

Some parties argued that a phase-in of competition should start in urban areas and that aggregators would not be interested in serving rural areas. Therefore, unbundled service and competitive markets appear to be irrelevant for rural consumers. However, the discussion indicated that competition will primarily involve generation of electricity and that the location of the consumer would not be critical in marketing or in selling generation.

One party noted that small consumers would be facing very high prices at peak times if they wanted firm service. However, the discussion also recognized that many consumers would opt for pricing plans that average out prices over the year and that aggregators would take the risk of covering hourly variations in cost with revenues received from their customers over the year.

#### **Selection of Participants in Early Phases**

During the early phases of a phase-in of competition, not all consumers desiring to participate in the competitive market may be able to participate. How should consumers be selected? It was suggested that those consumers who require emergency services or who are disadvantaged should be allowed to choose their power supplies first. Also, some parties indicated that residential consumers should have a minimum equitable percent of the available competitive load.

One method to select participants is to have consumers bid for the right to enter the market (i.e., to leave their utility). Revenues from the bidding would be used to cover stranded costs or to fund other projects such as renewables. However, there was opposition to bidding expressed by some parties because bidding might not produce a fair selection of participants.

Another selection method is a lottery to select participants from a pool of eligible consumers who apply to participate in the competitive market.

In the early phases, it is possible that only a small number of customers could constitute the entirety of consumers participating in the competitive market. For example, one large mine might account for nearly all the competitive power in an early phase. It was suggested that, rather than selecting one mine to participate and preventing another mine from participating, the

best approach may be to limit how much of a customer's load can be procured competitively. That way, competitive disparities in an industry are not created. As the phases progress, a larger percentage would be opened up for those customers.

Who picks the eligible customers? One possible answer is for the utilities to select consumers to participate in the competitive phase-in subject to guidelines proposed by the utilities and approved by the Commission.

Any difficulties with selecting participants for a phase-in could be alleviated by opening up the market to competition in its entirety at one time in lieu of a phase-in.

### **Reciprocity**

Not all utilities in Arizona are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction (i.e., municipalities). Therefore, the Commission cannot require that non-jurisdictional utilities open their markets to competition. However, the Commission may be able to require that any party wishing to sell electricity in the service areas of incumbent jurisdictional utilities abide by the Commission's competition rules, including a requirement that they open their service territories to competition. Incumbent utilities tend to favor a reciprocity requirement so that they can compete in another Arizona utility's service area if that other utility can sell in their service areas.

Municipalities may be precluded by law from expanding their service territories, except for annexations. Therefore, municipalities may not participate in the competitive market, but market forces may still affect municipal utilities.

Some parties are concerned that municipalities such as Salt River Project would have cost advantages in a competitive market because they have historically been able to finance power plants at lower interest rates and have been entitled to low cost federal power.

## **CONSUMER PROTECTION**

### **Effects of Competition on Rates for Ratepayers Not in the Competitive Market**

One goal for restructuring could be to insulate customers who are not yet participating in the competitive market from rate increases caused by restructuring, such as shifting stranded investment recovery onto captive ratepayers. One utility commented that it could not guarantee that rates would not go up for consumers who do not participate in the competitive market. That is, a utility may not be able to cover its costs of serving captive customers without a rate increase if those customers who participate in the competitive market were the high margin customers. Utility revenues would decrease as a result of competition but variable costs may not go down commensurably.

### **Service Quality**

One outcome of competition is that the customer is at risk of a power outage if an adequate supply is not delivered. The competitive nature of the market would put the burden on the consumer to ensure that adequate power is delivered. One way to protect consumers from black-outs would be to make minimum back up requirements explicit in rules on competition. But it was not clear who the requirement would be applied to. Another suggestion was made that a contact person be made available for service problems. Some utilities remarked that service quality should be left to the market place and service providers. Eventually there would be a shake out of poor quality providers.

It was argued that system reliability should not be jeopardized or lowered as a result of competition. A working group could be established to address operational problems. System reliability could be the responsibility of an independent system operator (ISO). An ISO could be developed out of existing institutions such as the Western Systems Coordinating Council.

### **Standard Offers for Nonparticipants in the Competitive Market**

Before competition is fully phased-in, some consumers will continue to be served in a noncompetitive market. For these consumers, utility service could be provided under a standard offer which provides bundled service at regulated rates. Concern was expressed for maintaining basic and vital necessities of people on fixed incomes. In addition, the group discussed whether the obligation to serve applies only to those consumers who do not have a choice or includes consumers who have a choice but do not acquire competitive services.

It was pointed out that utilities need not be the providers of standard offer service. Another party could be selected by a bidding process, for example. The issue of how long standard offer service will be needed was discussed, as was the question of how the Commission will determine that competition is fully established so that a standard offer is no longer needed.

### **Billing Procedures and Filing Requirements**

Utilities recommended that filing requirements be consistent for all service providers. Filing requirements also should build upon public documents already produced, such as annual reports, FERC filings, and regulatory assessment filings. In addition, we may wish to have participants file reports on the occurrences of failure to deliver. Generally, filing requirements should diminish in correspondence with increasing competition.

Regarding billing procedures, it was recommended that a standard policy be adopted with new rules and procedures. Payment obligations also should be clearly specified. A question was raised about how complaints against out-of-state suppliers might be handled.

## STRANDED INVESTMENT<sup>1</sup>

Several utilities indicated that full recovery of stranded cost was essential. However, some consumer groups questioned whether full recovery was appropriate.

The utilities strongly prefer that the issues associated with stranded investment and its recovery be dealt with prior to the implementation of competition. Consumer groups suggest that stranded investment issues be resolved in the next year.

The magnitude of stranded investment cannot be determined without actually implementing competition. Thus, the amount of stranded investment could be determined in parallel with market implementation. The market price of electricity is difficult to forecast and it is necessary to consider fluctuations in market prices to establish levels of stranded investment. The magnitude of stranded investment could be determined by having a utility sell its assets. The discussants could not predict whether such a sale of assets would depress the market price for generation facilities. Cooperatives and perhaps other utilities may not be able to sell off assets, at least without covering indentures.

The question was raised about whether there should be a cut-off date for investments to be eligible for stranded cost recovery. With the 1992 Energy Policy Act, utilities should have expected competition in their investment decisions. Consequently, investments made after 1992 should not be eligible for stranded cost recovery. Some utilities noted that there is little such investment.

There is a possibility that stranded investment could be negative, meaning that the regulated book value is less than market value. There was disagreement over whether transmission and distribution facilities would or could have market values that differ from book values. Some parties believe that regulation of transmission and distribution facilities will keep market values at book value. However, regulators could increase prices for transmission or distribution services to offset stranded investment in generation facilities.

Some parties indicated that the Commission should employ a uniform method for reviewing and estimating stranded investment, applicable to all utilities. Some utilities expressed concern with determining stranded investment on a case-by-case basis. The method should be uniform to avoid bias, but determination of the amount should be utility specific. Stranded

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<sup>1</sup> Stranded cost is a difficult issue. One participant said that it took Vermont months of intensive effort to develop a rule on stranded costs. It was suggested that it will be difficult to complete such a rule by year end. Many felt that the issue of stranded costs should be handled first.

*Summary of Restructuring Workshop of August 12, 1996*

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investment could be recovered through a different charge levied individually by each utility that experiences stranded costs. Further, some parties argued that the timing of stranded cost recovery consider that some utilities need to acquire sufficient revenue to meet borrowing obligations.

One proposal for recovering stranded investment is to impose a sliding scale stranded investment charge, so that those consumers who enter the competitive market early pay more of the stranded costs. This is similar to the bidding proposal discussed above. Those consumers who benefit the most from competition go first and pay the most to enter the market.

The possibility of imposing a single, pooled statewide stranded investment charge was also discussed. The Commission would have to develop a disbursement mechanism to forward the proper stranded investment revenues to each utility. Some consumers oppose a pooled stranded investment charge, fearing that it would shift risks to consumers from utilities.

Another issue in recovery of stranded investment is whether the level of stranded investment (and associated charge) should be set once and for all or should be regularly revised. For example, a preliminary estimate could be made and charges set based on that estimate; later a true-up could be implemented. There is risk that a one-time charge with no true-up could shift the risk of error onto consumers.

Whether stranded investment would stifle competition would depend upon how much stranded investment would have to be paid and how long payments would continue.

## **CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY**

### **Protection of System Benefits**

The regulated utility market produces several benefits that might not occur in a competitive market: an assured source of funding for nuclear power plant decommissioning, demand side management programs, integrated resource planning processes,<sup>2</sup> low income programs, promotion of renewable generation, and environmental protection. These programs, taken as a group, have been termed "system benefits," although the appropriateness of the term was disputed. Such programs could be continued in a competitive market if the Commission required that all consumers, even those who leave utility generation service, pay for them through a non-by-passable charge.

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<sup>2</sup> It was suggested that competition issues be discussed in the resource planning hearings. There was an extensive debate about whether competition issues should (or legally could) be included in the resource planning process and hearings.

It was argued that system benefits related to low-income DSM and social programs should remain distinct programs. There is a need for both, with each receiving an equitable share of benefits. There should be a balance between maintaining the programs and not setting benefits charges too high. However, social programs should not fall victim to cost cutting.

The system benefits charge could be a line item on a consumer's bill, which is consistent statewide and the same charge for all customers.

One utility stated that in a competitive market, the Commission should not require utilities to do DSM. Some parties argued that nuclear decommissioning should be excluded from system benefits charges.

### **Renewables**

Renewables include solar resources, geothermal resources, wind, biomass, and hydropower. Some parties identified solar resources as the type most likely to be applicable in Arizona. Some parties suggested that renewables be restricted to those technologies which do not create large, adverse environmental impacts. Thus, hydropower and refuse burning should be excluded.

A short term focus on current prices could be detrimental to long term energy cost control. If consumers and suppliers look only to cheap electricity on the spot market, there will be little investment in renewables. Over the long term, renewables could be the cheaper alternative, but the investment in research and development of renewables will not have been made, thereby foreclosing a rational option. Some parties thought that investments in renewables may yield additional stranded investments in the future.

Renewables have several potential benefits: they may improve system reliability or "resiliency," especially if they are distributed around the transmission system; they can improve environmental quality relative to conventional generation; and in the long run they may be less costly than alternatives because of falling renewables costs and rising conventional generation costs.

Renewables could be provided through normal market mechanisms, including green pricing. Some consumers are willing to pay more for environmentally better resources and renewables could thus be supported. However, it is unknown whether the level of demand for renewables through green pricing would foster significant price reductions in renewables through improved technology or improved manufacturing.

Some renewables are provided today -- Arizona Public Service Company pointed to its off-grid photovoltaics for remotely located customers. Tucson Electric Power Company noted

its venture in the manufacture of photovoltaics.

Renewables could be fostered through additional efforts, primarily intending to increase demand so that supply costs would fall. Revenues for this additional renewables effort could come from registration charges for entrants into the competitive market. Renewables could also be promoted through a solar portfolio standard in which x percent of competitive generation would be required to come from renewables. Suppliers need not build their own renewable generation facilities, but could purchase "renewable electrons" from another supplier.

Several other methods were suggested to encourage renewables:

- ◆ a working group to explore ways to encourage renewables;
- ◆ remote applications and distributed generation;
- ◆ tax credits for renewables investments;
- ◆ a Federal level commitment to renewables, which might include tradable renewables credits; and
- ◆ a statewide non-by-passable charge.

### **Employee Relations**

Tucson Electric Power Company indicated that bargaining agreements with employees must be respected as the industry moves into competition.

## **ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS**

### **Certificates of Convenience and Necessity**

Traditionally, certificates of convenience and necessity (CC&Ns) in Arizona have been exclusive and not open to competition. Once a CC&N is open and competitive, a determination needs to be made regarding the utility's obligation to serve and its responsibility to customers who leave the system.

The question of whether certificates of convenience and necessity (CC&Ns) for suppliers to end users in the competitive market would be desirable was discussed. New market entrants could be considered public service corporations and would, thus, fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission.

The group also discussed who would be required to obtain a CC&N. The most likely requirement would be that any company serving consumers must obtain a CC&N.

CC&Ns could clarify obligations to serve for new entrants and for incumbent utilities.

They could clarify a distribution provider's obligation to connect. CC&Ns are similar to licenses to do business and may be used to screen out unqualified entrants into the competitive market or to prohibit a supplier from continuing service if he or she has a poor record of service.

Issues to be considered in drafting a proposed rule for retail electric competition include:

- ◆ Determination of the technical and financial capability of new entrants.
- ◆ Uniformity of treatment of all entrants regarding CC&Ns.
- ◆ Removal of barriers to entry so that licensing requirements for new sellers are not needless obstacles to competition.

### **Confidentiality of Market Transactions**

Traditionally, special contracts between utilities and their customers were considered to be public documents. However, in a competitive market, it may be inappropriate to continue to make such information available to the public. For example, a consumer's expansion plans may be revealed to competitors or the bargaining ability of a party may be compromised if previous prices are revealed.

Representatives of utilities and consumer groups expressed an interest in excluding contracts with proprietary information from Commission filing requirements once the competition phase-in begins.

### **Coordination with the Legislature**

Legislation to promote competition would provide greater public acceptability of restructuring. Some parties believe that legislative or constitutional changes are needed before restructuring can be implemented.

*Summary of Restructuring Workshop of August 12, 1996*

**Table 1. Participants in the August 12, 1996 Workshop on Electric Industry Restructuring**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Participants</b>
Commissioners	Renz D. Jennings, Marcia Weeks
Arizona Public Service Company	Bill Post, Jaron Norberg, Herb Zinn, Bill Maese, Bruce Richardson, Sally Stewart, Jack Davis, Keith Van Ausdal, Tom Broderick, Pat Vincent, Ed Fox, Barbara Klemstine, Les Mesh, Ajit Bhatti, Vicki Sandler, Gary Volkenant
Citizens Utilities	John Spotts, Michael Mount, Bill DeJulio, Sean Breen, Dave Townsley, Denny Polosky, Dawn Blanchard, Dan McCarthy
Salt River Project	Jane Alfano, Jessica Youle, Charlie Duckworth
Tucson Electric Power Co.	Charles Bayless, Brad Carroll, Larry Lucero, Joe King, Jim Pignatelli, Caroline Gardiner, Mike DeConcini, Steve Glaser
Arizona Association of Industries	Mike Barrka, Sally Fernandez, Mike Pinnau, Jeff Sutherland
Energy Strategies, Inc.	Kevin Higgins, Matt Madura, Scott Gutting
Arizona Municipal Power Users Association	Michael Curtis, Kent Romney
IBEW, Arizona State Association of Electric Workers	Danny McKinney, Elizabeth Firkins, Tom Gallagher, Joe Carl, William Turner
Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative	Chris Hitchcock, Anselmo Torres
Navopache Electric Cooperative	Dennis Hughes
Graham County Electric Cooperative	Clifford Cauthen
Residential Utility Consumer Office	Greg Patterson
Arizona Consumers Council	Phyllis Rowe, Al Sterman

Summary of Restructuring Workshop of August 12, 1996

Table 1 (continued)

Organization	Participants
Duncan Valley Electric Cooperative	Mike Grant
Meyer Hendricks	Jay Moyes
AARP	Ellen Corkhill, Don Vance
Fennemore Craig	Webb Crockett
Brown and Bain	Mike Patton, Lex Smith
Arizona Community Action Association	Betty Pruitt, Jeff Schlegel
Town of Wickenburg	Tom Candelaria
K.R. Saline	Ken Saline
Robert S. Lynch	Robert Lynch
City of Phoenix	Bill Murphy
Mohave Electric Cooperative	Stephen McArthur
Electrical District #2	Thomas Martin
Wellton Mohawk Irrigation District	Cory Prohaska
Plains Electric	Richard Stribling
Arizona Chamber of Commerce	Marc Osborn
Texas New Mexico Power	Sheryl Johnson
ESE	Doug Hinshaw, Mark Bittner
Arizona Power Authority	Jim Bartlett
Land & Water Fund	Rick Gilliam

*Summary of Restructuring Workshop of August 12, 1996*

**Table 1 (continued)**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Participants</b>
Baltes Valentino	Bob Baltes
RMI	Alan Propper
AFMA	Dwayne Richard
Intel	Marty Sedler, Mike Edwards
Southwest Gas	Ken Jacobs, Brooks Congdon, Wally Kolberg, Keith Brown
Snell & Wilmer	Steve Wheeler
Cyprus Climax Metals	Mike McElrath, Jim Hartegan
Asarco	Jerry Turner
Arizona Utility Investors Association	Bill Meek, T.J. Taub
Power Resource Managers	David Kolk
Ascendix Group	Pat Osorio
San Diego Gas & Electric	Douglas Mitchell
Neidlinger & Associates	Dan Neidlinger
BHP Co.	Andrew Gregorich, Eli Knezovich
Streich Lang	Mark Rinehart, Lou Stahl
City of Mesa	Darrel Pichoff, John Branch
Grand Canyon State Electric Cooperative Assn	Ward Hicks
Arizona Power Pooling Association	Charles Reinhold

*Summary of Restructuring Workshop of August 12, 1996*

**Table 1 (continued)**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Participants</b>
Arizona Senate Staff	Debbie Johnston
Arizona House of Representatives Staff	Teri Grier
MLB Consulting	Maureen Bureson
Douglas C. Nelson P.C.	Doug Nelson
Vantus Energy	Paul McGuire
Calpine Power Services	Mike Rowley
Nordic Power	Andy Baardson
University of Arizona	John Lane
Continental Divide Electric Cooperative	Dick Shipley
Johnson Controls	Steve Montgomery
MCEDA	Roy Jones
Trico Electric Cooperative	Russ Jones, Kevin Ritter
Arizona Electric Power Cooperative	Bob Hewlett, Dirk Minson, Pat Cooper
CSI Cable Systems	Peter Woog
Policy Development Group	Jim West
Others	Barbara Sherman, Ron Yurtasz, William Matthews, Martin McLean, R. Polsdorfer, Elissa Peters
Commission Staff	Roland James, Stan Furman, Gary Yaquinto, David Berry, Kim Clark, Ray Williamson, Prem Bahl, Bob Gray, Barbara Keene, Janet Wagner, Deb Scott, Bradford Borman