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**BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION**

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2007 JAN 19 A 11: 25  
AZ CORP COMMISSION  
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IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF  
GOLD CANYON SEWER COMPANY, AN  
ARIZONA CORPORATION, FOR A  
DETERMINATION OF THE FAIR VALUE OF  
ITS UTILITY PLANT AND PROPERTY AND  
FOR INCREASES IN ITS RATES AND  
CHARGES FOR UTILITY SERVICE BASED  
THEREON.

Docket No. SW-02519A-06-0015

Arizona Corporation Commission  
**DOCKETED**  
JAN 19 2007

DOCKETED BY

**RUCO'S CLOSING BRIEF**

**INTRODUCTION**

The Residential Utility Consumer Office ("RUCO") submits this Brief in support of its position that the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission") should not authorize a rate increase of more than \$2,474,767 for Gold Canyon Sewer Company ("Gold Canyon" or "Company"). The Company's request represents an increase in revenues of 99.13%, and is unwarranted given the facts and circumstances of this case. The Commission should disallow for rate consideration at this time the excess capacity associated with Company's plant improvements and reject the Company and Staff's zero working capital allowance and the Company's rate case expense request. The Commission should adopt RUCO's proposed methodology for calculating property tax expense, depreciation and interest expense, and

1 remove inappropriate expenses associated with payments for memberships, gifts and  
2 refreshments. Finally, the Commission should approve RUCO's recommended rate of return  
3 of 8.54 percent, as well as RUCO's rate design.

#### 5 **DISALLOWANCE OF EXCESS CAPACITY**

6 Excess capacity is capacity over and above what is necessary to provide service to the  
7 existing customer base. From a regulatory accounting standpoint, excess capacity is neither  
8 used nor useful, and is generally excluded from rate base consideration. The Commission  
9 should exclude the Company's excess capacity from rate base consideration at this time.

10 At the end of the test year – October 31, 2005 - the Company's wastewater facility had  
11 a maximum capacity of 1,900,000 gallons per day ("GPD"). A-5 at 4-5<sup>1</sup>. According to the  
12 Company, at the end of 2005, the influent flow rate at the Company's Reclamation facility was  
13 708,000 GPD, so that 62.74 percent of its maximum capacity is not necessary to meet test  
14 year demand. R-9 at 10, R-2. The Company claims that the 708,000 figure represents the  
15 influent rate flow in terms of average gallons per day. Transcript at 266. In terms of maximum  
16 or peak flow, the Company estimated that peak day flow for the test year was 1.1 million GPD.  
17 Transcript at 271. The Company's estimate is consistent with the results of Staff's engineering  
18 report, which estimated test-year monthly peak flow at 1,170,000 GPD during the month of  
19 February 2005. S-1, Schedule MSJ page 10. Based on Staff's monthly peak flow estimate for  
20 the test year, the Company had excess capacity of 730,000 gallons or 38.42 percent of its

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23 <sup>1</sup> For ease of reference, trial exhibits will be identified similar to their identification in the Transcript of  
24 Proceedings. The Transcript volume number and page number will identify references to the Transcript.

1 maximum capacity of 1,900,000 GPD. Without question, the Company had excess capacity  
2 during the test year.

3 Staff further concluded that the Company will utilize 80% of its capacity by mid-2007,  
4 and its capacity can "be expanded to serve the projected growth" by year ending 2010. S-1,  
5 Exhibit MSJ, page 4. The Company agreed with Staff's figures. Transcript at 315 – 316.  
6 Despite Staff's figures, which no party disputes, the Company argues it does not presently  
7 have excess capacity. A-6 at 4. According to the Company, it does not have excess capacity  
8 because the increase in its maximum capacity limits from 1 million GPD to 1.9 million GPD is  
9 necessary to meet future growth, results in cost savings and is the prudent thing to do. Id. at  
10 6, Transcript at 301-303. The Company's argument is misplaced. The issue is not one of  
11 future growth, prudence of the investment, or whether the improvements themselves should be  
12 recovered. RUCO does not take issue with the fact that there may be future growth, that the  
13 improvements are prudent, and that they will likely result in cost savings. Nor does RUCO  
14 argue whether the cost should be recovered. The issue is when the plant should be recovered  
15 and who should pay for it. The regulatory accounting standard which governs this situation  
16 provides for the recovery of plant when it becomes used and useful. The Commission should  
17 disallow the Company's excess capacity at this time since it is not used and useful.

18 The Company claims that capacity should be measured in terms of peak flow per day  
19 and not average flow per day. Transcript at 268. While RUCO disputes the Company's claim,  
20 it is nonetheless of little relevance to the question of whether there is excess capacity, since it  
21 only addresses the **quantity** of excess capacity **and not the issue of whether there is**  
22 **excess capacity**. Nonetheless, there is excess capacity whether the standard is peak flow  
23 per day or average flow per day. As mentioned previously, during the test year, February 2005

1 had the highest peak day flow "when 1,170,000 gallons were treated in one day." S-1, Exhibit  
2 MSJ at page 4. In terms of average peak flow for any given day, the Company admits that the  
3 system's capacity needs have never reached maximum capacity, and "hangs in about 1.1 and  
4 1.2" million GPD. Transcript at 277 – 278. Regardless, the proper measure of capacity flow,  
5 as confirmed in the Company's Preliminary Design Report for the improvements dated April  
6 2004, is the Company's average daily flow. According to the report, its purpose was to  
7 summarize "the preliminary design for the upgrade and expansion of the Water Reclamation  
8 Facility from a maximum-month Average Day Flow (ADF) capacity of 1.0 mgd to a maximum-  
9 month ADF capacity of 1.9 mgd." R-1 at 1. Wastewater storage systems include equalization  
10 basins whose purpose is to accommodate fluctuations in flows. Transcript at 272 – 273. The  
11 Company's Preliminary Design Report noted that the design of the improvements should be  
12 based on "equalized flow loading characteristics rather than peak hour loads." R-1 at 5.  
13 Assuming the system was designed properly, where there is storage as in the subject case,  
14 peak flows are not a relevant measure of needed capacity<sup>2</sup>. The Commission should  
15 measure the Company's excess capacity in terms of ADF, and not peak flow.

16       However, should the Commission determine that the proper measure of capacity is  
17 peak flow, the Commission should consider the peak flow characteristics of the plant and not  
18 the daily flow characteristics. The Company's wastewater facility with the improvements was  
19 designed to have a maximum month flow of 1,900,000 gallons per day. R-1 at 2. In terms of  
20 peak flow, the improvements were designed for a maximum day flow of 3,300,000 gallons per  
21 day and a maximum hourly flow of 5,515,000 gallons per day. Id. Even assuming that during  
22

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23 <sup>2</sup> Peak flow is the proper measurement of capacity when considering utilities that do not have storage, such  
24 as an electric utility.

1 the test year, February 2005 had the highest peak day flow of 1,170,000 gallons, there still is  
2 no question that the Company has excess capacity. S-1, Exhibit MSJ at page 4.

3 RUCO's recommended disallowance for excess capacity is fair and reasonable. Based  
4 on the test year and the influent flow rate of 708,000 GPD reported by the Company, it is  
5 reasonable to disallow 62.74 percent of the Company's capacity as excess and make a  
6 corresponding adjustment. RUCO, however, incorporated a margin of reserve into its  
7 determination and selected the projected flow rate at the end of 2008 of 1,367,000 GPD, which  
8 equates to excess capacity of 28.05 percent. R-9 at 11. Ratepayers should not be burdened  
9 with the net costs associated with 28.05 percent of the test year plant improvements at this  
10 time since a portion of the plant is not used and useful.

11 RUCO is not suggesting that the Company never recover the costs associated with its  
12 excess capacity. In fact, RUCO is recommending the Commission grant the Company an  
13 Accounting Order that will allow the Company the opportunity to recover all of its costs when  
14 its excess capacity becomes used and useful. R-9 at 17. In the meantime, RUCO  
15 recommends the Company establish a deferred depreciation expense account to record the  
16 depreciation expenses on the disallowed plant. RUCO's recommendation is fair, reasonable,  
17 and should be adopted by the Commission.

18  
19 **WORKING CAPITAL**

20 A utility's working capital requirement represents the amount of cash the utility must  
21 have on hand to cover any differences in the time period between when revenues are received  
22 and expenses must be paid. The most accurate way to measure the working capital  
23 requirement is via a lead/lag study. S-18 at 17. The lead/lag study measures the actual lead

1 and lag days attributable to the individual revenues and expenses. No party performed a  
2 lead/lag study in this case. Id. The Company accepted Staff's recommendation of zero working  
3 capital in an effort to eliminate issues between Staff and the Company. R-10 at 4. Staff's  
4 recommendation is consistent with its working capital recommendation in past cases and  
5 appears to be more of a policy consideration, and not based on any analysis. See for example  
6 Staff's working capital recommendations in *Black Mountain Sewer Company, Docket No. SW-*  
7 *02361A-05-0657, Arizona-American Water Company-Paradise Valley Water District, Docket*  
8 *No. W-01303A-05-0405*. Typically, as Staff has admitted in other Class A water utility cases,  
9 most utilities have a negative cash working capital requirement. For example, see the Direct  
10 Testimony of Staff's witness, James J. Dorf, at page 6 in *Arizona American, Paradise Valley*  
11 *Water District Rate Application, Docket No. W-01303A-05-0405* ("Staff has typically found that  
12 most sophisticated utilities will have a negative rather than a positive Cash Working Capital  
13 Allowance.") Contrary to the Company's and Staff's working capital position, RUCO's working  
14 capital analysis considers the Company's operations and maintenance expenses. R-10 at 5.  
15 The result is a **positive** working capital allowance, which as Staff has found, is not typical.  
16 RUCO is less concerned with the numerical result than it is with the Commission sanctioning  
17 an adjustment made for policy reasons that has no regulatory accounting basis. Staff and the  
18 Company's recommendation of a zero working capital allowance ignore the expense and  
19 revenue components of cash working capital and should be rejected by the Commission.

20  
21 **RATE CASE EXPENSE**

22 The Company requests \$160,000 in rate case expense. RUCO is recommending  
23 \$70,000 in rate case expense given the lack of complexity and circumstances of this case. In

1 typical fashion, RUCO requested and the Company submitted details to support the  
2 Company's estimated rate case expense. R-10 at 11. RUCO, however, was unable to  
3 substantiate approximately \$72,000 of the documentation submitted by the Company. Id. at  
4 12. The Company's submission included questionable support for its expenses, bills with  
5 redacted information, and unreasonable amounts for legal and accounting services. R-10-  
6 Exhibit C, R-4. Moreover, the Company would not cooperate with RUCO in its attempts to  
7 mitigate rate case expenses such as copying costs. Id. 12 -13. Finally, during the hearing, the  
8 Company submitted its final rate case itemization, referencing for support documentation it had  
9 previously submitted (i.e. redacted legal bills, etc.) A-23. RUCO is still not able to verify the  
10 Company's actual rate case expense.

11 Perhaps the best example of what RUCO claims is insufficient supporting  
12 documentation is the Company's submission of redacted legal bills. The Company redacted  
13 its bills based on its invocation of the attorney-client privilege. Transcript at 573. The  
14 Company's decision to redact information suggests that the Company views its legal privilege  
15 superior to the Commission's right to know the information. This is the Company's prerogative,  
16 however, the Commission should not approve the Company's recommended rate expense for  
17 several reasons. First, the Company is attempting to make this a legal issue. It is not a legal  
18 issue. No one is challenging the Company's legal privilege. The issue is what is a verifiable  
19 and reasonable amount of rate case expense. Like every expense the Company is seeking to  
20 recover, the Company must verify and justify the reasonableness of the expense. If the  
21 Company cannot provide such substantiation, it should be denied. Second, the burden is on  
22 the Company to provide documentation of its expenses. *In the Matter of the Application of*  
23 *Southwest Gas Corporation for Establishment of Just and Reasonable Rates, Decision No.*

1 68487 at 21. The burden is not on RUCO to substantiate the Company's expenses. It is the  
2 Company, not RUCO that is requesting recovery of the Company's rate case expense. By  
3 redacting its bills, the Company is really asking the Commission to accept its word in lieu of  
4 adequately substantiating its expenses. The Company's own witness, when asked at the  
5 hearing, could not explain what service was performed for certain redacted entries. Transcript  
6 at 461-469. If the Company's own witness does not know what services were performed, then  
7 certainly the expense has not been adequately substantiated.

8 Staff, like RUCO, generally requires supporting documentation to verify an expense.  
9 Transcript at 1164. In the absence of supporting documentation, Staff does not approve an  
10 expense<sup>3</sup>. Id Staff's normal practice is to disallow costs associated with information where a  
11 party fails to provide the information for the reason of attorney/client privilege. Transcript at  
12 1165. Moreover, Staff, like RUCO, believes that the burden is on the Company to verify its  
13 rate case expense recommendation. Transcript at 1167. The Commission does not allow  
14 unsubstantiated expenses for any other type of cost and should not make an exception for rate  
15 case expense.

16 Finally, the Company is not without recourse. RUCO is not suggesting that breaching  
17 the attorney/client privilege is the only way that RUCO can verify the expense. A general  
18 description of the service is sufficient to verify the expense. While this may present a minor  
19 inconvenience to the attorney by having to change the manner in which he/she bills their client,  
20 it is an option which would allow the Parties and the Commission to verify the expense.

21  
22  
23 <sup>3</sup> In this case, Staff did not remove the redacted entries from its recommendation because of time constraints.  
24 Transcript at 1176.



1 **PROPERTY TAX**

2 RUCO recommends the Commission adopt its adjustment to property tax expense  
3 based on the formula used by the Arizona Department of Revenue ("ADOR"). The evidence  
4 shows that the use of the ADOR formula to estimate property taxes is a much more accurate  
5 estimate of actual property tax than the methodology that the Company proposes and any of  
6 the different methodologies the Commission has recently adopted. R-10 at 10. RUCO's  
7 recommended property tax expense calculation was based on the ADOR property tax  
8 formula. R-9 at 17. The property tax formula, as prescribed in ADOR's memo dated January  
9 3, 2001, values water utilities for property tax purposes by multiplying the average of the water  
10 utility's three previous years of reported gross revenues by a factor of two. Id. at 18.

11 The Company has disregarded the revenues required under the ADOR directive and  
12 substituted in its place the adjusted test-year revenues twice, and its proposed level of  
13 revenues once ("Company methodology"). Id. RUCO, for valuation purposes, has included the  
14 test year (ending October 31, 2004) and the prior two years (2002, 2003) as directed by ADOR  
15 ("ADOR methodology"). Since the ADOR issued its memo, enough time has passed so that  
16 actual property tax figures for 2005 are available and the Commission can compare those  
17 figures to the estimated figures derived using the Company's and the ADOR methodologies.  
18 The Company's actual 2005 test-year property taxes were \$143,662.58. R-10 at 10. Using  
19 the ADOR methodology, RUCO's estimated 2005 property tax assessment is \$175,355, a  
20 difference from the actual expense of \$31,692. Id. However, using the Company's  
21 methodology results in an estimate of \$255,139, a difference of \$111,476 from the actual  
22 expense. Id. This evidence clearly demonstrates that once again, ADOR's method more  
23 closely approximates the Company's actual post-test year property tax bill than does the

1 Company and Staff methodology. The Commission should adopt RUCO's approach and  
2 recognize the ADOR methodology as the best measure of actual property tax expense.

3 The Company mistakenly claims that the ADOR methodology uses historical inputs  
4 and ignores the Company's proposed revenues. A-11 at 11. In fact, the ADOR formula using  
5 historical inputs accounts for additional revenues. The application of proposed revenues,  
6 however, to the ADOR formula is likely to overstate property tax expense because of the  
7 timing lags inherent in the assessment and collection of property taxes. The impact of  
8 additional revenues on property tax is not the same as the impact of additional revenues on  
9 income taxes. The effect of additional revenues on income tax is immediate, but the effect of  
10 additional revenues on property taxes is not immediate because property taxes based on the  
11 increased revenues are not paid until more than a year after new rates go into effect. Even  
12 then the increased revenues' impact on property taxes is tempered by the use of two earlier  
13 years' revenues. The full impact of increased revenues on property taxes will not be felt until  
14 four years after new rates go into effect. An understanding of this timing difference is critical  
15 to understand why the ADOR formula using historical inputs is a more accurate method to  
16 estimate property taxes than the use of adjusted and pro-forma revenues. This also explains  
17 why the new rates that will go into effect will not affect property taxes immediately. In RUCO's  
18 experience, the Commission has not gone more than one year beyond the test year to look at  
19 any other expense on the income statement. Here, the test year was 2004, and one year  
20 beyond that is 2005. RUCO established a level of property tax for 2005.

21 The Company and Staff recommend the Commission look beyond one year from the  
22 test year, and consider new rates to estimate property tax expenses more than one year into  
23 the future. Historically, the Commission does not consider a post-test-year expense beyond

1 one year because, among other things, it violates the matching principle and the used and  
2 useful principle. The ADOR formula using historical inputs is forward looking and does  
3 consider the fact that new rates will be set. The Commission should adopt the ADOR formula  
4 using historical inputs.

5 The Company relies on previous Commission Decisions that conclude that RUCO's  
6 methodology, and hence the ADOR methodology, unreasonably understates property tax  
7 expense. A-12 at 12. With all due respect, the evidence in this case once again proves that  
8 the ADOR methodology is the most accurate method. In this case, had the Commission  
9 previously approved the Company's methodology, property taxes for 2005 would have been  
10 overstated by \$111,476, which would have allowed the Company to over earn for several  
11 years until that level of tax was actually assessed. The Commission should adopt the ADOR  
12 methodology.

13  
14 **DEPRECIATION EXPENSE**

15 RUCO recommends the Commission adopt its calculation for depreciation expense  
16 based on RUCO's end of test year gross plant in service using depreciation rates proposed by  
17 the Company. R-10 at 9. This adjustment decreases total year rate base by (\$2,789,016).  
18 Id.

19  
20 **REMOVAL OF INAPPROPRIATE EXPENSES AND INCOME TAX EXPENSE**

21 RUCO recommends the Commission disallow inappropriate and/or unnecessary costs  
22 associated with payments for memberships, gifts and refreshments (\$264). RUCO further  
23

1 recommends the Commission adopt its adjustment to income tax expense to reflect RUCO's  
2 adjusted test-year revenue and expense calculations. (\$81,921).

3  
4 **THE COMPANY'S PREVIOUS REPRESENTATIONS TO THE PUBLIC**

5 RUCO filed its response to the pre-filed testimony of Trevor Hill on November 22, 2006.  
6 RUCO incorporates, by reference, its response into this Closing Brief. In the response, RUCO  
7 reserved its right to add or modify its position after the hearing on this issue concluded. RUCO  
8 has nothing to add to its prior filing.

9  
10 **COST OF CAPITAL**

11 The Commission should adopt RUCO's recommended rate of return of 8.54 percent,  
12 which is the weighted cost of RUCO's recommended costs of debt and equity capital. R-8 at 5.

13 An 8.60 percent cost of common equity is appropriate, given the current environment of  
14 low inflation and low interest rates in which the Company is operating. Id. at 4-8. Moreover,  
15 RUCO witness, Mr. William Rigsby's recommendation is further supported by the Federal  
16 Reserve's recent announcements to hold interest rates steady and Value Line analyst's  
17 projection of interest rate costs. Id. at 3.

18 The Company is recommending a capital structure of 100% equity. R-7 at 49. It should  
19 follow that the Company's cost of equity would be low because of the decreased financial risk  
20 because the Company has no debt. Incredibly, the Company's cost of equity recommendation  
21 is 10.50%, compared to RUCO's recommended 8.60% and Staff's recommendation of 8.40%.  
22 R-8 at 10. The Company's cost of capital recommendation does not make sense and should  
23 be rejected by the Commission.

1 In response, the Company claims that it faces business risk because of its small size  
2 compared to sample companies and the regulatory environment the Company faces in  
3 Arizona. A-11 at 19-20. Even if there is a basis for the Company's argument, it does not  
4 justify a cost of equity recommendation of 10.50% given a 100% equity capital structure. The  
5 Company's cost of capital recommendation should be rejected.

6 Finally, RUCO's 8.60 percent cost of common equity is very reasonable when the  
7 Company's proposed projected capital structure of 100 percent equity is compared with the  
8 capital structures of other publicly traded water providers, which averaged 49.7 percent equity  
9 and 50.3 percent debt. R-7 at 49. Mr. Rigsby's belief that the Company is subject to less  
10 financial risk compared to the other utilities considered in his Cost of Capital analysis is  
11 validated by the lower level of debt in the Company's capital structure compared to the sample  
12 companies. R-7 at 50. Publicly traded companies with a level of debt similar to the  
13 Company's would be perceived as much less risky than the average of the sample and would,  
14 therefore, have a lower expected rate of return on common equity. Id. In order to account for  
15 less risk, it is customary in the regulatory practice to make a downward adjustment to the  
16 Company's cost of equity.

17 This lack of risk is the reason why RUCO is recommending a hypothetical capital  
18 structure of 60% equity and 40% debt. R-7 at 50. It is not uncommon to use a hypothetical  
19 capital structure when a company's capital structure is unbalanced as is the case here.  
20 RUCO's proposed capital structure will bring the Company's capital structure and weighted  
21 cost of capital in line with the industry average, and will result in lower rates to ratepayers. Id.  
22 at 52.

1 In terms of risk, RUCO's recommended 8.60 percent cost of equity, if anything, is fair  
2 and reasonable. RUCO could have easily made a downward adjustment to reflect the fact that  
3 the RUCO's cost of common equity figure was derived from a sample group of companies that  
4 face greater financial risk as a result of higher levels of debt in their capital structure. R-7 at  
5 51. RUCO believes a better method to reflect the lower level of risk is to recommend a  
6 hypothetical capital structure. Id. at 52. RUCO also revised its cost of equity analysis in its  
7 surrebuttal testimony to reflect the decline in stock prices of the publicly traded water utilities  
8 used in RUCO sample as a result of rising interest rates. R-8 at 4. In short, RUCO's cost of  
9 capital recommendation is well reasoned, reasonable, fair, and should be adopted by the  
10 Commission.

## 11

### 12 **RATE DESIGN**

13 RUCO recommends the Commission approve its rate design, which is consistent with  
14 RUCO's recommended revenue allocations and requirements. R-10 at 16.


### 15

### 16 **CONCLUSION**

17 The Commission should not authorize a rate increase of more than \$2,474,767. The  
18 Commission should disallow for rate consideration at this time the excess capacity associated  
19 with Company's plant improvements. The Commission should reject the Company and Staff's  
20 zero working capital allowance and the Company's request for \$160,000 of rate case expense.  
21 The Commission should adopt RUCO's proposed methodology for calculating property tax  
22 expense, as it is the best estimate of future property tax expense. The Commission should  
23 also adopt RUCO's recommendations for depreciation and interest expense, and removal of

1 inappropriate expenses associated with payments for memberships, gifts and refreshments.  
2 The Commission should adopt RUCO's recommended rate of return of 8.54 percent. Finally,  
3 RUCO recommends the Commission approve its rate design which is consistent with RUCO's  
4 recommended revenue allocations and requirements.

5  
6 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19<sup>th</sup> day of January 2007

7  
8   
9 Daniel Pozefsky  
10 Attorney

11 AN ORIGINAL AND THIRTEEN COPIES  
12 of the foregoing filed this 19<sup>th</sup> day  
13 of January 2007 with:

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